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Introduction: The BRICS New Development 
Bank 
Background 
The BRIC acronym was created at the beginning of the 2000s to represent a group of four 
fast-growing economies – Brazil, Russia, India and China – and was changed to BRICS in 
December 2010 with the inclusion of South Africa. At its fifth annual summit in Durban at the 
end of March 2013, the group announced the future establishment of a New Development 
Bank (NDB) to meet infrastructure investment needs in the developing world. At their sixth 
annual summit in Fortaleza the following year (July 2014), the BRICS finally agreed on the 
broader arrangements for the bank – an initial US$50bn fund – and coupled this 
achievement with the launch of the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) – US$100bn 
to be accessed to alleviate members’ financial difficulties (US$41bn from China, US$5bn 
from South Africa and US$18bn from each of the others). The Bank will start lending in 2016. 
Despite this achievement, commentators estimate that even if the NDB eventually increases 
its capital to US$100bn with injections from non-BRICS states and institutions (up to a 
maximum capital share from non-BRICS countries of 45 per cent), most infrastructure needs 
in the developing world will remain unmet. Compared to the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank – whose subscribed capital is US$223bn and US$162bn respectively – 
the additional capital available from the NDB is too small to fill the financing gap (Spratt 
2014). According to World Bank estimates, South Asia alone requires US$2.5tn over the next 
ten years, while overall the BRICS states are estimated to need a total of more than 
US$4.5tn over the next five years for infrastructure development. In consideration of the 
limited amount of lending that the NDB may provide, the bank may create ‘special funds’ – 
i.e. separately funded and managed mechanisms – designed to get round this capital 
constraint (Spratt 2014). 
Although the BRICS countries could choose to finance projects bilaterally, a number of 
interests have pushed them towards the establishment of the New Development Bank. First 
is the need to pool risk and limit reputational costs and second is to increase the legitimacy 
of their operations under the umbrella of South–South cooperation (e.g. China may widen its 
investments in African land deals or Bolivian bauxite mines under this arrangement). 
Along with this progress, some side agreements and arrangements have been made. These 
include a currency swap agreement between China and Brazil; a China Development Bank 
loan to South Africa for the development of the Transnet project (a 28,400km high-capacity 
telecommunications cable connecting the BRICS countries); China–India enhanced 
cooperation on military and security matters; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
set up by China and involving India and the BRICS Business Council (a forum composed of 
private and public business leaders from the BRICS countries). 
More importantly, since October 2013 China has put forward a plan to establish the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which will specialise in financing infrastructure on 
commercial terms (Yu Du 2014). This will alleviate the huge demand for infrastructure 
financing in the Asian region. Unlike the NDB’s registered capital, the AIIB’s will come mostly 
from China. This will counterbalance US and Japan dominance within the Asian 
Development Bank and ultimately increase Chinese influence in Asia (Yu Du 2014). 
Current arrangements of the New Development Bank 
The setting up of the New Development Bank was first suggested by India in early 2012 in 
order to fund its domestic energy and infrastructure needs, namely power transmission, 
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roads and ports. Finally, the objectives of the bank were agreed as (i) providing emergency 
funding at the time of global economic turbulence and (ii) ending or marginalising Western 
dominance. After initial enthusiasm about the creation of the bank, a number of issues 
revealed the differences between and different interests of countries in the group. Some of 
the main points of discussion were: 
1. Capital stock: China proposed that shares in the bank’s capital stock should be 
proportionate to GDP, but this encountered opposition from other members. The final 
solution was to divide the US$50bn founding capital equally among the group’s 
members and to give equal voting rights to all. 
2. Headquarters: The bank’s headquarters will be in Shanghai, after initial opposition 
from India which wanted them to be in New Delhi. 
3. First presidency: India and Brazil competed for presidency of the first term, which 
will rotate every five years. Presidency of the first term was ultimately won by India, to 
be followed by Brazil, then Russia, and finally China in 20 years. 
What has so far made negotiations over certain points difficult is the fact that there are strong 
differences between the BRICS as well as unresolved historical issues, such as the 
contentious borders between China and India. About the former, analysts have pointed out 
the BRICS’ dramatic economic differences in terms of: 
 Size of economy: China’s economy, for example, is about 28 times that of South 
Africa. 
 Trade: Russia, Brazil and South Africa trade predominantly in commodities, while 
China trades in manufactured products and India in services. 
 Account balance: Brazil, India and South Africa record a deficit, while China and 
Russia record a surplus. 
 Political regime: ranging from Brazil, India and South Africa, which are fully 
participatory democracies, to Russia, an authoritarian democracy, and finally to 
China, a single-party socialist state. 
The way the New Development Bank will operate largely depends on how the BRICS 
countries manage to reconcile their views on development cooperation and on the role 
financial institutions must play in that context. That is why there is increasing interest in 
understanding BRICS countries’ experiences with their own national development banks in 
order to derive commonalities and differences in the mandates, strategies, operational 
models, investment strategies and funding sources, etc., of each bank. 
BRICS’ views on development cooperation and their national 
development banks 
In the aftermath of the cold war, development assistance was a prerogative of Western 
countries, which promoted their foreign policy objectives and greatly increased their political 
and economic influence in the recipient countries. Until the mid-2000s, Western countries, 
grouped under the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), represented about 95 per cent of total 
funds allocated internationally for development projects. 
The rules and concepts set out in the OECD-DAC framework, mostly taking the form of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), are recognised as different from the modus 
operandi of the BRICS. These latter countries have worked together to gain voice and to 
influence development policies in international development fora such as the G20. 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the BRICS have gained greater relevance in world geopolitics 
and are less keen on being subject to a Westernised framework of development and 
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development assistance. At the 2011 Busan high-level forum on aid effectiveness in South 
Korea, the BRICS affirmed their critical role in forging a 'new global partnership' for 
development cooperation on an equal footing, emphasising the need to foster commercial 
ties rather than depending on an aid model. With the Durban Summit in 2013, and a year 
later in Fortaleza, the BRICS responded to international demand for sustainable 
development but with no clear consensus on what this concept actually means and how the 
New Development Bank will promote sustainable development in the developing world. 
Despite this lack of consensus, the BRICS’ views on development assistance have conveyed 
a few common features: 
1. BRICS tend to focus mostly on the region in their immediate vicinity. 
2. They have a principle of ‘non-interference’ in the recipient country’s affairs and so no 
conditionality – political, social or environmental – is attached to lending. 
3. Development assistance provided is often strongly connected to access to strategic 
resources or tied to commercial agreements for domestic companies from the donor 
country. 
4. The BRICS engage in South–South cooperation to promote cooperation on an equal 
footing, which can take the form of exchange of practitioners and providing training, 
as well as provision of funds at non-concessional rates. 
5. Development cooperation encompasses trade, aid and investments. 
At the same time, the BRICS’ views on development cooperation, as well as the role played 
by the national development banks in each of those countries, differ substantially. Before 
moving to a brief overview of each individual country’s development cooperation, Table 0.1 
shows some features of the prevailing form of development cooperation of four BRICS 
countries, as found in the literature. 
Table 0.1 Basic principles of development cooperation in the BRICS 
countries 
 Objectives Principles Instruments Sector Ministry 
responsible 
China Political influence in 
Asia 
Economic interest in 
Africa 
Win-win 
cooperation 
Non-
interference 
Tied aid Infrastructure development 
More recently capacity 
building and social 
development 
Commerce 
India Geopolitical influence 
Asia focus, political 
stability 
Economic interest in 
Africa 
Fair 
relationship 
Tied aid 
Technical 
assistance 
Access to markets and 
energy 
Health and education 
(secondary) 
In Africa training and 
purchase of own products 
Competing with China on 
natural resources 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Brazil Latin America 
Portuguese Africa 
Political and 
economic interests 
Horizontal 
cooperation 
Technical 
assistance 
Varied Foreign 
Affairs 
South 
Africa 
Africa, mainly SADC 
Political interest 
African 
renaissance 
 Defence, security and 
education 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Source: Cirera (2013). 
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Brazil 
Following its domestic socioeconomic achievements, Brazil has increasingly engaged in 
development cooperation with less developed countries, thus diminishing its position of aid 
recipient and taking up the role of donor. The terms ‘aid’ and ‘donor’, however, do not truly 
describe what Brazil pursues in international development cooperation. Brazilian support to 
other countries is based on Brazil’s successful domestic experiences, which are then 
‘exported’ and tailored to the needs of the partner country via technical cooperation. The 
most appropriate term for such engagement is therefore South–South cooperation. 
This enhanced engagement in South–South cooperation, introduced by the administration of 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–10), has been interpreted by analysts as related to 
Brazil’s aspiration to improve its own international positioning in the global economy and to 
preserve its regional leadership in Latin America. Most of Brazil’s development assistance 
goes in fact to neighbouring countries, such as Paraguay and Bolivia, and to the broader 
Andean region (Verdun 2013). Brazilian development aid has also supported the Caribbean 
region following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti with programmes in education, health and 
social development. In Africa, Brazil has maintained a leading role in the Portuguese-
speaking countries, mostly by providing support via technical assistance and cooperation 
programmes. 
The main agency in charge of development cooperation in Brazil is the Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency (ABC), which administers received and granted ODA. However, as Brazil’s 
cooperation programme goes beyond aid, the private sector component is also significant. In 
fact, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), which makes little use of ODA, plays an 
important role by providing tied loans for overseas projects in which Brazilian companies hold 
stakes. Not surprisingly, there is some alignment between public and private sector interests 
as the country and the sector focus of Brazil’s development assistance and private 
companies is the same. 
As a key instrument in the implementation of the Brazilian government’s foreign policy, the 
BNDES is subject to supervision by the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade. Since it was founded in 1952, the bank has been the driving force behind 
development of the Brazilian economy. It has also been the only source of medium- to long-
term bank credit for private industry, shifting the focus of its operations according to shifts in 
government priorities. While in the 1990s its operations focused almost exclusively on the 
privatisation of domestic companies, in the 2000s the BNDES extended its operations 
overseas in line with the government’s ‘go global’ policy to increase the internationalisation of 
domestic ‘champion’ companies. 
As will be seen in more detail in the Brazil case study in this report, most BNDES 
disbursements have been received by large companies, while over one-third of funds went to 
the infrastructure sector (mainly electricity and transport connected to the agro-food 
industry). BNDES action is restricted by the statutory clause that it only finances projects 
where Brazilian companies are involved and which increase the export of Brazilian goods. 
Although the BNDES has been praised for its international outreach under Lula da Silva’s 
administration, things have changed under President Dilma Rousseff, and mention of the 
BNDES in foreign policy speeches has disappeared. Time will tell whether the change in 
political administration will have drawbacks in terms of the role of the BNDES. 
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Russia 
Russia inherited a long history of engagement in development cooperation from the Soviet 
Union, dating back to the time when ideological motives made the USSR the world’s largest 
donor and creditor. In 1986, the USSR is quoted as having provided about US$26bn of aid 
(Brezhneva and Ukhova 2013). In the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia shifted 
from donor status to that of net aid recipient. 
The re-emergence of Russia as an active leader of development cooperation occurred in 
2004 when it once again allocated funds from the federal budget for development aid. This 
one-off government decision was followed a year later by Russia’s signing of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This event aligned the country to the OECD-DAC’s 
standard of development assistance, which has created a distance between Russia’s views 
on development cooperation and those of the other BRICS countries. 
In 2007, Russia also issued its Concept of Russia’s participation in international development 
assistance. Prepared by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, the Concept was 
signed by President Vladimir Putin on 25 June 2007. At the same time, the creation of an 
agency for international development assistance was announced. Until this institution is 
formalised, expenditures, priorities and implementation remain subject to decisions taken by 
individual ministries or through their coordinated action. 
In the Concept of Russia’s participation in international development assistance, Russia’s 
priorities for the delivery of development aid are: (i) to build ties with neighbouring countries, 
(ii) to stabilise the region, and (iii) to promote the integration of Russian capital, goods and 
labour into recipient countries. The Concept clearly states the importance to Russia of 
promoting its own political and economic interests through its development cooperation 
initiatives (Government of the Russian Federation 2007). 
A more recent document, Russia’s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept (Government of the Russian 
Federation 2013), sets out the country’s programmatic directions and views on foreign 
affairs. Importantly, the documents mention the power shift from West to East and the 
consequent opportunities that friendlier cooperation with China and India opens up, both 
within the BRICS framework and more widely. Finally, as Russia aims to be a link between 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, the Foreign Policy Concept makes working for the 
establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union a priority. 
Russia’s development strategy follows some of the OECD principles on development 
cooperation (e.g. the 0.7 per cent target and the Paris Declaration). For this reason, out of 
the BRICS countries it is the most in line with the OECD-DAC Committee (European 
Parliament 2012). A considerable amount of financial aid provided by Russia goes through 
multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations and the Eurasian 
Economic Community. Russia was also part of the G8 group until 24 May 2014 when the 
group’s Hague Declaration suspended any form of collaboration with Russia in response to 
the country’s annexation of Crimea and its heavy involvement in the Ukraine crisis. 
Furthermore, the US and EU have imposed an array of sanctions on Russian individuals and 
businesses. In particular, on 16 June 2014 the US imposed sanctions on the Russian 
Development Bank (VEB), restricting the bank’s ability to access US capital markets. 
These recent events have led Russia to deepen its engagement within the BRICS and with 
the G20 group, as well as bilaterally with countries beyond Western influence (Volchkova 
and Ryabtseva 2013). An example is the 30-year gas deal worth US$400bn which it signed 
with China at the end of May 2014 in response to worsening relations with the EU over the 
Ukraine crisis (Luhn and Macalister 2014). The Ukraine crisis also prompted renewed 
impetus for the creation of the New Development Bank in Fortaleza in July 2014. 
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Russian development institutions were created in the 1990s to provide financial support to 
projects of national strategic interest. The creation of these policy banks occurred mostly by 
direct order of the government, which provided the capital for their establishment. These are: 
 The Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank) 
 The Investment Fund of the Russian Federation 
 The Russian Venture Company 
 The Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending 
 The Russian Agricultural Bank 
 The Russian State Agricultural Leasing Company (Rosagroleasing). 
These banks specialise in different spheres, ranging from the promotion of innovations to 
export support, venture business development, promotion of housing mortgage lending, 
small business support, financing of agriculture, etc. By early 2010, the aggregated capital of 
these banks amounted to RUB 1.2tn (US$26.5bn (about three per cent of Russia’s GDP in 
2009) (Maidan 2012). 
In this complex financial context, the Vnesheconombank (VEB) provides investment and 
support for domestic and external projects aimed at boosting the competitiveness of the 
Russian economy. In particular, as this bank is responsible for external operations (insurance 
of export credits, export guarantees and credits) as well as operations that support small 
business development in the whole CIS area, this bank is one of the case studies in this 
report. 
India 
India is not an emerging donor, rather an emerging leader in South-South cooperation. The 
country is in fact heavily reliant on ODA from OECD countries, while at the same time acting 
as a donor in terms of experience and best practice which it shares with other developing 
countries through technical assistance initiatives. 
Since the early 1950s, India has provided support to its neighbouring Asian countries and 
later has moved towards African countries. The oldest of its technical assistance 
programmes, the International Travel and Education Company (ITEC), was founded in 1964 
and entailed the delivery of training by Indian experts in various fields such as information 
technology, education and enterprise development. 
India’s development cooperation is guided by five longstanding principles which were first set 
out in the Panchsheel Agreement signed by India and China in 1954. These principles are: (i) 
mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, (ii) mutual non-
aggression, (iii) mutual non-interference, (iv) equality and mutual benefit, and (v) peaceful co-
existence (OECD 2012). 
Similar to other BRICS countries, India’s perspective on development cooperation is 
therefore based on the values of mutual respect and non-interference in other countries’ 
internal affairs, thus it does not attach any conditionality to its assistance. 
The determinants of India’s engagement in early forms of South–South cooperation were, 
and still are, strictly connected to the country’s need to foster trade and investments that 
favour its domestic products and companies. Trade and investments are conceived by India 
as integral to its development cooperation approach, which aims to engender self-
development through economic and technical cooperation. 
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Among other drivers related specifically to India’s foreign policy in Africa, the literature quotes 
India’s quest for strategic autonomy, its desire to play a role in shaping the global system, its 
need for energy and natural resources, and its diaspora policy (Sahni 2007 in Chidaushe 
2010). 
Much of Indian financial assistance takes the form of concessional lending via lines of credit 
(LOCs) tied in some part to the use of Indian exports and often combined with technical 
assistance and training. The main field targeted by the LOCs is infrastructure development 
(electricity, energy, irrigation and transport). In June 2012, the India Exim Bank reported over 
157 active LOCs worth US$8.2bn. If neighbouring countries in Asia were once the 
geographic focus of India, Africa has recently become the primary focus. 
In terms of its institutional framework, Indian development cooperation is structured around 
three main institutions: the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Export-Import Bank of India (India Exim Bank). Within the MEA, the Development 
Partnership Administration is a recently created division coordinating the activities of Indian 
development aid. The main financial institution dealing with India’s development cooperation 
and overseas lending is India Exim, which is one of the country’s numerous specialised 
policy banks, directly supervised by the Ministry of Finance’s Department of Economic 
Affairs. Although India has a highly fragmented banking system, as will be discussed in the 
India case study in this report, the Exim Bank plays a prominent role in South–South 
Cooperation and the promotion of trade and investments in the developing world. 
China 
China is the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP, although its strategic influence 
in global geopolitics goes much beyond its economic achievements. Indeed, China has a 
longstanding history of engagement in international development that goes back to the 
1960s. At that time, China managed to gain strong influence in Africa, achieving its own 
objectives in exchange for economic cooperation. A remarkable example of the country’s 
strategic behaviour is the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN Security 
Council in October 1971, thanks to votes from African countries at the UN General 
Assembly. Similarly, China has demonstrated preference for extending loans to countries 
adhering to the ‘One-China’ policy (Dreher and Fuchs 2011). 
More recently, after successful implementation of the 1978 market reforms and China’s 
economic boom, motives shaping the country’s foreign policy have changed. The need for 
natural resources as well as market access for its manufactured products has increased 
China’s outward-oriented trade and investment policy and the geographic focus of its 
external operations has shifted accordingly. While previously China secured its influence in 
the Asia-Pacific region, since the 2000s the bulk of its funds have focused on resource-rich 
African countries. The same rationale seems to have guided China’s recent lending to Latin 
American countries, such as its oil-backed deals with Venezuela. 
China has recently placed stronger emphasis on regional cooperation mechanisms. In 
particular, the latest released White Paper on Foreign Aid dedicates considerable attention to 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China-ASEAN summit. These are 
the two main regional cooperation mechanisms through which the country develops relations 
with African and Asian countries (State Council of the PRC 2014). It is argued that the 
reason behind this renewed interest in regional cooperation stems from the need to tackle 
issues which are global in nature, thus requiring more efficient concerted actions (UNDP 
China 2014). China’s enhanced participation in assistance programmes initiated by 
multilateral organisations, amounting to 1.76bn yuan (US$287.8m) for 2010–12 (State 
Council of the PRC 2014) probably fall under the same reasoning. 
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There is often a blurred line between China’s foreign aid and other outward financial flows. 
Development assistance may indeed be characterised by the simultaneous presence of 
commercial requirements and investment clauses attached to the extension of grants and 
loans. For this reason, quantifying China’s aid is difficult, as is the division of labour across 
the several institutions involved in delivering China’s foreign assistance. 
At the top of the system is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Leading Grouping for 
Foreign Affairs, chaired by the CCP General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping. This 
core structure defines the general policy directions for all government organisations involved 
in development assistance. Beneath this body is the State Council, a high-level unit 
responsible for implementing the CCP’s directives and allocating funds at the beginning of 
every budgetary year. 
Under these political bodies, four ministries are involved in the implementation of 
development assistance operations: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Social Welfare. This 
latter ministry is responsible only in those operations relating to humanitarian aid – i.e. in the 
event of a famine or other natural disaster. 
More complex is the division of tasks between the remaining three ministries. The Ministry of 
Finance is responsible for drawing up the foreign aid budget in consultation with MOFCOM. 
Under this category, all operations similar to ODA – concessionary loans, debt relief and 
grants – are financed, as well as trade concessions. This ministry is also responsible for the 
multilateral aid delivered through international financial institutions. 
The main body governing China’s development aid is MOFCOM. This agency is divided into 
two branches: the Department of International Cooperation, managing incoming aid, and the 
Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (DAFC), which supervises outgoing aid. As a 
measure of the increasing relevance of Africa in China’s development assistance, between 
20 and 30 DAFC staff are working solely on Africa (Davies et al. 2008). The DAFC 
coordinates China’s foreign policy with the MOFA. The MOFCOM also manages 
concessional loans, working with the China Export-Import Bank (China Exim), which is in 
charge of evaluating requests. 
Last but not least, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is in charge of institutionalising 
China’s foreign policy, negotiating and defining China’s policy towards all regions of the 
world. With regards to China’s Africa policy, MOFA operates in international fora such as the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), where it has recently started to successfully 
coordinate with MOFCOM in order to formulate a more coherent foreign policy towards 
Africa. In terms of aid, MOFA plays an advisory role to MOFCOM. China’s engagement in 
Africa has also benefited from the establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADF), an independent commercial fund created with a capital inception of US$5bn by the 
China Development Bank in 2006 (see the China case study later in this report for further 
details). 
China’s foreign policy is implemented through two main national development institutions: the 
China Development Bank (CDB) and China Exim. Both institutions play a major role in 
fostering China’s development priorities overseas. While the CDB has mainly been active in 
the agriculture and infrastructure sectors, particularly in Asia and Latin America, China Exim 
has operated in the area of export promotion, and with a stronger presence in Africa. The 
CDB provided US$224.5bn of international funding in 2012, while China Exim provided 
US$35bn. The China case study in the next section of this report explains the CDB in more 
detail and also discusses some of the main features of China Exim. 
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South Africa 
South Africa’s view on development cooperation has been primarily Afro-centric as the 
country’s priority has been to maintain regional security and stability in the African continent 
as a whole and, more specifically, within the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). 
Given its leading economic role in the African continent and its favourable relations with other 
emerging economies, South Africa was invited to join the BRICS and is so far the only 
African country in the G20. Indeed, South Africa is the largest African economy. Its GDP is 
equivalent to a third of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, South Africa has a well-developed 
infrastructure and financial market, and highly ranked institutional development. Over time, 
the country has also built independent economic relations with all the BRIC countries. In 
particular, with India and Brazil it has set up a trilateral development initiative (IBSA), a 
coordinating mechanism envisaged to deepen ties among its members and gain voice on 
global issues in the international community. 
Since the 1994 elections brought an end to the apartheid regime, South Africa’s perspective 
on development cooperation has changed. Before that date, the drivers shaping South 
Africa’s development assistance were mainly political, reflecting the regime’s efforts to gain 
acceptance and votes within the UN. During this period, the bulk of South Africa’s foreign 
development assistance supported the ‘homelands’, territories set aside for black inhabitants 
within South Africa, which were not recognised by the international community. Established 
in 1983, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) functioned as a major channel of 
South African aid to the homelands, also providing technical assistance to these territories. In 
addition, the DBSA has supported the development of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), agriculture, mining, water, energy, transport and social infrastructure development in 
the whole country and reached out into the broader Southern Africa region after its mandate 
was reviewed in 1997. 
Largely unstrategic and denoting a lack of emphasis on commercial interests, South Africa’s 
development assistance in the post-apartheid era has been guided by three main objectives: 
1. to strengthen Africa’s institutions 
2. to support the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) 
3. to foster dialogue and cooperation in bilateral political and socioeconomic relations. 
Although South Africa’s development assistance is not formally tied, most of the projects 
financed still make use of South African inputs in the form of skilled labour and/or technology. 
The country’s development assistance has been largely carried out via peacekeeping, post-
conflict reconstruction, and research for development. South Africa has also delivered 
humanitarian assistance in the event of natural disasters. 
Since 2000, South Africa has opened up to tripartite partnerships, collaborating with a 
traditional donor to deliver development assistance programmes to a recipient country 
(usually in Africa). Its outgoing development assistance in 2006 was estimated at between 
US$363m and US$475m, equal to 0.18 per cent of GDP (Braude et al. 2008). Around three-
quarters of this was channelled through multilateral organisations and regional development 
banks. 
South Africa is also a recipient of development assistance. However, since 2010, ODA 
directed to South Africa has seen a gradual decline, while concessionary loans in the field of 
green energy and the climate change agenda have increased. 
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The institutional framework of development assistance in South Africa has no central agency 
appointed to the overall management of programmes. The institutions involved in the 
process belong to several government departments (with the Department of Defence and the 
Department of Education accounting for the bulk of expenditures for development 
assistance) as well as parastatals, government agencies, and other statutory bodies. Within 
this last category are the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC), the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the National Research Fund (NRF), and the South 
African Management Development Institute (SAMDI). 
In this fragmented framework, the main vehicle for disbursement of development assistance 
funds since 2000 has been the African Renaissance Fund (ARF), an agency created with the 
broad mandate of funding ‘activities of cooperation, democracy and good governance, 
conflict resolution, social and economic development, humanitarian and disaster relief, 
technical cooperation and capacity development’ (Besharati 2013). The ARF is supervised 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which receives recommendations on the disbursement of 
funds by an Advisory Committee composed of the Director General of Foreign Affairs, three 
members nominated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and two members nominated by the 
Minister of Finance. The ARF is meant to be reformed and integrated in the South African 
Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), although this transformation has already been 
under discussion for several years. However, the SADPA is expected to be set up soon as 
South Africa needs to better coordinate its aid and development cooperation activities. The 
SADPA will have a projected annual budget of 500m rand (US$50m) and will overcome the 
ARF’s shortcomings, notably bureaucratic and structural delays, poor coordination, and lack 
of strategic direction in development cooperation activities. 
Due to the historical role played by the DBSA in developing the infrastructure of the country 
and the broader Southern Africa region, the South Africa case study in this report analyses in 
more detail the functioning and operations of this development bank. 
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1 China Country Profile: The China 
Development Bank 
1.1 Summary key features 
 The China Development Bank (CDB) is a financial institution with ‘full ministerial rank’ 
(Downs 2011: 6), as it is under the direct control of the State Council, China’s highest 
governing body. 
 As a ‘hybrid’ policy-commercial bank, the CDB conducts both policy and commercial 
operations. It played a major role as a ‘policy bank’ during the 2008 global financial 
crisis and domestically it is supporting the urbanisation of the country through the 
government’s local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). At the same time it is 
engaged in various commercial operations to support Chinese state-owned 
companies expanding abroad in the name of the ‘going global’ strategy and to secure 
long-term access to energy and other natural resources. 
 Thanks to the ‘quasi-sovereign’ nature of its bonds, the CDB is able to provide longer-
term loans than other Chinese banks (Provaggi 2013). 
 Being a policy bank that also operates as a commercial bank, the CDB does not 
provide concessional loans (Stuenkel 2013; Provaggi 2013; Sanderson and Forsythe 
2013). Interest rates are reported to be higher than those of other domestic 
(commercial) banks and international banks (such as the World Bank). 
 The CDB implements rigorous risk management mechanisms both for the approval of 
domestic loans (Downs 2011: 14) and foreign deals (risks waived by the provision of 
oil as collateral, e.g. in the case of Venezuela). As a way to mitigate credit risk the 
bank directly supervises the money transfer both in domestic asset-backed loans 
(e.g. Tianjin) and in overseas resource-backed loans (e.g. Venezuela), so as to be 
sure that loans are paid back. 
 No conditionality is attached to its credit. However, domestic loans are secured with 
land sales that pay off the debt service; external operations are often energy-backed 
loans. 
1.2 Background 
The CDB was established at the time of the central government’s 1994 financial reforms 
together with two other banks, the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the Export-
Import Bank. The three institutions were funded as ‘policy banks’, with the objective of 
providing policy-driven lending, while China’s other state-owned banks – the Bank of China, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of 
China – would act as ‘commercial banks’ and deal with regular corporate lending (He 2010). 
In separating policy from commercial operations, the government intended to gain control 
over lending management, so as to promote more rational, market-based lending in 
commercial banks (Steinfeld 1998: 71). 
The history of the CDB has been intimately connected with that of the person who presided 
over the bank for more than 15 years, Mr Chen Yuan. He took office in 1998, when the bank 
had serious profitability problems, with a non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of over 40 per cent 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: xvi). Under his guidance, the bank improved its risk 
assessment procedures through an enhanced mechanism of independent assessment (see 
notes on the organisational structure below) and managed to drop the NPL ratio to below     
1 per cent. The CDB has since aspired to become a sound top-ranking international bank 
(Downs 2011: 8), committed to both achieving commercial profitability and pursuing national 
interests. 
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One of the most striking features of the financial system in China is that the CDB and other 
Chinese commercial banks are on an uneven playing field. First, the CDB has a natural 
structural advantage over the purely commercial banks as it is financed through long-term 
bonds (up to 30 years) rather than via short-term deposits. Second, commercial banks are 
subject to the rules and restrictions of the Commercial Bank Law, which prevents banks from 
having an outstanding balance of loans to a single borrower exceeding 10 per cent of the 
bank’s capital balance (Downs 2011: 62). As it is also a policy bank, the CDB can conduct 
both commercial and investment banking activities (Downs 2011: 19; Zhong and Ning 2003). 
For the same reason, the CDB has greater freedom in major overseas lending than other 
Chinese commercial banks as it is not subject to China’s Commercial Bank Law. Finally, the 
CDB has a historical advantage, being the preferred lender by local governments due to its 
strategy of financing LGFVs (Downs 2011: 18). 
Given its position as favourite, the CDB is able to provide bigger loans with longer maturities, 
both domestically and internationally. So far, the majority of CDB loans to Latin American 
countries were in fact equal to or greater than US$1bn (Gallagher et al. 2012). 
 
Box 1.1 The CDB vs the China Exim Bank 
Both the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Exim Bank have played a special role in 
fostering China’s international outreach by supporting the national ‘going out’ strategy and financing 
development and commercial projects in a number of foreign countries throughout Africa and Latin 
America. The two banks have created the conditions for business development overseas and have 
engaged in infrastructure development projects (roads, power plants, oil and gas pipelines, telecom, 
and water projects). They have also supported the establishment of Chinese businesses overseas 
in the energy, mining and industrial sectors (Wang 2007). 
Although both banks are under the direct control of the State Council and supervised by the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, they operate under different mechanisms and have slightly 
different mandates. The CDB, as we will examine in the following pages, is a bank tasked with 
implementing the national economic strategy and allocating resources in order to foster China's 
economic and social development. The China Exim Bank is instead the world’s largest export credit 
agency, responsible for facilitating the export and import of Chinese products. In 2009, it approved 
over US$70bn, more than the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation, and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) Exim combined, as noted 
by the World Resource Institute (WRI 2013). 
The China Exim Bank offers different products in support of China’s trade, namely export credits, 
concessional loans, and loans for contracting and outbound investment. It is important to stress that 
the China Exim Bank is the sole provider of Chinese government concessional loans (Wang 2007). 
Also, it has been noted that while the CDB has more stringent lending terms – i.e. higher interest 
rates – the China Exim Bank provides loans at comparatively lower rates than other international 
providers such as the World Bank and the US Exim Bank (Gallagher et al. 2012). 
The two banks also have different sources of funding. The CDB is financed through bonds issued in 
both the domestic and international markets, while the China Exim Bank receives funds from the 
People’s Bank of China and public institutions, as well as interbank deposits (Friends of the Earth 
US 2014). 
As of 2013, the China Exim Bank had 21 domestic business branches and three overseas 
representative offices, namely the Representative Office for Southern and Eastern Africa, the Paris 
Representative Office and the St Petersburg Representative Office. Its total assets as at                
31 December 2012 were 1,559bn yuan (approx. US$ 249.3bn) and its net profit equalled 3.8bn 
yuan (approx. US$ 607.8m). From 2001 to 2010, it provided over US$67.2bn of loans to Africa 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013). 
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Despite this competition between the CDB and other banks, in some cases synergies may 
arise. In fact, CDB lending has had the effect of attracting further investments, thus 
functioning as a sort of ‘guarantee’ for companies wishing to get further short-term loans from 
other Chinese commercial banks (Provaggi 2013). Overseas, CDB lending generally seems 
not to overlap with that of Western banks, with the exception of Brazil and Argentina which 
has received loans from both Chinese and Western banks (Gallagher et al. 2012).  
1.3 Origin and mission statement 
The China Development Bank (CDB) was founded in March 1994 and is under the direct 
jurisdiction of the State Council. As reported on its website, the current CDB mission is: 
To provide medium- to long-term financing facilities that assist in the development of 
a robust economy and a healthy, prosperous community. It aligns its business focus 
with national economic strategy and allocates resources to break through bottlenecks 
in China's economic and social development.1 
Since its foundation, the CDB’s main objective has been to support national macroeconomic 
policies by focusing on the development of infrastructure and basic key industries, i.e. 
electric power, road construction, railways, petroleum and petrochemical, coal, postal and 
telecommunications, agriculture and related industries, and public infrastructure. 
1.4 History 
The first and major event affecting the nature of and role played by the CDB goes back to the 
central government’s 1994 budget reform which forbade local governments from running 
deficits and selling bonds (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 4). This situation put local 
government administrations needing funds to support the development of infrastructure in 
urban areas under pressure. In this context, the CDB started financing local governments 
through Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs), companies set up with the specific 
purpose of enabling local governments to borrow money to develop urban infrastructure. In 
this way, the CDB has been the driving force behind China’s urban development. The Asian 
financial crisis further fuelled this role by giving new impulse to the demand for funding in the 
housing market. 
In its initial years, however, CDB performance was poor. Before Chen Yuan took office, in 
fact, the CDB had accumulated a high non-performing loan (NPL) ratio amounting to over 40 
per cent. The whole financing system in China favoured this negative outcome. The high 
saving propensity of the Chinese combined with the guaranteed three per cent spread 
between what is paid on deposits and the lending-out rate meant that the Chinese banking 
system ended up favouring any sort of investment, including non-profitable ones, without any 
risk control against insolvency. Much of this lending went to inefficient state-owned 
enterprises and financed state projects with no expected returns. 
Between 1997 and 2001, after Chen Yuan had become head of the CDB, the NPL ratio 
reduced dramatically (from 42.65 per cent to less than 5 per cent in 2001) (Downs 2011: 12). 
This was achieved thanks to a series of strategies put in place to improve the bank’s 
profitability: the establishment of a better credit risk assessment, the implementation of land-
backed deals, and market-based mechanisms to raise funds. 
In the early 2000s, when the national priority in supporting growth became the provision of 
sufficient energy and natural resources, the CDB took on a new role. It started to finance 
both domestic companies expanding into this sector overseas and foreign companies 
providing China with energy and natural resources. In 2003, the CDB approved a US$230m 
                                               
1 www.cdb.com.cn/english/index.asp (accessed 27 January 2014). 
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loan to the state-owned company Sinochem to finance its acquisition of Atlantis, a petroleum 
company based in several countries. Since then, several foreign energy acquisitions have 
been financed by the CDB. 
External operations in the field of energy and natural resources also entailed the 
development of infrastructure to supply China with oil and mineral resources. In 2006, the 
CDB financed the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline and later the Central Asia-China natural gas 
pipeline. 
The enhanced engagement abroad made it necessary for the CDB to internationalise. Since 
2006, the bank has dispatched its teams in several countries overseas and reorganised its 
structure to meet the new needs (see organisational structure in Section 1.6). 
The process of internationalisation also required diversification of the CDB portfolio. In 2003, 
the bank issued the first US$ bond in China and in September 2005 it sold a US$1bn asset-
backed bond in New York. In July 2007, the CDB issued its first yuan-denominated bond in 
the Hong Kong market (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 70). 
When the collapse of oil prices in 2007–08 favoured Chinese foreign investments in energy 
and resource assets, the CDB strongly supported the investment of Chinese companies 
abroad (e.g. the US$30bn loan to the China National Petroleum Corporation in 2009) as well 
as selling off bonds abroad. 
As overseas activities increased, the CDB has placed increasing emphasis on issuing yuan-
denominated bonds as a strategy to limit foreign exchange costs and reliance on the US 
dollar (Friends of the Earth, Banktrack 2012). In 2011, yuan-denominated bonds reached 
61.5bn yuan. The bond with the longest maturity was sold in July 2012 in Hong Kong with a 
maturity of 20 years (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 79). 
During the 2008 financial crisis, the CDB acted as a countercyclical lender. While the central 
government provided just 1.18tn yuan of the 4tn fiscal stimulus, the state-owned banks 
provided the remainder. The CDB took the lead, with 147 LGFVs reported to have received 
loans and lines of credit from the CDB for an amount of 928.6bn yuan from 2009 to 2011 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013). 
1.5 Mandate and strategy 
1.5.1 Domestic operations 
CDB domestic operations were largely driven by the needs arising from China’s rapid 
urbanisation. The CDB has used the LGFVs – companies set up by local governments – to 
finance infrastructure development through low-interest, asset-backed loans. This way of 
operating gave birth to what is also known as ‘the land-backed local government finance 
model’ (see Box 1.2). 
1.5.2 External operations 
The CDB engaged in a series of cross-border energy and natural resource deals in order to 
align to the national government’s ‘going global’ strategy, thus financing the expansion of 
Chinese firms abroad and securing long-term access to natural resources for China         
(see Box 1.2). 
Among operations that support the ‘going global’ strategy, the CDB contributed to the 
establishment of China’s special economic zones in Nigeria, Mauritius, Egypt, Algeria, 
Zambia and Ethiopia, where Chinese firms could find profitable investment opportunities as 
well as gain contracts for building infrastructures. To foster deeper Sino-African relations, the 
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Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000. The FOCAC aimed 
to institutionalise dialogue between China and Africa in order to promote African economic 
development in the framework of South–South cooperation. Through FOCAC, China has 
upgraded its Africa policy over the years, thus becoming a key trading and investment 
financing partner for African countries. In 2006, during a FOCAC summit, President Hu 
Jintao committed further a US$2.3bn to Africa and announced the creation of the China-
Africa Development Fund (CADFund) (see Box 1.5). 
More recently, the pressing need for energy has pushed China and, as a consequence, the 
CDB, to turn attention to the renewable energy sector (see Box 1.6). 
1.6 Organisational structure 
The CDB has 32 branches and four representative offices across China. Each branch has 
responsibility for a different part of the world, e.g. Chongqing for the Balkans, Henan for 
South Africa and Sichuan for Nepal, among others (Downs 2011). There are two CDB 
representative offices in Egypt and Russia. The CDB-funded CADFund has offices all over 
Africa. 
The CDB also has a securities venture, a private equity division – CDB Capital – a leasing 
arm and credit guarantee company (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 41). It has a special 
system in place for credit risk assessment that relies on four separate bureaux for the 
evaluation of loan applications. Final approval is given by a lending committee headed by a 
rotated vice-governor (Downs 2011: 14; Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 59). 
In 1999, Chen Yuan set up an independent International Advisory Council which has been 
meeting annually ever since. The council – composed of economists and governors of 
international reputation – discusses relevant global financial issues and management 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 62). 
In 2008, the CDB was restructured as a commercial bank. Its shareholders are: 
 the Ministry of Finance (MoF), which manages the fiscal revenues and expenditures, 
formulating fiscal and taxation policies and performing financial supervision 
 Central Huijin Investment Ltd (Huijin), a wholly state-owned limited liability company, 
which acts as an investor in key state-owned financial institutions 
 the National Council for Social Security Fund, a government agency responsible for 
the management and operation of the National Social Security Fund. 
Table 1.1 China Development Bank shareholders 
 Capital contribution Number of shares Total (%) 
Ministry of Finance 153.9bn yuan (approx. US$25.5bn) 153,908,000,000 50.18 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd 146.092bn yuan  
(approx. US$23.4bn) 
146,092,000,000 47.63 
National Council for Social 
Security Fund 
10m (approx. US$1.6m) 6,711,409,395 2.19 
Total 310bn (approx. US$49.7bn) 306,711,409,395 100 
Source: China Development Bank (2014). 
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There are two Boards reporting to the bank’s shareholders: 
 the Board of Directors, made up of 14 directors plus two independent non-executive 
directors 
 the Board of Supervisors, appointed directly by the State Council and composed of 
five members. 
1.7 Sector focus 
The main focus of CDB operations has been infrastructure and industrial projects (mainly 
relating to energy, natural resources and transport). It is estimated that until 2011, half of 
CDB’s loans went to local government lending (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 32) for 
infrastructure development. Among the key large infrastructural projects are the Three 
Gorges Dam, the Shanghai Expo and the Olympic Games. Along with these major 
operations, the CDB has also supported the implementation of social programmes such as 
slum upgrades, migrant worker training and disaster relief. 
Figure 1.1 Sector distribution of loans and advances to customers (as at 31 
December 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from China Development Bank (2013). 
Table 1.2 CDB loans by sector, percentage of total 
 2001 2008 2012 
Public infrastructure 9.6 28.8 20.6% 
Roads 15.9 20.3 17.2% 
Power 36.7 15.7 11.4% 
Petrochemicals 4.2 4.4 7.3% 
Railways 14.4 3.2 7.2% 
Telecoms 3.3 2.3 1.4% 
Agriculture – 2 2.2% 
Coal – 1.2 1.3% 
Other 16.1 22.1 31.5% 
Source: China Development Bank (2013). 
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1.7.1 Domestic operations 
The main focus has been on urban infrastructure: roads, bridges, railroads and 
communications, ports, electric power. More recently, in the framework of China’s clean 
energy agenda, the CDB has financed Chinese renewable energy projects. 
1.7.2 External operations 
In the CDB’s annual financial reports there is no sector breakdown of the overseas lending. 
However, it was reported by a CDB official in 2009 that the majority of CDB foreign currency 
lending abroad goes to energy and natural resource projects (Friends of the Earth, Banktrack 
2012: 7). 
Also, in Gallagher et al. (2012) it is reported that over two-thirds of the outstanding loans to 
Latin America went to loans-for-oil deals. 
In Ethiopia, CDB financing was directed to the manufacturing industry, e.g. leather and glass 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013). 
1.8 Geographic focus 
Table 1.3 Total CDB operations by geographic area (in yuan millions) 
 Eastern 
China 
Central 
China 
Western 
China 
Overseas Total 
Deposits with banks and other financial 
institutions 
69.34% 0.22% 0.25% 30.18% 100.00% 
Derivative financial assets 35.23% 12.42% 3.65% 48.71% 100.00% 
Loans and advances to customers, net 40.07% 19.39% 24.04% 16.49% 100.00% 
Available-for-sale financial assets 97.89% 1.29% 0.73% 0.09% 100.00% 
Debt securities classified as receivables 98.57% – – 1.43% 100.00% 
Other financial assets 69.40% 6.18% 10.85% 13.57% 100.00% 
As at 31 December 2012 46.10% 17.02% 20.85% 16.03% 100.00% 
As at 31 December 2011 45.33% 18.19% 21.31% 15.17% 100.00% 
Source: China Development Bank (2013). 
1.8.1 Domestic operations 
The CDB has focused on urban areas, predominantly in the eastern regions. 
Table 1.4 Outstanding loan balance (main activity) 
 Eastern 
China 
Central 
China 
Western 
China 
Overseas 
Loans and advances to customers, net 40.08% 19.39% 24.04% 16.49% 
Source: China Development Bank (2013). 
1.8.2 External operations 
The CDB does not release information on the geographic focus of its lending overseas. 
However, the literature reports some figures that help in quantifying CDB lending to different 
areas of the world. 
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Some authors have estimated that the bank’s outstanding loans to Africa equalled 
US$13.7bn as at July 2012 (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 103). Our calculation, based on 
Chinese development finance activities in Africa from 2004 to 2012 returned a total of slightly 
less than US$10bn.2 
CDB loans to Latin American countries for the period 2005–11, however, amounted to 
approximately US$62bn, according to the data collected for a recent study by Gallagher et al. 
(2012). Most of those loans went to Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina. 
Russia and Central Asia reported US$28bn in financial support by mid-2011 (Friends of the 
Earth, Banktrack 2012: 10). 
According to ThompsonOne and Bloomberg League tables, which list 158 CDB deals 
between 2002 and 2011, the highest number of transactions occurred with Taiwan (28) and 
Australia (26), followed by Indonesia (12) and Russia (10) (Friends of the Earth, Banktrack 
2012: 10). 
1.9 Financial performance 
Table 1.5 Selected financial indicators (as at June 2013) 
Total equity 497,851m yuan (approx. US$79,853m) 
Total assets 7,520.3bn yuan (+20.28% year-on-year) (approx. US$1,205bn) 
Total profits (as at 31 March 2012) 64,139m yuan (approx. US$10,283m) 
Net loans and advances 6,237bn yuan (approx. US$1,000bn) (82.93% of the total assets) 
– of which 78% (4,872bn yuan) in yuan-denominated loans and 
22% (1,364bn yuan) in foreign currency-denominated loans 
Net operating income 83.4bn yuan (+36.97% year-on-year) (approx. US$13.3bn) 
Non-performing loan ratio 0.30% 
Return on assets ratio 0.92% 
Return on equity ratio 13.37% 
Source: China Development Bank (2012). 
1.10 Sources of finance 
Low-interest bonds with long-term maturities of up to 30 years are the main source of the 
CDB’s funding (as opposed to commercial banks that rely on deposits). 
Until 1998, CDB bonds were bought by state-owned commercial banks at a fixed rate. Since 
1998 they have been sold on the Chinese interbank bond market, i.e. through market 
auctions at a rate that varies according to the commercial interest rate and issuance volume 
(He 2010). Until 2011, the bond market rates were determined by lending and deposit rates. 
As CDB bonds are guaranteed by the central government and the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC), the PBC would have to provide short-term loans if the CDB had a liquidity shortage 
(Friends of the Earth, Banktrack 2012). CDB bonds have a zero risk weighting (i.e. they are 
‘quasi-sovereign’ bonds), which means that banks do not have to hold any capital against 
them. Commercial banks can buy CDB bonds by using people’s savings (deposits) and earn 
return at no risk (yields on CDB bonds are higher than the deposit rate but lower than the 
lending rate). 
                                               
2 Data collated from http://aiddata.org/. 
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Since 2000, the CDB has also been able to underwrite corporate bonds and, after 2005, sell 
asset-backed securities (Downs 2011: 17). 
The CDB exploited the market-based mechanism to raise funds. After 1998, it began selling 
bonds on the Chinese interbank bond market. In 2000, it obtained a licence to underwrite 
corporate bonds and in 2005 sold the first asset-backed bond in New York. 
1.11 Instruments deployed 
1.11.1 Domestic operations 
The CDB used LGFVs to finance the development of infrastructure by local governments. 
However, LGFV projects produced very few returns as the projects barely covered their 
operating costs. However, returns from these LGFV projects/infrastructure investments were 
guaranteed by the selling or leasing of the land local governments had expropriated and 
which was used for the development of infrastructure projects via the LGFVs. 
 
Box 1.2 The land-backed local government finance model via local 
government financing vehicles (LGFVs) 
The land-backed local government finance model relies on the use of local government financing 
vehicles (LGFV) – companies set up by local governments – to provide local administrations with 
the necessary funds to complete infrastructure projects. Loans to the LGFVs are provided at low 
interest rates and asset-backed. The collateral most commonly used in these deals is land; the 
LGFVs sell or lease the land provided to them by the local government (mostly land expropriated 
from farmers for little compensation) in order to repay the interest on the CDB loans. Land 
selling/leasing represents an extra source of revenue for local governments and has been subject to 
rampant inflation. The CDB’s financing of LGFVs has ultimately generated a self-sustaining cycle 
that increases the value of land with the provision of more services and infrastructures. Thus, the 
value of the land covers the interest on the loans. 
Examples 
Wuhu 
Years of agreement 1998–2010 
Type of instrument Loans 
Details The CDB issued bonds and lent money to the city of Wuhu via an LGFV 
company which borrowed money to build local infrastructure against assets 
(mainly land) that the local government had transferred to it. The LGFV was 
able to repay the CDB from the sale of the land which meant that the local 
authorities did not incur any debt. As building infrastructure increased the 
value of the land, the LGFV was able to borrow more money. The system 
relied on the unfair expropriation of land from farmers, with little or no 
compensation. 
Borrower Wuhu Construction Investment Company 
Amount 5.39bn yuan (approx. US$864m) 
Sector Urban infrastructure 
Term Ten years 
Loan rate n/a 
Estimated returns 
on investment 
Wuhu Construction Investment Company assets increased from 319m to 
21.4bn yuan 
Conditions Loans and interest were repaid through land sales 
Comments CDB lending brought in more lending from other institutions 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 1.2 (cont’d) 
Tianjin 
Year of agreement 2003 
Type of instrument Loans 
Details CDB loans went to Tianjin’s land bank to finance the development of local 
infrastructure. The land bank could then sell the land to pay back the loans. 
The process was under the direct control of the CDB as the land revenues 
were stored in the land bank’s CDB account, from where the loans and 
interest were deducted directly. 
Borrower City’s land bank (later set up as an LGFV) 
Amount 50bn yuan (approx. US$8bn) 
Sector Infrastructure development 
Terms 24bn yuan soft loan 
26bn yuan hard loan 
15 years’ maturity 
Loan rate On average, 8 per cent below normal loans 
(10 per cent from the benchmark rate for the soft loan; 10 per cent from the 
benchmark rate for the hard loan for the first five years) 
Estimated returns 
on investment 
Land sales income increased by 20 per cent between 2004 and 2006 and by 
67 per cent between 2008 and 2009 
Conditions 15 years of land usage rights sales (used as collateral and as a source from 
which to pay back the loans) 
Comments The biggest loan agreement in China at the time (Sanderson and Forsythe 
2013: 23) 
1.11.2 External operations 
The CDB operates under different mechanisms to promote Chinese investments overseas: 
1. Energy-backed loans: the CDB finances foreign governments and national oil and 
gas companies 
2. Loans and lines of credit to support ‘going global’ Chinese state-owned enterprises 
3. Equity funds: the CDB takes equity stakes in Chinese companies operating abroad. 
 
Box 1.3 The CDB’s energy-backed loans 
In line with China’s priority of securing energy to meet its national development needs, the CDB 
extends loans to countries rich in oil and natural resources. To reduce the risk of payment default, 
the CDB secures the agreements with energy-backed contracts and sets up a system for direct 
control of the loan payments through the borrower’s CDB account. Loans, interest and other fees 
are deducted directly from the oil revenues, which are deposited by the foreign oil companies into 
their own CDB accounts. Other conditions may be attached to these types of deals, such as the 
borrower’s obligation to purchase equipment from Chinese firms or to contract Chinese companies 
to implement infrastructure projects. 
The CDB’s energy-backed loans serve three objectives: 
1. to secure long-term access to natural resources 
2. to provide market opportunities for the Chinese firms 
3. to reduce the risk of payment defaults. 
Analysis of bilateral oil flows through data registered with Chinese customs indicates that not all oil 
purchased by China’s state-owned oil companies is then shipped back to China (Sanderson and 
Forsythe 2013). This finding supports the hypothesis that China would sell oil to American countries 
rather than using the whole amount for domestic needs (see the Venezuela case). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 1.3 (cont’d) 
Examples 
Venezuela 
Year of agreement (a) 2008; (b) 2009; (c) 2010; (d) 2011; (e) 2012 
Type of instrument (a) and (b) CDB capitalises the China-Venezuela Joint Investment Fund 
(c) a dual-loan facility of US$20.6bn 
(d) two other loans 
(e) CDB capitalises the China-Venezuela Joint Investment Fund 
Details CDB loans went to finance the development of infrastructure and social 
projects in Venezuela. Chinaoil payments of PDVSA’s oil go into a 
BANDES account at CDB that deducts directly the interest, principal and 
other fees from BANDES account. 
Borrower Venezuela’s Bank for Economic and Social Development (BANDES) 
Amount Total US$40bn 
Sector Infrastructure development 
Terms (a) three years; (b) three years; (c) ten years 
Loan rate From 0.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent above the LIBOR 
Estimated returns on 
investment 
n/a 
Conditions Loan (a) secured by a three-year contract between Venezuela’s national 
oil company PDVSA and the China National United Oil Corporation 
(Chinaoil) for the delivery of 100,000 barrels a day (b/d) of fuel oil to 
Chinaoil. 
Loan (b) secured by another three-year contract that stipulated a 
minimum of 107,000 b/d (at oil prices above US$60 per barrel) and a 
maximum of 153,000 b/d (at oil prices below US$42 per barrel). 
Loan (c) US$10bn plus 70bn yuan 
In 2012 the total was 419,000 b/d of oil. 
Social and 
environmental concerns 
The CDB presented Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez with a 600-
page long-term strategic plan for boosting Venezuela’s development 
between 2010 and 2030 (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013). 
Comments There is a gap between the volume of oil sold to Chinaoil and that 
actually shipped to China, suggesting that oil has probably been stored 
and sold in the Americas. 
Russia 
Year of agreement 2009 (February) 
Type of instrument Loans 
Details The CDB provided a combined loan of US$25bn to Rosneft (US$15bn) 
and Transneft (US$10bn) 
Borrower The Russian national oil company, Rosneft 
The Russian pipeline monopolist, Transneft 
Amount US$25bn 
Sector Oil 
Term 20 years, with a five-year grace period where only the interest has to be 
paid 
Loan rate 5.69 per cent per year 
Estimated returns on 
investment 
Rosneft estimated that it would repay US$25.9bn over the US$15bn 
loan, so the CDB would increase its gross interest income by 
US$10.9bn. 
Conditions Rosneft received 60 per cent of the loan and had to provide 60 per cent 
of the oil (180,000 b/d). Transneft received 40 per cent of the loan and 
had to provide 40 per cent of the oil (120,000 b/d). 
Social and 
environmental concerns 
n/a 
Comments n/a 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 1.3 (cont’d) 
Ghana 
Year of agreement 2011 (December) 
Type of instrument Two loan tranches 
Details The CDB signed a deal with Ghana, providing an energy-backed loan to 
support the realisation of various projects including a liquid petroleum 
gas processing project, a port, a railway, oil transportation facilities and a 
road. 
Borrower Ghana National Petroleum Corporation 
Amount US$3bn 
Sector Multiple/infrastructure development with a focus on oil and gas 
exploitation 
Term One 15-year loan; one ten-year loan 
Loan rate 295 basis points above the LIBOR for the 15-year tranche; 285 basis 
points above the LIBOR for the ten-year loan 
Estimated returns on 
investment 
n/a 
Conditions Chinese contractors must implement projects worth 60 per cent of the 
loan. 
An ‘off-taker agreement’ obliges Ghana to sell 13,000 b/d of oil to Unipec 
Asia for 15 years and six months. 
Social and 
environmental concerns 
n/a 
Comments CDB lending followed Ghana’s discovery of oil in 2007, and its 
exploitation started in 2010. 
 
Box 1.4 The CDB’s support to Chinese state-owned companies ‘going 
global’ 
The CDB decided to support Chinese state-owned enterprises ‘going global’ through so-called 
‘vendor financing’. This is a credit line that helps Chinese firms operating abroad to provide their 
foreign buyers with money from the CDB under favourable conditions. The use of this innovative 
mechanism has helped embryonic industries such as telecommunications to attract clients from all 
over the world and to get the best position in the international markets. 
In order to reduce the credit risk, the loan, once approved by the CDB-appointed branch (Shenzhen 
for the Huawei case), has to be managed by a foreign agency bank of the countries where the 
Chinese firm operates. This enables the CDB to share the risk with other financial institutions that 
are more knowledgeable about the credit risk situation in the foreign country. 
Examples 
Huawei and ZTE 
Year of agreement Started in 2004 
Type of instrument Lines of credit 
Details The CDB extended credit to Huawei and ZTE, two Chinese phone makers 
with low international competitive advantages that wanted to expand 
abroad. CDB credit lines went to overseas telecom operators interested in 
buying equipment from Huawei and ZTE. 
Borrower Clients of Huawei and ZTE (e.g. the Brazil land line company Take Tele 
Norte Leste Participacoes) 
Amount US$30bn to Huawei 
US$15bn to ZTE 
Sector Telecommunications 
Term n/a 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 1.4 (cont’d) 
 
Loan rate Two-year grace period and an interest rate of two percentage points over 
the LIBOR 
Estimated returns on 
investment 
7–10bn yuan (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013) 
Conditions An agreement with a foreign agency bank is required for the management 
of the loans. 
Social and 
environmental concern 
n/a 
Comments Thanks to the CDB’s credit lines, Huawei expanded in Brazil, Mexico and 
several African countries. 
 
Box 1.5 Equity funds 
The CDB operates through its subsidiary, CDB Capital, which over the years has invested in more 
than 17 funds, including Chinese-foreign funds – the China-Africa Development Fund, the Sino-
Belgian Fund and the ASEAN Fund. Its domestic private equity funds include Hony Capital, the 
Bohai Industrial Fund and the Mianyang Industrial Fund (China Development Bank 2011). CDB 
Capital’s total assets under management were more than 50bn yuan in 2010. 
Examples 
China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) 
Year of agreement Established on 14 March 2007 
Type of instrument Equity investment 
Quasi-equity investment in stocks and bonds 
Fund investments 
Investment management and consulting services 
Details The CADFund operates under market economy principles and therefore 
makes profits and assumes the risks of its losses. Together with other funds, 
the CADFund also provides management, consulting and financial advisory 
services for Chinese enterprises going abroad. The CADFund facilitates 
Chinese investment in Africa, by investing directly in Chinese companies 
operating or willing to do so in Africa. It provides them with low-interest 
bearing loans and on-site facilitation services (Executive Research 
Associates 2009). When an African enterprise identifies a suitable Chinese 
partner, the latter applies directly to the CADFund. 
Country/region Africa (48 African countries plus China) 
Amount US$1bn in 2007 
US$2bn in 2012 
Sector Agriculture and manufacturing industries 
Infrastructure, including power generation, transportation, 
telecommunications and water supply 
Natural resources, such as oil, gas and raw materials 
Industrial parks for Chinese enterprises in Africa 
Term n/a 
Loan rate n/a 
Estimated returns 
on investment 
If the fund gets to raise US$5bn, it is estimated that this will originate 
US$50bn of investments in Africa (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 98) 
It has had no returns on investments so far. Money comes from investors. 
Conditions n/a 
Comments The CADFund has been compared to the Britain’s Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (money comes from the state although it claims to 
work under market principles). 
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1.12 Financing terms 
Little information is present in the literature on the financing terms of CDB loans. 
One clear feature is that the CDB extends longer-term loans than other commercial banks 
(Downs 2011: 18). The longest maturity was given to Russia: in 2009 the Russian Rosneft 
and Transneft received respectively a US$15bn loan and a US$10bn loan, both with a       
20-year maturity. 
Most Chinese loans to Latin American countries have been around or greater than US$1bn, 
with the largest loan – US$20bn – going to Venezuela. 
Some authors put forward the hypothesis that the CDB sometimes provides loans at a higher 
interest rate than the commercial rate (Provaggi 2013), especially the one offered by other 
financial institutions, namely the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB). For example, in 2010 the CDB offered Argentina a US$10bn loan at 600 basis 
points above the LIBOR, while the WB’s US$30m loan had a spread of 85 basis points 
(Gallagher et al. 2012). 
1.13 Conditionality 
1.13.1 Domestic operations 
Asset-backed loans: the repayment of the loans and their interest by the LGFVs is 
guaranteed by the selling/leasing of assets such as land and buildings. 
1.13.2 External operations 
Although no policy conditionality is attached to CDB loans, commercial requirements are 
present both in the form of energy-backed deals (e.g. Venezuela, Ghana, Russia, Ecuador, 
Brazil) and ‘off-taker agreements’, such as the obligation to buy Chinese goods 
correspondent to a certain percentage of the loan received (e.g. 60 per cent of the loan 
amount in the case of Ghana). 
1.14 Environmental and social policies and practices 
The CDB has adopted a range of policies aimed at monitoring and improving the impact of its 
lending. In 2004, the bank issued its CDB Lending Assessment Handbook, containing 
specific guidelines related to the assessment of loan applications, financing criteria, and 
environmental assessment, etc. 
The CDB’s environmental assessment is compliant with the 2003 Law on Environmental 
Impact Assessment. The bank therefore requires all loan applications to have an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) report and claims that environmental compliance is 
an important aspect of the loan evaluation process. 
CDB environmental assessment is undertaken throughout the loan cycle and is structured 
around two phases – pre- and post-lending – when the bank examines the borrower’s 
environmental compliance and violations (Global Environmental Institute 2010). 
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Table 1.6 The CDB’s environmental guidelines 
Pre-lending 1. Clients must be in compliance with all environmental laws of the People’s Republic 
of China. 
2. All loan applications require an environmental impact assessment (EIA). 
For highly-polluting and energy-intensive industries such as coal mining, oil and 
gas exploration and development, power generation and transmission, and 
hydropower, EIAs must be approved by the relevant environmental authorities. 
EIAs must be completed by an independent evaluator. 
3. Environmental standards and costs can be written into loan covenants in order to 
commit borrowers to environmental promises. 
4. The Bank can exercise the ‘one-ballot veto’ procedure which allows loans to be 
rejected by the credit committee solely for environmental reasons. 
5. The Bank assigns two personnel to carry out due diligence for each loan 
application, one to evaluate the loan and the other to evaluate the client. 
6. The Bank also has an appraisal department to assess environmental and social 
risks, and also manages environmental and social issues across business units. 
Post-lending 7. In order for loan requirements to be considered fulfilled, clients must provide proof 
from a relevant environmental department that the project meets environmental 
protection requirements. 
Source: Friends of the Earth US (2014: 38). 
Among the CDB’s social responsibility initiatives for supporting energy conservation and 
emission reduction, it has adopted a series of other non-binding documents, namely: 
 the Environmental Impact Assessment Framework for Lending to Small or Medium-
Sized Enterprises 
 the Circular on the Publication and Distribution of a Work Plan on Energy 
Conservation and Emission Reduction 
 the government’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection 
 Guidelines on Environmental Protection Project Development Review 
 Guidelines on Special Loans for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction 
 a Work Plan on Loans for Pollution Control and Emission Reduction. 
 
Box 1.6 The CDB’s approach to the renewable energy sector 
China’s growth has been characterised by a heavy dependence on the consumption of energy, 
largely from non-renewable resources, which has resulted in highly unsustainable rates of air and 
water pollution. In this context, the shift towards more sustainable energy consumption and 
achieving the goal of producing 20 per cent of energy from renewable resources by 2020 has been 
recognised as a national priority. China adopted its renewable energy law in 2006, but since 2009 
the government has emphasised the need to develop ‘strategically important and emerging 
industries’, namely the energy conservation and environment protection industry, the new energy 
industry (nuclear, wind, solar and biomass), a new generation of information technology industry, 
the biotechnology industry, a high-end equipment manufacturing industry, a new materials industry, 
and a new-energy vehicles industry. 
In agreement with the National Energy Administration (NEA), the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology the CDB was 
charged with drafting the State Council’s Decision on Cultivating and Developing Strategically 
Important and Emerging Industries, later promulgated by the State Council on 10 October 2010. 
Since then, the government has encouraged financial institutions to increase credit support for the 
renewable energy industries and a special fund was established for this purpose. 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 1.6 (cont’d) 
In alignment with this strategy, the CDB has extended approximately US$47.3bn credit lines to 
Chinese solar and wind companies since 2010 (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 149), investing 
about 13 per cent of those funds in wind and 13 per cent in solar (Spratt et al. 2014). More 
precisely, it was recorded that US$9.1bn went to the LDK Solar company, US$6.5bn to Sinovel 
Wind, US$7.6bn to Suntech Power Holdings and US$4.6bn to Trina Solar (Sanderson and Forsythe 
2013: 149). 
The CDB also adapted its internal procedures to its new target sector and therefore issued 
Guidelines of Solar Power Development Project Evaluation, a document to be used as an integral 
part of its policy lending. 
With regard to lending terms obtained by renewable energy projects, it has to be taken into account 
that this sector was recognised as one of the national priority industries. Its enterprises are therefore 
entitled to borrow loans with an interest rate that is 10 per cent lower than the benchmark and, since 
June 2012, they have had a 20 per cent concession (Spratt et al. 2014). Despite this general rule, it 
was noted that interest rates agreed by the CDB have been higher than those offered by other 
commercial banks, making the only advantage of borrowing from the CDB the ease of raising 
additional and cheaper credit from other institutions once CDB approval has been obtained. Solar 
companies such as Yingli have been able to borrow money from commercial banks at an average 
interest rate of 6 per cent (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 154) and get long maturity. 
As revealed by previous IDS research on wind and photovoltaic (PV) projects, renewable projects 
typically obtain long-term lending, i.e. with maturity of between 10 to 15 years (based on a 
construction period of one year). Taking as an example the Huaneng New Energy Company, a 
wind-power enterprise, the long- to short-term ratio over the three-year period 2008–10 was 
respectively 66 per cent: 34 per cent; 80 per cent: 20 per cent; 78 per cent: 22 per cent. The loan 
ratio for such projects is typically 80 per cent. Generally, the typical capacity of a wind-power project 
is 49.5 megawatts (MW), which would need approximately 350m yuan in bank loans. Most of the 
centralised PV projects have a capacity of 10MW each, which would need about 170m yuan of bank 
loans (Spratt et al. 2014). 
Another feature of CDB engagement in the renewable energy sector is that it favours companies 
operating in partnership with local governments. Before 2002, the CDB only lent to state-owned 
companies (Spratt et al. 2014). Results from the IDS research mentioned above reveal that PV 
companies applying for CDB loans partner with local governments. The study also mentions the 
case of Yingli, a solar company whose application for a loan in 1998 was rejected because it came 
from a private company. The company was eventually able to receive financial support from the 
CDB when the government of Baoding High-tech Zone arranged the purchase of 60 per cent of 
Yingli’s shares via one of its subsidiary state-owned enterprises. 
The substantial support offered by the CDB to solar and wind companies had the effect of 
increasing international competition for many US and EU solar companies, which led to some 
eventually filing for bankruptcy. In October 2011, a group of solar panel makers led by Solar World 
Industries America signed a petition against Chinese PV cell and panel makers for using illegal 
government subsidies to sell in the US market (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 155). The following 
year the US announced the application of anti-dumping duties of about 31 per cent to Chinese PV 
products entering the US market. Solar World applied to the European Commission to take similar 
action. 
1.15 Debated issues 
1.15.1 Environmental issues 
According to some authors, CDB lending follows the ‘non-interventionist’ principle by which 
borrowers are freed from any policy conditionality attached to CDB’s lending. Although this is 
not entirely true, as China requires its borrowers to purchase Chinese goods as part of its 
lending deals, more important aspects such as environmental and social responsibility 
concerns remain largely unaddressed. 
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In 2005, CDB incorporated some provisions of the Western-style social environmental 
guidelines into its own lending procedures (i.e. all loan applications require an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA), highly polluting and energy-intensive industries need their EIAs to 
be carried out and approved by independent environmental authorities, etc.). However, it was 
estimated that more than 170 environmental accidents occurred in 2010 (Gallagher et al. 
2012: 26) and, despite the publication of the Green Credit Directive by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2012, the CDB has not yet implemented its provisions. 
Looking at the social and environmental impact of CDB lending, the bank has engaged in a 
growing number of environmental protection initiatives for a total of 232bn yuan (approx. 
US$38.15bn). Projects financed by the CDB include urban and river environmental protection 
infrastructure, industrial pollution control and ecological projects. 
At the same time, however, the CDB has also financed some controversial projects such as 
the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, which have been estimated to generate 
environmental and social problems related to the practice of land confiscation and loss of 
livelihood for local farmers, and increased militarisation of the area, corruption, and 
environmental degradation (Friends of the Earth, Banktrack 2012: 25). More disruptive 
environmental damage has been recorded by the Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) Group which 
operates in Indonesia and China and is involved in logging, plantation development, pulp 
production and various processing activities. The environmental impact of this group has 
been an increase in deforestation, millions of tons of CO2 emissions, and social unrest due to 
land expropriation. 
In conclusion, although the CDB’s environmental policy has been greatly improved, the bank 
has not yet adopted international standards such as the Equator Principles. 
1.15.2 Social issues 
The innovative LGFV system put in place by the CDB to support China’s urban growth rests 
on exploitation of the land, the conversion of land from rural to urban use, and the 
expropriation of farmers’ land rights. More precisely, local governments using land as 
collateral against borrowing from the CDB via LGFVs authorise the expropriation of farmers’ 
land rights3 and the conversion of rural land to urban development. There is a price premium 
arising from this rural-to-urban conversion of land, which represents an extra entry point for 
local governments. Land valued as ‘rural’ increases in value once planning permission has 
been granted and it is deemed ‘urban’. Critics point out that the social impact of this practice 
is extremely controversial and much higher than estimated in monetary terms. First, the price 
paid for the expropriation is often very low compared to the value of the land (especially after 
it has been converted). Second, compensation is paid to the village and then by the village to 
the household, making the farmer’s actual compensation uncertain. Third, even where 
farmers obtain a ‘fair price’ as compensation, the impact on their daily lives and the lives of 
their families is high. There is a high risk of families becoming more vulnerable to poverty 
since farming is often their only skill and they are unable to relocate to other jobs. Fourth, this 
practice is fuelled by and fuels one of the major problems with China’s current development 
model. Rural-to-urban migration has created a mass of ‘second-class’ citizens who hold rural 
residence permits but actually live in the cities. These rural migrants do not have access to 
the same social assistance as those with urban residence permits and put the labour market, 
space and other resources under a great deal of pressure. 
1.15.3 Adverse impact on the economy 
As mentioned previously, the CDB has been a hybrid bank for a long time. On the one hand 
it is a policy bank entitled to sell bonds with sovereign rating (therefore able to get less 
                                               
3 In China land is owned by the state; it is not the property of the farmers. Farmers, however, are given the right to cultivate land 
in exchange for producing a certain amount of crops.  
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expensive funds by selling quasi-risk free bonds to commercial banks). On the other hand, it 
operates as a commercial bank and became a proper commercial bank on paper in 2008 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 74). This double role has created the basis for an uneven 
playing field between the commercial banks and the CDB. However, if the commercial banks 
complain about the CDB stepping into their sphere of competence (when the CDB acts as a 
commercial bank while maintaining the privileges of a policy bank), they would not benefit 
from the complete conversion of the CDB into a commercial bank. In fact, the CDB 
bondholders would record enormous losses from a possible downgrading of them 
(Sanderson and Forsythe 2013).4 
1.15.4 Transparency and accountability issues 
Although the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of the CDB appears to be very low, the 
reliability of such a figure is questionable, especially if one takes into consideration the recent 
problem of local government debt. On both the domestic side and internationally there is a 
question about how it has been possible for the CDB to maintain such a low NPL ratio while 
lending to countries with a high risk of default. 
Another issue is the mismatch between the policies and practices of the CDB. Putting this in 
context, the CDB has on several occasions stated its commitment to green finance, more 
specifically ‘to serving as a pioneer in developing creative, green finance models... [and to]… 
enhance Green Credit and financially support the Tai Lake Clean-up Campaign’ (Friends of 
the Earth US 2014: 31). Nevertheless, the CDB has maintained its strong focus on and 
support to the coal industry, with data showing no sign of decreasing disbursements in favour 
of those sectors (ibid. 2014). 
  
                                               
4 Ba Shusong estimates losses of 71.5bn yuan if the bonds are rated AAA (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: 84) 
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2 Brazil Country Profile: The Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) 
2.1 Summary key features 
 The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is a wholly state-owned financial 
institution, responsible for over 70 per cent of long-term financing in Brazil. 
 Since the BNDES is funded via the Worker's Assistance Fund, it has the statutory 
obligation to employ those funds for projects that increase the country’s employment 
and production levels. 
 During the 2008 financial crisis, the BNDES played the role of countercyclical lender. 
Such operations were funded by an increased share of funding from the National 
Treasury. 
 The BNDES has a pervasive role in all sectors of the Brazilian economy: 
agribusiness, information technology, aircraft, oil and gas, consumer goods, 
pharmaceuticals, retail, engineering services, tourism, education, sports and cultural 
goods. 
 To address the needs of such a variety of sectors and clients (small to medium 
enterprises as well as large firms), the BNDES operates through mergers and 
acquisitions, funds for research and development, export promotion, programmes for 
social inclusion, urban development and, finally, environmental protection and the 
promotion of renewable resources. 
 The largest share of the BNDES operations is represented by financial support to 
large companies, either in the domestic market or for their expansion abroad. This 
support may take different forms, ranging from lines of credit offered to participation in 
the capitalisation of the company. 
 The largest share of the BNDES disbursements goes towards high-risk projects 
(especially the hydroelectric mega-projects), which may have both controversial 
environmental and social impacts. For this reason, the BNDES has in place a system 
of environmental and social appraisal and is in dialogue with civil society 
organisations which, however, point out the shortcomings in the BNDES’ approach to 
environmental and social concerns related to the projects it finances. 
2.2 Background 
The BNDES is a 100 per cent stated-owned company, operating under private law, serving 
as the key instrument for the implementation of the government’s industrial and infrastructure 
policies (BNDES 2013a). It is the main banking institution in Brazil, providing more than 70 
per cent of long-term bank lending in the country (Colby 2012). The size of its credit 
operations equals 5 per cent of the Brazilian GDP (Mantega 2005). Compared to other 
international financial institutions, the BNDES is the second largest credit provider in the 
world, after the China Development Bank and followed by the World Bank in third position 
(although way behind the BNDES, whose loans value in 2010 was more than three times 
that provided by the World Bank) (BNDES 2012a). 
The BNDES provides subsidised credit to respond to failure of the domestic financial market, 
where the interest rate is extremely high – this was set at 10.75 per cent in February 2014. 
This historically high interest rate has been quoted as an important constraint on Brazil’s 
economic development (Segura-Ubiergo 2012; Hausmann 2008). Various arguments have 
been put forward to explain it, including (i) the high levels of public debt (Favero and Giavazzi 
2002), (ii) the many episodes of debt default (Rogoff 2005), (iii) the relatively low level of 
domestic savings (Hausmann 2008; Fraga 2005; Miranda and Muinhos 2003), (iv) the lack of 
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full Central Bank independence (Rogoff 2005), (v) jurisdictional uncertainty (Arida et al. 
2004), and (vi) the long history of high and volatile inflation (Segura-Ubiergo 2012). One of 
the arguments also pointed to the causal responsibility of the BNDES – that providing public 
lending at below market rates has contributed to segmentation of the credit market, leaving 
the Central Bank in control of only part of the credit market (Segura-Ubiergo 2012: 10). 
The BNDES’ more favourable lending terms have resulted in the private sector banks being 
crowded out from corporate credit markets (Boadle 2013). Despite this effect, the BNDES’ 
strategy has been to cooperate with other private financial actors. This is evident if one looks 
at the fact that about 50 per cent of BNDES’ lending is ‘indirect’ and therefore passes 
through other private banks. While this seems to be the preferred modality for small-project 
lending, for big projects BNDES also offers co-financing opportunities to other private 
financial institutions and works together with multilateral and Western donors. Indeed, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (DB) and the BNDES co-finance a number of projects 
(e.g. highways and electrical power projects), and the BNDES has been recognised as one 
of the most important and active partners of the DB. The amount of financing the BNDES 
received via the DB equalled 17 loans for a total amount of US$4.2bn (Ryan et al. 2012). 
2.3 Origin and mission statement 
The BNDES was founded on 20 June 1952 with the priority of expanding the economic 
infrastructure and providing long-term financing credit in order to foster the country's 
development. 
By law (Art. 3 of Federal Law) the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES) is: ‘the main instrument for the execution of the Federal Government’s investment 
policy, having as its foremost purpose to support programs, projects, construction and 
services related to the Country’s economic and social development’. 
Officially its mission is ‘to foster sustainable and competitive development in the Brazilian 
economy, generating employment, while reducing social and regional inequalities’.5 
2.4 History 
Originally established as the ‘BNDE’ (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico) in 
1952, the bank included the ‘S’ (for Social) in the 1980s after widespread criticism – mainly 
from Brazilian civil society organisations – that the socio-environmental perspective was not 
sufficiently integrated into the bank’s lending. 
Since its establishment, the BNDES has been the financial instrument for the implementation 
of the federal government’s industrial and infrastructure policies. The focus of the BNDES’ 
operations has therefore changed along with national government priorities. 
In the 1950s, the central focus was on infrastructure (both in terms of energy and transport) 
and the steel industry. 
In the 1960s, attention was directed more towards the development of heavy industry and 
the provision of consumer goods. An increasing role was also played by small and medium 
enterprises. This phase also saw the start of support to technological development. 
In the 1970s, the BNDES’ actions were instrumental in the implementation of the national 
import substitution industrialisation, a policy strategy defined by the federal government to 
promote domestic development via substituting foreign imports with domestically produced 
goods. The long-term financing offered by the BNDES played a crucial role in realising the 
                                               
5 www.brasil.gov.br/. 
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import substitution policy. Similarly, the BNDES intervened in the 1980s, supporting the 
development of the energy sector and agribusiness. 
In the 1990s, the BNDES became ‘the operational arm of the Privatization Program’,6 both by 
planning and by executing the reforms (Lazzarini et al. 2012). The bank, in fact, acted on two 
sides: providing loans to the acquirers and at the same time becoming an ‘acquirer’ itself by 
purchasing minority stakes in several state-owned companies. 
More recently, the BNDES has turned its attention to promoting Brazil’s competitiveness by 
supporting strategic sectors of the economy and the international expansion of national 
champions. It is doing this by financing the development of infrastructure (both energy and 
logistics) and by fostering the shift of gains made from its oil discoveries into the 
development of the petrochemical industry. It also promotes social inclusion and engages in 
programmes directed at reducing extreme poverty through initiatives such as the national 
programme for strengthening family farming (BNDES Social Fund). 
The BNDES has acted as a ‘countercyclical lender’ (Colby 2012), for example, during the 
2008 global financial crisis when the bank was one of the main agents responsible for the 
maintenance and expansion of credit, contributing 36 per cent of the total increase in 
financing operations and the maintenance and/or creation of over three million jobs in 2009 
(Di Miceli da Silveira 2010). 
Between mid-2009 and mid-2011, BNDES lending to the country’s producers grew by 70 per 
cent (Ghosh 2011), with a lending record of US$96.3bn in 2010 (Grabel 2013). Measured in 
terms of length of financing, the BNDES accounted for 67 per cent of bank loans with 
maturity over five years (Torres Filho 2011). 
Much of this increase in BNDES disbursements in recent years comes from the National 
Treasury in the form of direct transfers through special programmes, i.e. the Accelerated 
Growth Programme (PAG) and the Sustainable Investment Programme (PSI). The 
programmes have provided specific credit lines for infrastructure projects (energy, logistics, 
social and urban infrastructure, and public administration). The total disbursement in 2011 
amounted to R$19,827m (approx. US$8,605m), the largest share of which, over 74 per cent, 
went for energy projects (about 310), followed by logistic projects (94), social and urban 
infrastructure projects (85) and finally public administration projects (18) (Verdun 2013: 16). 
In 2011, with the 7.635/2011 Presidential Decree, the BNDES obtained authorisation to 
gather resources abroad to finance projects beyond national borders. The only condition is 
that projects have to be performed by Brazilian companies or by nationally controlled foreign 
companies in which the BNDES can hold shares (Kraychete and Cristaldo 2013). 
2.5 Mandate and strategy 
2.5.1 Domestic operations 
BNDES objectives have changed over time in line with priorities set by the government. It 
has provided long-term subsidised financing to companies, covering virtually all sectors of 
the economy. This strategy has meant that the BNDES is less exposed to crises in any 
specific sector. 
On various occasions, the BNDES has acted as a countercyclical financial source – for 
example, during the global crisis of 2008–09 (Araujo 2013; Colby 2012) – enacting measures 
                                               
6 Interview with Sérgio Besserman Vianna (planning director of the BNDES (1996–69) and president of the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) included in BNDES – 50 Years of Development, 
www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/Publications_and_Presentations/book50years.html.  
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that have reduced the bank’s compulsory reserves, cut the prime interest rate, and expanded 
low interest rate and easy credit. The main goal has been to promote the sustainable and 
competitive development of the Brazilian economy by generating jobs and reducing social 
and regional inequalities. With the foundation of the EXIM Brazil (Agência Crédito à 
Exportação do Brasil SA) in 2010, the BNDES acquired a new tool to strengthen Brazilian 
foreign sales by increasing opportunities for market access for Brazilian high added-value 
products and services. The BNDES credit division carries out the risk analysis of EXIM 
Brazil’s operations. 
2.5.2 External operations 
In the 1990s, the BNDES began to act as a founding agent promoting the internalisation of 
important sectors of the Brazilian productive structure. It started by financing the export of 
capital goods to Latin America through FINANEX, the Machinery and Equipment Export 
Financing Programme. Later, in 1997, through the BNDES-Exim, BNDES offered credit lines 
on a broader range of financeable goods (not only capital goods as before), including 
intermediate products and consumption goods. Since 1999, BNDES has also managed the 
Exports Guarantee Fund, connected to the Ministry of Finance, which has now become the 
Foreign Trade Guarantor Fund (Fundo Garantidor de Comércio Exterior – FGCE), a private 
instrument responsible for offering guarantees to EXIM Brazil operations. 
More recently, the BNDES’ strategy (mainly started in 2003 under the government of Luiz 
Ignácio Lula da Silva) has been to support the outward foreign investment of Brazilian 
companies (Araujo 2013) in order to contribute to the social and economic development of 
Brazil by reaching new markets, learning new technologies, and promoting Brazil. The 
strategy has privileged the financing of big Brazilian companies in a few strategic sectors. 
BNDES activities aimed at strengthening the links between foreign direct investments and 
the export of industrial goods and engineering services, and research and development 
projects. Substantial support was given to services surrounding the activities of Brazilian 
companies abroad, such as starting subsidiaries in other countries, creating strategic 
partnerships, maintaining long-term supply contracts, managing distribution channels, and 
other forms of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Araujo 2013). 
2.6 Organisational structure 
The BNDES is directed by the Board of Directors and the Administrative Council, members 
of which are appointed by the president of Brazil. 
The so-call ‘BNDES System’, the operative centre of the BNDES, is composed of the 
following subsidiaries: 
 FINAME: provides indirect financing for the purchase of machines and equipment 
 BNDESPAR: the investment arm of the BNDES which operates through capital 
ventures, equity, and the issue of debentures 
 BNDES Limited: focusing on improving the bank’s visibility in the international 
financial community and supporting the internationalisation process of Brazilian 
companies 
 EXIM Brazil: in charge of the internationalisation and trade support (pre- and post- 
shipment). 
The process of credit approval involves the following bodies: 
 Department of Priorities and Planning (DEPRI) which performs the pre-screening 
analysis of credit requests and determines if the project conforms with BNDES 
priorities. 
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 Classification and Credit Committee dealing with the financial risk assessment 
 Competent Operational Division, which does the bulk of the work in the project 
analysis phase, working with the client to structure the project and define the contract. 
Operational divisions are divided into strategic sectors, such as the Foreign Trade 
Division (AEX), the Infrastructure Division (AIE) and the Industrial Division (AI).7 Since 
2009, the BNDES has opened subsidiaries abroad. The first office was opened in 
August 2009 in Montevideo, Uruguay. In November of the same year, it created 
BNDES Limited, an office with operational autonomy in London, capitalised with 
about £58m/US$95m (Biller 2013). In December 2013, the BNDES broadened the 
scope of its activities in Africa beyond the Portuguese-speaking countries and opened 
its third international office in Johannesburg. 
The important bodies that support BNDES external operations are: 
 EXIM Brazil – a subsidiary of the BNDES with access to its foreign trade division and 
operations portfolio. 
 BNDES Credit Division, in charge of the risk analysis of EXIM 
 Exterior Foreign Trade Guarantor Fund – Fundo Garantidor de Comércio Exterior 
(FGCE) – a private instrument managed by the BNDES and responsible for offering 
guarantees to EXIM Brazil operations. 
2.7 Sector focus 
Historically, the BNDES has concentrated its activities on the petroleum and basic 
infrastructure sector, but more recently its focus has been on mining, commodities, food 
processing and the creation of Brazilian multinational firms (Spink 2013). The BNDES has 
also been recognised as the institution that has channelled funds towards the strategic 
sectors of the Brazilian economy – e.g. renewable energy sectors, deep-water pre-salt oil 
exploration and production – so as to promote the modernisation and restructuring of the 
Brazilian economy (Colby 2012). 
The BNDES has also extensively supported the export of goods and services of Brazilian 
firms to Latin America and Africa, mainly linked to the following sectors: infrastructure 
projects; the construction of hydroelectric power plants, aqueducts and pipelines; 
transportation operations; subways, highways and railways; and wind farms (Seibert 2011). 
More specifically, the BNDES has provided support for the export of heavy equipment for 
energy, rail locomotives, ships, aircraft and arms across countries in Africa, the Middle East 
and East Asia (TFR 2010). 
The BNDES credit operations portfolio has the following sector structure (as at 31 
March 2012): 
1. Infrastructure (45.3%) 
a. Electricity and gas (42.6%) 
b. Transport (33.7%) 
2. Industry (35.1%) 
a. Coke, oil and fuel (35.8%) 
b. Extraction (10.9%) 
c. Metallurgy (10.8%) 
d. Pulp and paper (9.7%) 
3. Trade and services (19.1%) 
a. Pubic administration (57.8%) 
b. Finances and insurance (12.9%) 
4. Agriculture and cattle raising (0.5%) 
                                               
7 www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/Corporate_Governance/Project_Selection_Process/. 
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Figure 2.1 Annual disbursement by business sector from 2002 to 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from BNDES Financial Area – Accounting Department (2013b). 
Table 2.1 Sectorial distribution of the BNDES portfolio (%) 
 Stakes in companiesa Purchase of debenturesb 
Electric energy 10.9 15.2 
Mining 19.8 14.3 
Telecommunications 1.7 12.6 
Services – 12 
Foodstuff 4.9 10.3 
Metallurgy – 9.9 
Consumer goods – 7.2 
Oil and gas 47.4 6 
Pulp and paper 6.6 – 
Others 8.7 12.5 
Total 100 100 
aValue of the portfolio for corporate shares in 2012: R$94.4bn (approx. US$40.3bn) 
bValue of debentures in 2012: R$18bn (approx. US$7.68bn) 
Source: BNDES (2012b). 
 
Box 2.1 Oil and gas sector 
The Brazilian oil and gas industry has extended its activities as a result of exploration and 
production in deep and ultra-deep waters, in the so-called ‘pre-salt’ layer. Thanks to its pre-salt 
reserves, Brazil could be the nation with the highest reserve increase by 2020, climbing up to 8th 
position in the ranking of the world's oil reserves (PWC 2013). 
The BNDES’ financing role: 
 BNDES Oil and Gas Structuring credit line targets the supply of goods and services 
in the field of oil and natural gas. 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.1 (cont’d)
 BNDES Investment Support Programme (PSI) is a credit line to stimulate the production, 
acquisition and export of technology and capital goods. 
 BNDES Finem credit line supports projects for installation, expansion and management of 
refineries and the development and production of oil fields. 
 BNDES Proengenharia supports technical and engineering projects in the sectors of capital 
goods, defence, automotive, aviation, aerospace, nuclear, oil and gas, chemical and 
petrochemical. 
 The FINAME programme finances the incorporation of parts and components supplied by 
BNDES-registered manufacturers into machinery and equipment 
 The BNDES provides funds through the Progressive Nationalisation Plan (PNP) in order to 
increase the local content of manufactured products. Projects with a minimum local content 
of 30 per cent are eligible and this content must reach 60 per cent within three years. 
The BNDES’ oil and gas financing portfolio reached R$83bn in 2012, mainly centred around the 
energy company Petrobras and its subsidiaries (Santos 2013). The volume of loans increased from 
R$3.3bn in 2011 to R$7.8bn in 2012. 
The BNDES created a special unit, the Department of Oil and Gas and Production Chain, to 
stimulate domestic development of supply chains, mainly in the pre-salt projects and in the domestic 
field (PwC 2013). Interviews with managers in this department support claims that activities in this 
field will continue to expand in future. Priscila Branquinho das Dores, Head of the Department of Oil 
and Gas, has estimated that in the next four years her department will finance a further R$8bn. Ms 
Das Dores also emphasised the progressive diversification of the bank’s portfolio in the coming 
years, with the BNDES tending to decrease the share of refining investments (R$4.4bn in 2011) 
currently centred around Petrobras (PwC 2013). 
 
Box 2.2 Renewable energy sector 
In Brazil, 49.7 per cent of the energy supply comes from renewable sources (BNDES 2013c). 
Compared to the world average (13 per cent) and that in developed countries (6 per cent), the 
relevance of this sector is even clearer. The BNDES has been the largest provider of project finance 
to the renewable energy industry, at first domestically and, more recently, in operations abroad.8 
In 2012, the BNDES financed US$11.9bn in the clean energy sectors, including hydro and other 
renewable energy projects, manufacturers, research, energy efficiency, transmissions and 
distribution in America (UNEP 2010b). The main focus over this period has been on bioenergy and 
wind projects, e.g. R$26m (US$115m) went to the sugarcane producer Usina de Acucar Santa 
Terezinha, R$210m (US$104m) to the Energias Renovaveis do Brasil for a biomass project, and 
R$378m (US$185m) to Forca Eolica do Brasil. 
The BNDES cooperates both with the private sector and multilateral institutions for the 
implementation of clean energy projects. 
In 2007, Vale Soluções em Energia (VSE) was created from a partnership between the BNDES and 
Vale. VSE’s main objective is the development of technology programmes, focusing on 
environmentally sustainable processes and the use of renewable energy sources. The company 
also complies with Corporate Climate Change Guidelines and aims to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions. That is why, since 2008, it has undertaken a series of investments in hydroelectric 
facilities in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from its electricity consumption. VSE has 
managed to shift 45 per cent of its electric power supply needs to hydroelectric plants in which it has 
stakes, i.e. the large hydroelectric plants Igarapava, Porto Estrela, Funil, Candonga, Eliezer Batista, 
Amador Aguiar I, Amador Aguiar II, Machadinho, and Estreito, and small plants, namely Glória, 
Ituerê, Mello, and Nova Maurício (Vale 2012). 
(Cont’d) 
                                               
8 A government official reported that US$5bn of subsidised credit had been pledged to renewable energy projects in developing 
countries by the BNDES, ranging from ethanol mills in Mozambique to wind farms in Central America (UNEP 2010b). 
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Box 2.2 (cont’d)
Multilateral institutions supporting BNDES operations in the field of clean energy include the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). IN 2011, the EIB agreed to provide a €500m loan to the BNDES 
for small and medium-size investments in the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors in the 
framework of Brazil’s Climate Change Mitigation Programme. 
A final point to be noted is that the financing conditions offered by the BNDES for projects in the 
renewable energy sector are more favourable when compared to the average conditions applied to 
other sectors (Motta Veiga and Rios 2013). The interest rates granted to these projects is reported 
to be 1.4 per cent below those offered for coal or oil thermal plants. The financing terms vary from 
16 to 20 years for renewable energy projects compared to the 14 years allowed for conventional 
plants. Moreover, the maximum financing participation for such projects ranges between 70 and 90 
per cent, while for coal or oil thermoelectric plants it is capped at 50 per cent (IDB 2013). 
Table 2.2 Disbursement – green economy and climate change (in R$bn) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Renewable energy and energy efficiency 5.7 5.7 6 7.1 6.1 
Hydroelectric energy (over 30MW) 3.7 8.4 6.2 5.2 7.1 
Public passenger transport 0.6 1.4 0.7 0.9 1.5 
Cargo transport 1.5 2 1.4 1.6 2.6 
Water and sewerage management 0.8 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.5 
Solid waste management 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Forests 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Agricultural improvements 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Adapting to climate change and risk-of-
disaster management 
– – 0.1 0.6 0.6 
Others 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Total 12.9 19.9 18 18.5 20.8 
Source: BNDES (2012b). 
Table 2.3 Annual disbursements by number of projects 
Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Hydroelectric power plants 10 17 13 9 9 19 22 17 11 10 
Thermal plants 3 1 1 1 – – 3 5 7 6 
Wind power plants – – 1 3 1 2 2 13 11 10 
Small hydros 4 6 8 27 37 46 41 39 32 22 
Cogeneration 3 1 – – – – 2 3 5 5 
Nuclear – – – – – – – – 1 1 
Distribution 1 4 8 11 13 17 15 20 19 18 
Transmission lines 5 8 11 6 13 7 12 17 17 24 
ESCOs – – – – 2 5 2 4 4 5 
Railways 1 5 5 8 5 6 6 5 8 7 
Roadways 15 12 13 11 11 4 16 19 20 22 
Ports and terminals 3 4 4 6 7 4 8 14 10 16 
Navigation 10 9 11 9 9 11 12 6 9 8 
Other – – 3 3 2 1 – – 1 3 
Total 55 67 78 94 109 122 141 162 155 157 
Source: Pinto (2012: 23). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.2 (cont’d)
Table 2.4 Electrical power industry: approved operations 2003 to 2012 
Segment Capacity Projects BNDES R$m Investment R$m 
1. Generation (MW) 47,039 353 92,859 149,779 
 Hydro (>30MW) 32,955 47 59,720 94,435 
Thermal 6,056 16 12,737 24,237 
Hydro (< 30MW) 2,253 116 7,424 11,310 
Biomass and cogeneration 1,959 44 3,422 4,610 
Wind 3,815 130 9,557 15,188 
2. Transmission (km) 26,922 86 14,858 29,845 
3. Distribution  77 13,952 24,028 
4. Energy efficiency  19 101 133 
Total  535 121,770 203,786 
Source: BNDES (2013c: 11). 
Table 2.5 Financing terms for the credit lines offered for renewable 
energy projects 
Industry Maximum 
amortisation term 
BNDES maximum 
support (%) 
Financial cost Basic 
spread 
Generation hydroelectric 
projects 
20  
(Hydro’s capacity 
higher than 
1,000MW) 
16  
(Hydro’s capacity 
from 30MW to 
1,000MW) 
70 100% TJLPa 0.9 
Gas and cogeneration 
thermoelectric projects 
14 70 100% TJLP 0.9 
Coal and oil thermoelectric 
projects 
14 50 50% TJLP  
50% TJ-462b 
1.8 
Alternative sources (small 
hydroelectric, wind, solar) 
16 80 100% TJLP 0.9 
Biomass (Boiler < 60 bar) 16 80 100% TJLP 0.9 
Biomass (Boiler > 60 bar) 16 90 100% TJLP 0.9 
2. Transmission 14 70 100% TJLP 1.3 
3. Distribution 6 50 50% TJLP  
50% TJ-462 
1.3 
4. Railways 15 80 100% TJLP 0.9 
5. Roadways 15 60 70% TJLP  
30% TJ-462 
1.3 
6. Other investments in 
logistics 
15 70 100% TJLP 0.9 
Note: Total loan cost: financial cost + basic spread + risk spread (0.46% p.a. to 3.57% p.a.) 
aTJLP (Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo) – a subsidised credit rate set by the National Monetary Council 
bTJ-462 = TJLP + 1% p.a. 
Source: Pinto (2012: 29). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.2 (cont’d)
Examples 
Hydroelectric 
BNDES support to major hydroelectric projects since 2007 
Projects BNDES support Investment in R$m MW 
Belo Monte 22,500 28,869 11,233 
Jirau 9,545 15,702 3,750 
Santo Antônio 8,129 17,813 3,569 
Angra III 6,146 10,488 1,405 
Estreito 2,661 3,607 1,087 
Fóz do Chapeço 1,656 2,207 855 
Simplício 1,034 1,667 334 
Mauá 739 991 361 
Serra do Facão 588 850 213 
Caçu e Barra dos Coqueiros 543 694 155 
Dardanelos 485 755 261 
Salto 290 407 108 
Salto do Rio Verdinho 250 342 93 
Total 54,567 84,391 23,424 
Source: BNDES (2013c: 13). 
Figure 2.2 Electricity generation hydroelectric plants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Miranda Farias (2008: 11). 
Sugar cane and ethanol 
Brazil launched its first ethanol programme (ProAlcool) in 1975 as a direct response to the dramatic 
rise in imported petroleum prices (1973) in the short term and to reduce dependence on oil in the 
long term. ProAlcool increased the sugar cane output of producers and at the same time managed 
to maintain low ethanol prices for consumers. 
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Box 2.2 (cont’d) 
Thanks to over 30 years of strong support from the government, sugar cane-based ethanol now 
substitutes half of the gasoline that would be used if no other sources were available (Friends of the 
Earth 2008). The BNDES played its role through providing subsidised credit to the companies 
operating in this sector. The Brazilian government created the National Agro-Ecological Zoning of 
Sugar cane (Zoneamento Agroecologico da Cana de Açúcar), indicating which areas of the country 
are most suitable to grow sugar cane. Companies intending to build sugar cane refineries within the 
designated areas could access long-term subsidised loans from the BNDES (Ninô de Carvalho 
2013). 
In recent years, the recession and a weaker oil price drove investors to reduce their investments in 
new ethanol plants. This lack of investments contributed to reducing the quality and quantity of 
sugar cane available for milling (BNDES 2013c). 
The drop in BNDES disbursement to the sugar-ethanol sector has occurred in those parts of the 
funds disbursed via ‘direct’ modality, while the ‘indirect’ financial transfer made via accredited 
financial institutions remained relatively constant between 2011 and 2012. The indirect 
disbursement over these two years was sustained through the BNDES Prorenova, a R$4bn 
(US$2bn) programme created to encourage the production of sugar cane by financing the renewal 
of old sugar cane fields and expanding the cultivated area. In 2012, the BNDES Prorenova portfolio 
reached approximately US$700m and was responsible for the renewal of approximately 315,000 
hectares and the planting of 87,000 hectares with sugar cane. This programme contributed to 
resumption in the productivity of Brazilian sugar cane crops and to a reduction in the unused 
industrial capacity in sugar and ethanol production, which is expected to drop from over 20 per cent 
in 2010–12 to less than 5 per cent in 2013–14 (BNDES 2013c). 
The cost of financing BNDES Prorenova’s operations is the Long-term Interest Rate (TJLP) plus 1.3 
per cent per year of the BNDES’ Basic Spread for the medium-large and large companies with a 
gross operating income equal to or higher than R$90m. For these companies, BNDES’ maximum 
participation is up to 80 per cent. For the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), the 
cost of financing is instead equal to the TJLP plus 0.9 per cent per year of the BNDES’ Basic 
Spread and the maximum participation rate is up to 90 per cent of the eligible items. 
Table 2.6 BNDES disbursements to the sugar-ethanol sector (in US$bn) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total disbursements to the sugar-ethanol sector 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.5 2.1 
of which direct 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 0.7 
of which indirect 2.1 1.7 2.9 1.8 1.5 
Total disbursements to the sugar-ethanol sector  
as % of BNDES’ total disbursements 
7% 4.7% 4.5% 4% 2.7% 
Source: BNDES (2013c). 
Table 2.7 Distribution of BNDES disbursements per nature of activity 
(in US$bn) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Var. 2011–12 
Agriculture 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 7% 
Industrial 2.6 2.6 3.4 2.5 1.2 –52% 
Co-generation 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 –34% 
Total 3.5 3.2 4.3 3.5 2.1 –40% 
Source: BNDES (2013c). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.2 (cont’d)
Wind 
In Brazil in recent years, as in other Latin American countries (Argentina, Uruguay and Peru), there 
has been an increased interest in the wind sector. Brazil’s interest stems from its high-quality wind 
resource, the oversupply in the global wind market and the downward pressures on costs in the 
industry. 
In 2011, the BNDES alone put R$3.4bn into wind farm projects, providing 1,160MW of new wind 
energy capacity.9 
Table 2.8 Evolution of wind turbine capacity power in Brazil (in MW) 
Year ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 
MW 3 17 19 22 24 22 24 24 29 237 247 339 606 931 1,509 
Source: REVE (2012). 
Despite the huge potential of this sector, most of Brazil’s renewable resources still come from 
hydroelectric sources. BNDES financing, through the machinery and equipment financing 
programme (FINAME), imposes a nationalisation index of 60 per cent as a condition to access 
funding. The reason for this rule is that the BNDES aims to foster the development of a national 
wind manufacturing industry. Since the BNDES is the main long-term lender, whose financing costs 
are much lower, the immediate result of this has been a rapid expansion of the local supply chain. 
The BNDES’ rules to license and verify the local content of wind turbines manufactured in Brazil are 
complex. There are physical targets that need to be met, showing a gradual increase in the number 
of domestic components in the equipment used. For instance, manufacturers of wind turbines with a 
‘step-up’ gear box must comply to at least three of the following rules (Rothmann 2013): 
 Manufacturing of towers in Brazil, with at least 70 per cent of the steel plates 
manufactured in the country or domestically-reinforced concrete 
 Manufacturing of blades in Brazil in their own plant or that of a third party 
 Assembly of the Nacelle (main part of the wind turbine) in Brazil, in their own plant 
 Assembly of the hub (the part that houses the Nacelle) in Brazil, with a domestic dye-cast. 
By January 2016, manufacturers are also committed to have gradually increased local components 
in their production process until they cover the whole chain (Rothmann 2013). 
In July 2012, the BNDES disqualified six foreign wind turbine suppliers (Fuhrländer, Siemens, 
Vestas, Suzlon, Clipper and Acciona Windpower) which did not comply with the financing 
requirements of FINAME. 
The expected impact of the BNDES’ rules on the development of the wind industry is controversial. 
Some point out the impulse given to the development of the domestic sector, while others stress the 
fact that such strict requirements may slow down growth in this sector, drive up prices, and be 
challenged internationally. The local content requirements are quoted as among the main 
challenges affecting the energy sector, accompanied by the lack of sufficient transmission and 
distribution lines (GWEC 2012). 
  
                                               
9 See REVE (2012). 
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2.8 Geographic focus 
The BNDES has a pervasive presence domestically. Along with its domestic focus, over the 
past decade the bank has also embraced operations that support the expansion of domestic 
firms abroad. In this last field, the BNDES has become the most important public lender in 
Latin America, providing credits either directly or indirectly through intermediaries. In Africa, 
the BNDES first focused attention on the Portuguese-speaking countries, but in more recent 
times has extended its support to other countries. 
2.8.1 Domestic operations 
Table 2.9 BNDES operations in 2012 per region 
 North Northeast Central-
West 
Southeast South 
Number of operations (units) 51,486 138,451 100,104 427,210 311,189 
Number of operations (%) 5.01% 13.46% 9.73% 41.54% 30.26% 
Number of operations (var. % 2008–12) 6.84% 6.44% 5.00% 3.94% 3.11% 
Disbursement (in R$bn) 13.3 21.0 20.1 72.4 29.9 
Disbursement (%) 8.6% 13.5% 19.39% 46.4% 18.6% 
Disbursement (var. % 2008–12) 1.66% 1.76% 1.03% 0.42% 0.67% 
In the North Region, 58 per cent of the total disbursement went to infrastructure projects, 
mainly hydroelectric plants (Belo Monte, Santo Antonio, Jirau, Teles Pires and Estreito), 
railways (Carajàs railway) and electric energy transmission lines (BNDES 2013a: 57). 
Over the last five years, the Northeast Region has catalysed a larger share of BNDES 
disbursement, recording a positive growth variation of 1.76 per cent between 2008 and 
2012). These funds have been directed to large-scale projects: thermoelectric plants, 
hydroelectric plants, wind parks, refineries, shipyards, steel mills, pulp mills and an airport 
(BNDES 2013a: 58). 
The Central-West Region is characterised by an increase in lending to micro and small 
enterprises, accounting for over 90 per cent of total operations in the region (BNDES 2013a: 
58). 
2.8.2 External operations 
The BNDES’ presence abroad started much earlier in Latin America than in Africa. 
In Latin America 
Between 2001 and 2010, the amount of BNDES disbursement made to South America, 
through the BNDES-Exim post-shipment line of financing, reached US$3.6bn, of which 49.2 
per cent went towards Argentina and 19.8 per cent towards Venezuela (Niko 2011: 85–86), 
Between 2000 and 2012, BNDES expenditures for infrastructure exports in Latin America 
mainly went to Argentina (50.89%), Venezuela (27.85%) and Ecuador (11.7%) (Kraychete 
and Cristaldo 2013). 
The BNDES’ interest abroad, and in Latin America in particular, is also focused on energy. 
The bank has backed more than 350 power projects since 2003, accounting for over 
28,000MW of new electric generation capacity (Ryan et al. 2012). 
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Table 2.10 BNDES expenditures in support of Brazilian exports destined 
for infrastructure projects in South American countries 2000–12 (US$m) 
 Argentina Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Total 
2000 – 89.8 – – 7.3 – 97.1 
2001 – 33.3 13.8 – 9.5 16.1 72.7 
2002 – 3.3 16.3 – – 18 37.6 
2003 – – 24.8 – – 25.4 50.2 
2004 – 112.3 17.2 – – 44 173.5 
2005 150.5 57 8 – – 3.9 219.4 
2006 – 55.8 – – 2.6 10.4 68.8 
2007 308.9 17.4 – – 3.1 39.5 368.9 
2008 260.1 0.5 – – 2.4 6.8 269.8 
2009 325.4 – – – 1.7 25 352.1 
2010 172.5 – – 129.9 – 315.2 617.6 
2011 361.1 – – 96.7 – 392.9 850.7 
2012* 103.1 – – – – 23.2 126.3 
Total 1,681.60 369.3 80.2 226.6 26.6 920.4 3,304.70 
% 50.89 11.17 2.43 6.86 0.80 27.85 – 
Source: Kraychete and Cristaldo (2013: 79). 
Table 2.11 BNDES-Exim post-shipment disbursement to Latin America 
countries (US$m) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 56.22 14.72 0.39 1.16 216.32 5.44 310.11 276.01 385.62 541.47 
Bolivia 2.47 13.53 1.64 0.13 – 0.88 – – –  
Chile 2.24 2.56 26.11 23.27 30.37 66.76 31.73 120.27 11.99 102.41 
Colombia 19.56 5.99 0.56 – – – – – – – 
Ecuador 37.78 39.43 0.40 112.33 57.03 117.58 17.37 0.64 0.12 – 
Paraguay 14.37 17.59 26.14 17.22 8.01 – – – 1.27 – 
Peru 10.71 3.49 5.02 9.00 5.65 0.85 0.38 0.38 0.22 135.14 
Uruguay 23.96 3.32 – 0.31 – 2.63 3.20 2.35 2.05 – 
Venezuela 17.09 81.17 55.62 44.08 26.13 25.33 70.32 43.21 48.07 315.20 
Total 184.4 181.8 115.9 207.5 343.5 219.5 433.1 442.9 449.3 1,094.2 
Source: Niko (2011: 87). 
In Africa 
The BNDES’ focus on Africa has increased over the last decade, thus stimulating the 
expansion of bilateral trade. The bank’s strategy for Africa has to be interpreted as the 
consequence of the directions received by government through the Productive Development 
Policy that in 2008 issued a number of directives and practical measures for strengthening 
trade relations between Brazil and Africa (World Bank-IPEA 2012). Under the Integration with 
Africa Programme (Programa Integração com a África), Brazilian companies willing to invest 
in Africa could benefit from credit that amounted to R$477m (US$265m) in 2007, rising to 
R$649m (US$360.5m) in 2009. Stolte (2012) estimated that the BNDES provided US$766m 
in 2009 and US$466m in 2011. 
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In 2012, the BNDES granted US$3.2bn to Angola for various construction (streets, basic 
sanitation, housing, technological centres) and industry and agriculture projects (machinery 
and technical equipment) (BNDES 2012a). In early 2006, Angola had already received a 
US$1.5bn credit line resulting from the strategic bilateral partnership agreement aimed at 
increasing Brazilian influence in the new African ethanol industry. 
Another two African countries, Mozambique and South Africa, received credits of 
respectively US$80m for construction projects (Nacala airport) and US$35m for public 
transport projects (BNDES 2012a). 
The BNDES has granted lines of credit to be used for the financing of Brazilian enterprises in 
infrastructure and construction projects. A large share of BNDES credit lines going to sub-
Saharan Africa (32.5 per cent) went for projects carried out by Odebrecht, one of Brazil’s 
biggest companies and a leader in the areas of civil construction and resources (Stolte 
2012). Out of the top 20 Brazilian transnational companies, six that operate in some of the 
strategic economic sectors (energy, mining, construction and infrastructure) have already 
invested in Africa (Seibert 2011). Three big companies, which possess the necessary 
financial resources to operate in Africa, are: 
 Odebrecht Construction in Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibuti, 
Gabon, Libya, Liberia, Mozambique and South Africa 
 Petrobras Oil in Angola, Benin, Gabon, Libya, Namibia, Nigeria and Tanzania 
 Vale Mining in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia (Stolte 2012). 
The BNDES has also engaged in the development of sugarcane-based ethanol processing 
plants in Africa. In 2010, the bank offered a credit line of US$3.5bn to Brazilian companies 
working in Ghana and Mozambique. For Ghana, in particular, it was possible to gain access 
to the Swedish biofuel market thanks to the Brazilian funding and expertise via a tripartite 
agreement (between Brazil, Ghana and Sweden). Under this deal, the BNDES financed the 
Ghanaian corporation Northern Sugar Resources with US$260m to plant 30,000 hectares of 
sugarcane in the northern part of the country. The sugarcane produced would then be 
processed by a plant built by Odebrecht and finally all the ethanol produced would be 
purchased by the Swedish Svensk Etanolkemi AB (Sekab) under an agreement over ten 
years (World Bank-IPEA 2012) 
2.9 Financial performance 
Table 2.12 Selected financial indicators (as at June 2013) in US$m 
Total equity 24,902 
Total assets 329,043 
Total profits (as at 31 March 2012) 3,657 
Total disbursements 39,871 
Capitalisation* 7.57 
Net operating income 1,472 
Non-performing loan (NPL) Ratio** 0.14% 
ROA ratio 0.46 
ROE ratio 6.96 
* Equity/total assets 
**2011 value (Ferraz et al. 2013). 
Source: BNDES (2013b). 
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Table 2.13 Other financial indicators (as at 31 March 2012) in R$m 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total assets 277,294 386,633 549,020 624,827 715,486 
Credit and on-lending 
portfolio, net after 
allowances 
215,989 283,671 361,575 425,518 492,148 
Company shares* 25,293 34,012 107,476 99,601 94,391 
Debenture portfolio, net 
after allowances 
8,078 12,176 17,839 18,127 18,021 
Public bonds and securities 10,600 35,917 25,638 51,329 61,525 
Other assets 17,334 20,857 36,492 30,252 49,401 
Total liabilities 277,294 386,633 549,020 624,827 715,486 
National Treasury 43,207 144,213 253,058 310,774 376,042 
FAT/PIS-PASEP** 146,088 152,540 163,091 177,947 194,655 
Foreign fundraising 17,486 16,463 19,778 22,449 23,275 
Other obligations*** 45,246 45,789 47,194 52,645 69,345 
Net equity 25,267 27,628 65,899 61,012 52,169 
Net profit 5,313 6,735 9,913 9,048 8,183 
Earnings from financial 
intermediation 
4,312 5,815 9,891 7,206 11,578 
Earnings from company 
shares 
6,024 3,990 6,159 6,962 2,644 
Tax expenses (2,425) (2,784) (4,879) (3,549) (3,618) 
Other revenue/(expenses) (2,598) (286) (1,258) (1,571) (2,421) 
*Includes investments in non-affiliated companies, affiliated and other investments, after impairment allowances 
** FAT (workers’ support fund from payroll taxes) and PIS/PASEP (a social fund that collects contributions paid by companies 
for the social benefit of their workers: unemployment insurance, child benefit and allowances, etc. 
***Includes resources from the FGTS, FI-FGTS, Merchant Maritime Fund (FMM), the National Development Fund (FND) and 
other financial development funds. 
Source: BNDES (2012b). 
2.10 Sources of finance 
Table 2.14 BNDES capital structure  
Source 2011 2012 
FAT/PIS-PASEP 28.5% 27.2% 
National Treasury 49.7% 52.6% 
Other governmental sources 3.5% 3.3% 
Fundraising abroad 3.6% 3.3% 
Other obligations 4.9% 6.4% 
Net equity 9.8% 7.2% 
Source: BNDES (2012b). 
Loans made by the National Treasury have been the largest source of BNDES’ capital over 
the last decade. The second largest source of funding is represented by the FAT/PIS-
PASEP. 
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The FAT (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador) funds come from payroll taxes and are 
therefore subject to a BNDES’ statutory obligation that requires them to be used for projects 
aimed at increasing Brazilian employment and production (Armijo 2013: 14). The PIS-PASEP 
is a social fund that collects contributions paid by companies for the social benefits of their 
workers: unemployment insurance, child benefit and allowances, etc. 
Because of the large share of funds provided to the BNDES by the FAT/PIS-PASEP 
programme, the bank has a statutory obligation to employ those funds for projects that 
increase employment and production of the country. The capital coming from these public 
sources (the National Treasury, FAT/PIS-PASEP) is provided at below-market rate – TJLP 
(Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo) – a subsidised credit rate set by the National Monetary 
Council and then used as a benchmark to finance key sectors of the economy via the 
BNDES. As the market rate – the SELIC (overnight lending rate set by the central bank) and 
the LIBOR rate (for loans issued in US$) – is much higher than the TJLP rate, the return on 
investments for taxpayers is much lower when directed to the BNDES, which provides 
subsidised financing to its clients. 
Until 2008, the FAT was the major financial contributor to the BNDES, but with the breaking 
of the financial crisis and the enhanced role of the BNDES as a countercyclical lender, the 
National Treasury has increased its financing to the BNDES enormously (Franck 2012) 
through special programmes, namely the PAG (Accelerated Growth Programme) and PSI 
(Sustainable Investment Programme), which accounted for half of BNDES funding by 2011 
(Armijo 2013: 14). 
In the 1970s, the bank began raising funds in the international markets. Now it counts on 
foreign fundraising both in terms of loans from multilateral organisations and syndicated 
loans and issuances of bonds. The BNDES’ international partners are for instance the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB); Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW); Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC); Nordic Investment Bank (NIB); China Development Bank 
(CDB), World Bank (WB), European Investment Bank (EIB). 
Table 2.15 Bond issuances held by the BNDES  
Issuing year Market Value (currency millions) Coupon (%) Maturity 
1998 Eurodollar/144-A US$1,000 6.37 16 Jun 2018* 
2009 Eurodollar US$1,000 6.50 10 Jun 2019 
2010 Eurodollar US$1,000 5.50 12 Jul 2020 
2010 Euro MTF EUR 750 4.13 15 Sept 2017 
2011 Euro CHF 200 2.75 15 Dec 2016 
*The bond was renegotiated in June 2008. 
Source: BNDES website.10 
BNDES revenues come from the spread charged on its lending operations and from capital 
investments. The relative share of these two sources of revenue has changed over time. In 
2003, the revenue from intermediation was R$4.4bn and from investment R$1.5bn, while in 
2011 the former reached R$6bn and the latter R$7bn (Colby 2012: 18–19). The BNDES’ 
profitmaking from its capital investment is partly explained by its ability to source capital at 
below-market rate and then reinvest it in government bonds while waiting to offer it again to 
its clients at a subsidised rate (Lazzarini et al. 2012; Colby 2012). 
                                               
10 www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES_Abroad/ForeignFundraising/foreignfundraising_ 
market.html. 
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As a consequence of the higher return of its credit operations, the BNDES’ credit portfolio 
also makes up the largest share of the bank’s flow of resources – which in 2012 amounted to 
R$160bn. The return on credit operations contributed 77.4 per cent to the total 2012 BNDES 
releases. The National Treasury, which provides the largest share of BNDES capital 
contributed just 15.6 per cent to the releases. (This is a ‘net’ contribution computed after 
deducing the payment of debt, dividends and taxes.) 
2.11 Instruments deployed 
BNDES support takes the following forms: 
 Financing: financing modalities differ according to the purpose and nature of the 
project to be financed. Several products are available disciplined by rules for 
financing and operating procedures. (See Table 2.16 for a list of instruments.) 
 Non-reimbursable resources: grants given for investments of a social, cultural 
(educational and research), environmental, scientific or technological nature (i.e. the 
Amazon Fund, BNDES Mata Atlantica and the BNDES technology fund, FUNTEC) 
 Subscription of securities: shares, simple debentures, convertible debentures, 
subscription bonds, options and other derivative products, receivables-backed funds 
– called Fundo de Investimento em Direitos Creditórios (FIDCs) – (e.g. participation in 
private equity funds such as the Climate Change Fund, Caixa Ambiental, Vale 
Florestal Fund, ECOO11). The BNDES operates through the BNDES Participações 
S.A. integral subsidiary (BNDESPAR) to provide support to Brazilian publicly-listed 
and private companies by means of subscription of shares, convertible or permutable 
debentures, mutual fund shares and other securities. It is present in all growth stages 
of companies – e.g. seed companies, start-ups, capital venture funds, equity private 
funds (BNDES annual report 2011). The BNDES holds stocks in over 200 firms and 
about 39 funds (as at June 2012) for an amount of R$105.4bn (approx. US$45bn) 
(Magalhães Junior 2012). 
For its external operations, the BNDES operates through the following instruments: 
 BNDES-Exim Brazil: the newly created credit agency facilitates operations that 
support the export sector, e.g. the sale of heavy equipment for energy, locomotives, 
ships, spacecraft and aircraft. 
 Exim-pre-shipment (Pré-Embarque): an instrument to finance the production of 
goods to be exported. Operations are accomplished through other financing agents 
(BNDES indirect operations) and cover up to 100 per cent of the production value of 
the goods or services that are destined for the foreign market. 
 Exim-post-shipment (Pós-Embarque): an instrument that entails the direct 
involvement of the BNDES and is directed at providing buyer/supplier credit for the 
financing (up to 100 per cent) of the commercialisation of goods and services in 
foreign countries. 
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Table 2.16 BNDES instruments for financing and operating procedures 
Type Instrument Description 
D
ir
e
c
t 
BNDES Finem Financing for undertakings with a minimum value of R$10m 
BNDES credit limit Credit for clients in good standing 
Subscription of 
bonds/securities 
The purchase of minority shares or convertible debentures of a temporary 
nature or investments by means of closed funds 
Project finance Financing supported by a project’s cash flow 
BNDES securities 
and guarantees 
Provides guarantees with the aim of reducing the participation level in 
projects. Used in large-scale projects. 
BNDES bridge 
loans 
Financing for a project, granted in specific cases, to speed up investments 
by granting resources during the structuring period of a long-term 
operation. 
BNDES-Exim post-
shipment 
Financing to commercialise Brazilian goods and services abroad 
In
d
ir
e
c
t 
BNDES automatic Financing up to R$20m for micro, small, medium-sized or medium-sized-
to-large companies, and up to R$10m, if the client is a large company 
BNDES Finame Financing for the production and sale of machinery and equipment 
BNDES Finame 
agriculture 
Financing for the production and sale of agricultural machinery and 
equipment 
BNDES Finame 
leasing 
Commercial lease of machinery and equipment 
BNDES Exim pre-
shipment 
Financing to produce Brazilian goods and services earmarked for export 
BNDES Exim Financing for domestic production earmarked for export and sale of goods 
and services abroad 
BNDES card Pre-approved revolving credit for the purchase of products, inputs and 
services 
Table 2.17 BNDES-Exim instruments (in US$m) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Pre-shipment 1,304 970 1,278 1,981 1,921 3,166 4,475 3,493 4,903 6,180 
Post-shipment 1,779 1,633 2,670 2,025 1,940 2,697 1,863 698 1,694 2,150 
Total 3,083 2,603 3,948 4,007 3,862 5,863 6,337 4,191 6,597 8,330 
Source: Galetti (2010: 53). 
 
Box 2.3 Support to national champions ‘going global’ 
Around 60 per cent of the BNDES portfolio is invested in large companies (Franck 2012: 9). In 
terms of equity holdings, over 80 per cent by value is made up of shares of state-owned or semi-
private large companies, such as Petrobras and Vale, also considered among the so-called 
‘national champions’ (BNDES 2012a). 
BNDESPAR, a wholly owned subsidiary of the BNDES, is strongly oriented towards investments in 
the oil and gas companies, among which Petrobras makes up over 33.2 per cent of the BNDESPAR 
portfolio. Similarly, 20 per cent of BNDESPAR’s investments go to the mining sector in which Vale, 
the largest mining company in Brazil, operates. The electric power sector, where Electrobras and 
CPFL Energia are the largest operators, accounts for 16 per cent of BNDESPAR operations (Franck 
2012). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.3 (cont’d)
The rationale guiding the BNDES’ support to large companies is that it encourages the insertion and 
strengthening of companies in the international market so that they can grasp opportunities to 
develop their overseas markets. 
The instruments the BNDES uses to support the internationalisation of companies are the 
subscription of bonds and securities. 
Companies eligible for BNDES support for internationalisation are: 
 companies with headquarters and administration in Brazil which can be domestically 
controlled, including any subsidiaries abroad 
 foreign companies whose shareholders with more significant voting capital and more 
influence on activities the companies carry out are in Brazil 
 companies that are directly or indirectly controlled by an individual or group of individuals 
domiciled and residing in Brazil 
 companies controlled by a government entity in Brazil. 
The type of investments eligible for support relate to the building of new branches, purchasing, 
expanding or modernising installed plants, and equity investments. 
The maximum support guarantee is 60 per cent of the investment.11 
Examples 
Petrobras oil company 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobas) is a partially state-owned company, heavily supported by the 
BNDES. In 2012, over 30 per cent of the BNDES portfolio was made up of loans to Petrobras. In 
response to the downward economic swing, BNDES financing to Petrobras increased by 291 per 
cent in 2008 and 129 per cent in 2009, making the company’s publicly financed debt owned by the 
BNDES over 77 per cent of the total (Barbosa 2013). 
Between 2009 and 2013, Petrobras invested US$174.4bn, of which US$15.9bn (nine per cent) was 
directed to international activities. For the 2010–14, period the quota allocated to international 
activities reduced to five per cent (US$11.7bn) of the total US$224bn investments. In this second 
period, Petrobras increased its domestic engagement in pre-salt exploration and production (ADB 
2011). 
In Africa, Petrobras is present in 28 countries, including Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Namibia, and 
Tanzania, with several oil exploration projects (mainly offshore). Its oil production in Africa (57,444 
barrels of oil equivalent per day) makes up about 24 per cent of its international production. Its 
specialisation in deep-water oil production contributes to its presence in the Gulf of Guinea, where 
the geology is very similar to that of the Campos Basin in Brazil. 
Aside an established presence in oil-producing areas in Angola, Libya and Nigeria, Petrobras has 
more recently turned to investment in frontier exploration projects, such as the acquisition of a 50 
per cent stake in Benin’s Block 4 from Compagnie des Hydrocarbures Beninoise (New African 
2012). In the aftermath of approval in 2011 of national legislation requiring ten per cent biofuel in 
Mozambique, Petrobras is planning to start producing ethanol in the country in 2014, supported by 
the BNDES. Petrobras Biocombustível is going to launch a new project on sugar cane and ethanol 
production, based on the establishment of an ethanol factory in Mozambique with an initial 
production capacity of 20m litres a year to supply Mozambican customers (New African 2012). 
Petrobras also represents a model company for African countries. In Nigeria, the government is 
willing to turn the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation into something similar to Petrobras, a 
more commercially driven upstream oil company (New African 2012). 
(Cont’d) 
                                               
11  www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES_Abroad/internationalization.html. 
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Box 2.3 (cont’d)
Vale metals and mining company 
Vale is the world’s second largest company in metals and mining. The company has invested about 
US$ 2.5bn in Africa, with a presence in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia. The focus of its operations has been 
mining exploration, mainly related to iron ore and copper. Its investments in Africa over the period 
2010–15 are planned to reach US$15–20bn (ADB 2011). 
Table 2.18 Vale investments in Africa 2009–11 
Value of investment Country Project Year 
US$4bn Mozambique Moatize Coal Project: Coal production and export 2011 
US$65m South Africa Teal: copper company (50:50 joint venture) 2009 
US$145m Zambia Kokola North Copper Project 2010 
US$5bn Guinea/Liberia Simandou Iron Ore Project  2010 
Source: ADB (2011: 6). 
Vale’s main shareholders: 
 Valepar, which owns 52.7 per cent of Vale’s common shares, is a special-purpose 
company created as a result of the first stage of Vale’s privatisation in 1997, when 
Valepar acquired Vale’s controlling stake from the Brazilian government. 
 BNDESPAR, a wholly owned subsidiary of the BNDES, owns 11.51 per cent of Valepar and 
6.3 per cent of Vale’s common shares (Vale 2013). 
Direct linkages with the BNDES: 
 Vale’s outstanding debt is principally owed to the BNDES and Brazilian commercial 
banks, denominated in Brazilian reals and other currencies (Vale 2013). 
 Vale and the BNDES are parties to the Mineral Risk Contract that provides authorisations 
for the joint development of certain unexplored mineral deposits in the Northern System 
mine site. In September 2012, the parties entered into a financing agreement of R$3.9bn to 
expand logistics infrastructure in Vale’s Northern System site (Vale 2013). 
 The BNDES has provided Vale with R$7.3bn (US$3.6bn) of credit facilities (Vale 2013). 
 The BNDES holds a total of R$774.5m (US$379.0m) in debentures of Vale’s subsidiary 
Salobo Metais S.A. (Vale 2013). 
Indirect linkages with the BNDES: 
 BNDESPAR also holds a total of R$1.685bn (US$824m) in Vale debentures, which 
finance the expansion of the Ferrovia Norte-Sul (FNS) railroad. BNDESPAR is in the 
control group of several Brazilian companies with which Vale has commercial 
relationships and it has a direct stake in Vale’s subsidiaries Tecnored 
Desenvolvimento Tecnologico S.A., Vale Solucoes em Energia S.A. and Vale 
Florestar Fundo de Investimento em Participacoes (Vale 2013). 
 Nelson Henrique Barbosa Filho, Director of Vale since April 2011, was an adviser to the 
presidency of the BNDES in 2005–06 (Vale 2013). 
 Renato da Cruz Gomes, Director of Vale since April 2001, held various positions at the 
BNDES from 1976 to 2000 (Vale 2013). 
 Luciano Galvão Coutinho, Director of Vale since August 2007, has been President of the 
BNDES since 2007 (Vale 2013). 
 Luciano Siani Pires, Chief Financial Officer and Executive Officer for Investor Relations at 
Vale since August 2012 and Member of Vale’s Executive Risk Management, Finance and 
Disclosure Committees, held several executive positions at the BNDES, including Executive 
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Presidency, Head of Capital Markets and Head of Export 
Finance, from 1992 to 2008 (Vale 2013). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.3 (cont’d)
Table 2.19 Financing terms agreed with Vale by the BNDES and other 
financing partners 
Financial institution Currency Date Available 
for 
Total 
amount 
available 
Amount drawn at 
31 December 
2012 2011 2010 
Revolving credit facilities 
Revolving credit facility – 
Vale/Vale International/
Vale Canada 
US$ April 2011  5 years 3,000 – – – 
Credit lines 
Nippon Export and 
Investment Insurance 
(Nexi) 
US$ May 2008*(a) 5 years** 2,000 300 300 150 
BNDES R$ April 2008*(c) 5 years** 3,572 1,753 1,368 941 
Loans 
Export-Import Bank of 
China Bank of China 
Limited  
US$  September 2010(d) 13 years 1,229 837 467 291 
Export Development 
Canada (EDC) 
US$ October 2010(e) 10 years 1,000 975 500 250 
Korean Trade Insurance 
Corporation (‘K-Sure) 
US$ August 2011(f) 12 years 528 409 161 – 
BNDES        
Vale Fertilizantes R$ November 2009(g) 9 years 20 20 18 18 
PSI 4.50% R$ June 2010(h) 10 years 379 343 258 100 
Vale Fertilizantes R$ October 2010(i) 8 years 121 110 109 91 
PSI 5.50% R$ March 2011(j) 10 years 50 43 43 – 
CLN 150 R$ September 2012(k) 10 years 1900 1032 – – 
Vale Fertilizantes R$ October 2012(l) 6 years 44 44 – – 
PSI 2.50% R$ December 2012(m) 10 years 89 – – – 
Source: Vale (2013: F-35). 
*Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signature date. 
**The availability for application of projects is five years. 
(a) Mining projects, logistics and energy generation. Vale through its subsidiary PT Vale Indonesia Tbk (PTVI) applied in the 
amount of US$300m for the financing of the construction of the Karebbe hydroelectric plant, Indonesia and withdrew totally. 
(b) Mining projects, logistics and energy generation. 
(c) Credit lines to finance projects. 
(d) Acquisition of 12 large ore carriers from Chinese shipyards. 
(e) Financing investments in Canada and Canadian exports. 
(f) Acquisition of five large ore carriers and two capsize bulkers from two Korean shipyards. The maturity period is counted 
from each vessel delivery. 
(g) Gypsum storage in Uberaba plant. 
(h) Acquisition of domestic equipment. 
(i) Expansion of production capacity of phosphoric and sulfuric acids at Uberaba plant (Phase III). 
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2.12 Financing terms 
The BNDES provides concessionary credit that accounted for over 30 per cent of total credit 
in the country between 1997 and 2007 (Castelar Pinheiro 2012). The financing cost structure 
is as follows: 
 Direct operations: financing cost + BNDES fee + risk premium = interest rate 
o Risk premium: margin to cover non-performing loans 0.0–3.57 per cent per 
annum 
 Indirect operations: financing cost + BNDES fee + financial intermediation tax + 
financial institution spread = Interest rate 
o Financial intermediation tax: 0.0–0.5 per cent (SMEs exempt) 
o Financial institution spread: determined by the accredited financial institution 
 The financing cost is calculated on the TJLP (long-term interest rate). 
 The basic BNDES spread is based on the margin to cover operational expenses, 0.0–
2.5 per cent per annum (0.9 per cent p.a. for SMEs). 
 The Amortization Schedule varies from five to 15 years. 
Collaterals: pledge on company´s shares; concession rights pledge; company receivables; 
corporate or banking guarantees; mortgage. 
2.13 Conditionality 
As the protection and development of local manufacturing is a key strategy of the Brazilian 
government, the BNDES makes its lending to some strategic sectors (such as renewable 
energy) conditional on securing local content in the project (PWC 2013). (For more 
information, see Box 2.2 Renewable energy sector.) 
2.14 Environmental and social policies and practices 
In 2008, the BNDES signed a ‘Green Protocol’ with the Ministry of Environment in which it 
committed to adopt social and environmental criteria in its financing operations. In 2009, the 
BNDES created an Environmental Division, previously encompassed under the social 
department. 
The current structure of the BNDES Environmental Division is: 
 Department of Environmental Policies and Studies (DEMAM): in charge of drafting 
environmental policies and provision of technical support 
 Green Financing Department (DEOPE): development and execution of financial 
instruments and strategies related to sustainable environmental initiatives 
 Amazon Fund Department (DEFAM): management of the Amazon Fund 
 Legal Department (JUAMA): in charge of the legal aspects of operations, including 
checking compliance with environmental legislation. 
In the framework of the World Bank Development Policy loan in 2010, the BNDES upgraded 
its commitment to sustainable development and on 9 November 2010 it issued the Social 
and Environmental Responsibility Policy (Resolution 2023/2010), in which economic, social 
and environmental aspects are incorporated into the view on development. With this 
document, the BNDES also commits to promoting respect for human rights, ethics and 
transparency, and to opposing any kind of discrimination and violation of human and social 
standards aligned to the international norms of behaviour. 
There are also some sectorial guidelines (e.g. traceability for the cattle industry; 
Agroecological Zoning (ZAE) of cane sugar for the sugar and alcohol sector; energy 
production requirements related to emission limits; the accepted combustion systems; 
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solutions for the final disposal of ash from burning coal and from desulphuriser waste; 
restrictions on the use of water; and a compensation plan for greenhouse gas emissions) 
that set ‘indicative’ rules for projects in these sectors. They are designed from the joint work 
of the operational areas, the planning area and the Environment Area. The sectorial 
guidelines are not compulsory, i.e. there is no obligation to follow them as they are not 
included in contractual clauses, nor monitored or controlled (Franck 2012: 12). 
The Committee for Eligibility, Credit and Capital Markets (CEC) is responsible for examining 
requests for financial support and also examines the environmental impact and makes 
recommendations about what policies have to be adhered to. Since the 1990s, following 
pressure from non-governmental organisations and trades unions, the BNDES has included 
social and environmental conditionalities in its process of project evaluation. In recent years, 
these conditions have become stricter for natural resource-intensive projects and projects to 
be developed in the Amazon (Motta Veiga and Rios 2013). 
Despite the environmental and social safeguards in its project approval process, the majority 
of the BNDES portfolio (at least in value) is still made up of activities with a high impact risk. 
Table 2.20 Impact risk of the BNDES portfolio 
Level of 
risk 
Description of risk category Number of 
operations (%) 
Value of the 
operations (%) 
A Activities present risks of significant environmental impact, 
or with regional scope. Licensing requires impact studies, 
preventive measures and mitigating efforts. 
16 59 
B Activities present slight or local environmental impact. This 
requires assessment and specific measures. 
46 30 
C Activities present no environmental risk. 38 11 
Source: BNDES (2012b). 
 
Box 2.4 The Amazon Fund 
The Amazon Fund was created by the Brazilian Federal Government in 2008 and placed under the 
management of the BNDES, which is allowed to retain 3 per cent of proceeds to cover costs related 
to managing the fund (IDB 2013). The Fund obtained financial resources from the Government of 
Norway (US$1bn), the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW) (€21m) and Petrobras (US$4m). 
The main objective of the Fund is to provide financial support through non-reimbursable 
investments to projects aimed at preventing, combating, and monitoring deforestation in the 
Amazon (IDB 2012). Full Amazon Fund objectives are: 
 management of public forests and protected areas 
 environmental control, monitoring and surveillance 
 sustainable forest management 
 economic activities developed from sustainable use of the forest 
 ecological and economic zoning, land-use planning and land-title regulation 
 conservation and the sustainable use of biodiversity, and 
 recovery of deforested areas. 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 2.4 (cont’d)
Governance of the Fund: 
 The BNDES, in charge of the management of the Fund: raising funds, analysing, 
approving, contracting, monitoring projects, and finally rendering accounts (IDB 
2013) 
 Steering Committee (COFA), responsible for setting the guidelines and priorities for the 
disbursement of funds, assessing the compliance of projects against the guidelines and 
monitoring results 
 Technical Committee (CTFA), appointed by the Ministry of Environment and responsible for 
certifying reduced emissions from deforestation calculations made by the National Institute 
of Space Research and the Brazilian Forest Service (IDB 2013) 
Project approval depends on meeting the following conditions: 
 Eligibility: (i) projects must directly or indirectly contribute to reducing 
deforestation;12 (ii) be compliant with the Amazon Fund guidelines and criteria of 
financing; (iii) meet the operational criteria of BNDES; and (iv) GHG emission 
reductions cannot be negotiated in carbon markets 
 Pass the first assessment by the BNDES Priority Department of the Planning Division and a 
committee of senior executives 
 Obtain a technical recommendation for approval by Amazon Fund staff 
 Have final approval by the board of directors. 
There is a results-based management framework (RBM) in place. Obtaining funds is linked to the 
achievement of reduced deforestation that is demonstrated if deforestation in the year prior to 
payment is lower than the average for the previous ten years (IDB 2013). 
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures: 
 The BNDES reports twice a year to the COFA on the fund’s performance and 
fundraising progress. 
 An external audit is carried out annually. 
 Completed projects are required to deliver a report and an impact assessment highlighting 
environmental achievements. 
 An annual meeting of the BNDES and donors must be held to discuss future directions of 
the fund. 
Table 2.21 Scale of Amazon Fund operations (as at December of year) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 
Number of projects 5 13 23 36 45 
Amount (US$m) 40 99 134 189 270 
Source: Amazon Fund (2013a). 
*November 2013 
Geographical distribution of supported projects: 
 Paraíba 12 projects (27 per cent) 
 Interstate 10 (22 per cent) 
 Mato Grosso 8 (18 per cent) 
 Amazonas 5 (11 per cent) 
(Cont’d) 
                                               
12 Up to 20 per cent of the funding can be devoted to projects targeting other Brazilian biomes or other tropical countries to 
monitor and control their deforestation levels. 
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Box 2.4 (cont’d)
Sample projects: 
IMAZON – AMAZON INSTITUTE OF PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(US$5.5m; area covered: 66,640 km2) 
Description: IMAZON is a non-profit research institution working to promote sustainable 
development in the Amazon through studies, support for public policy formulation, broad 
dissemination of information and capacity building. Founded in 1990 and located in the metropolitan 
region of Belém (Pará, Brazil), IMAZON is a member of the Amazon Network for Socio-
environmental Information (RAISG). In partnership with Google, IMAZON has developed the 
Deforestation Alert System (SAD), a monitoring technology available worldwide (Imazon 2013). In 
2012, the BNDES contributed 18.86 per cent of the funds received in that year. The financed 
projects are about the collection of environmental and land-related data on rural properties in order 
to register land owners at the Environmental Rural Registry (state of Pará). 
TNC – THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (US$9.1m; area covered: 120,000km2) 
Description: TNC promotes the environmental registration of rural producers operating in the 
sectors of wood production, cattle-raising and soybean harvesting in 12 municipalities of the Mato 
Grosso and Pará states. 
IOV – OURO VERDE INSTITUTE (US$3.1m) 
Description: IVO is involved in the environmental recovery of degraded areas by introducing 
sustainable forest management, agricultural production and animal-raising practices and helping 
family farms in six municipalities of Mato Grosso. 
ARPA – PROTECTED AMAZON AREAS (US$11.4m; area covered: 320,000km2) 
Description: ARPA works to halt deforestation by creating and consolidating new conservation units. 
FAS – AMAZONAS SUSTAINABLE FOUNDATION (US$11m; area covered: 
100,000km2) 
Description: FAS prevents and controls deforestation by providing payment for environmental 
services, promoting sustainable productive activities and raising the living standards of the 
population in the forest. 
Source: Amazon Fund (2013b). 
  
64 
Box 2.5 The Climate Fund 
In 2010, Brazil founded the National Fund on Climate Change (FNMC), an institute that would 
provide finance to mitigation and adaptation projects as well as support studies on climate change 
and its effects. The BNDES is the institution appointed to manage this fund (Decree Nº 7,343 of 26 
October 2010). 
By law (the Petroleum Law) it was established that, together with funds coming from public, private, 
national and international donors, some of the resources to finance Climate Fund operations would 
come from a tax on profits in the oil sector. The 2011 FNMC budget was approximately US$132m 
(R$ 226m), while the estimated revenues were R$300m (approximately US$176m) per year (IDB 
2012). 
The Fund is a key instrument of the Brazilian government to implement the National Policy on 
Climate Change by offering support to projects that aspire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
adapt to climate change. The Fund provides support to six types of investment projects related to 
the following areas: 
1. Efficient means of transport 
2. Efficient machinery and equipment 
3. Renewable energy 
4. Waste into energy 
5. Wood coal 
6. Combating desertification. 
2.15 Debated issues 
2.15.1 Environmental issues 
 The BNDES’s energy strategy risks further contributing to climate change. 
Aligned to the strategy of the Brazilian government, the BNDES supports hydropower 
development in the Amazon region with disruptive development impacts on forests 
and methane emissions together with other social, human and environmental impacts 
as claimed by numerous civil society organisations, represented in the BNDES 
Platform.13 
 Not having signed the Equator Principles. Despite having signed the Green 
Protocol and made great improvements in promoting environmental and social 
safeguards, unlike other Brazilian banks (Banco do Brasil, Itau, Bradesco), the 
BNDES still has not signed the Equator Principles (Franck 2012). The BNDES also 
chose not to adhere to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) performance 
standards which guide the financial sector in incorporating social and environmental 
criteria into project finance (NGO Reporter Brazil and Biofuel Watch Center 2011). 
 No independent evaluation of the environmental impacts of financed projects. 
The BNDES has been accused of being an important driver of deforestation in Brazil 
(Franck 2012: 13) due to its investments in cattle ranching, soybean plantations and 
hydropower plants. The reason behind this has been identified as the lack of 
appropriate and systematic assessment of the environmental impacts of BNDES-
financed projects. The environmental impact assessments carried out are often 
undertaken by the same companies involved in constructing the project, which means 
they lack independence. 
                                               
13A network established in 2007 and composed of over 25 organisations, involved in sector-based mobilisation movements that 
watch BNDES operations, promoting the respect of social and environmental safeguards. The platform draws on previous work 
carried out in the framework of the 2005 programme on Development and Rights launched by the Instituto Brasileiro de Análises 
Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE), a Rio de Janeiro-based civil society organisation. 
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2.15.2 Social issues 
 Sector-specific regulations are insufficient in practice. Despite the BNDES 
putting in place sector-specific regulations related to the cattle raising industry, the 
meatpacking and slaughtering industry, and sugar-alcohol production, environmental 
and social violations are still being reported. For example, there is evidence of use of 
child and slave labour, indigenous land invasion and deforestation by companies 
running projects in those sectors. 
 Serious violations of legal, health and safety conditions, culminating in the use 
of slave labour. The BNDES does not pay enough attention to the legal, health and 
safety conditions of workers in the companies getting its loans. The lack of safe 
working conditions caused numerous deaths on the construction sites of the large 
Belo Monte, Santo Antonio and Jirau hydroelectric plants. Although it was notified of 
health and safety violations by the local authorities, the BNDES extended its loans to 
such projects. Some of the companies financed by the BNDES have been reported 
for serious labour violations, culminating in the most extreme cases with the company 
being included on the Ministry of Employment’s slave labour ‘dirty list’. The BNDES 
generally only revokes financing of a company after it has been included on such a 
list. For example, Cosan – the largest producer of sugar and ethanol in Brazil – was 
officially included on the list in 2011. Critics of the BNDES point out that it should 
have taken action against the Cosan group well before it was included on the list as 
relevant irregularities had been reported during inspections of its plants – i.e. ‘the 
extinction of individual labour contracts, excessive working hours, overtime, unhealthy 
and hazardous activities and operations, unpaid dismissal fees, problems with 
individual protection equipment, production incorrectly recorded, irregular working 
papers, labour intermediation, among others’ (NGO Reporter Brazil and Biofuel 
Watch Center 2011: 16). The view of NGOs and civil society organisations is that the 
BNDES should not finance companies reporting such violations even if they have not 
yet been placed on the Ministry’s ‘dirty list’. 
 Invasion of indigenous land. The BNDES has not taken into account the impact of 
projects on indigenous communities when approving several loans. For example, the 
huge Belo Monte hydroelectric project proposes to divert 80 per cent of the flow of the 
Xingu River and, as well as devastating an extensive area of the Amazon forest, will 
displace over 20,000 people, including indigenous peoples and other traditional 
communities (International Rivers 2012). In September 2013, some 150 indigenous 
people occupied one of the sites to demonstrate against the project (Amazon Watch 
2013b). 
2.15.3 Adverse impact on the Brazilian economy 
 Energy efficiency overlooked. The BNDES does not prioritise energy efficiency. 
Rather, it has extensively supported energy projects such as hydroelectric dams so 
as to guarantee that demand meets the energy supply (from renewable resources). 
As argued by a WWF-Brazil study, investments in energy efficiency that would cut 40 
per cent of the expected demand between 2007 and 2020 would save the equivalent 
energy produced by 14 Belo Monte hydroelectric plants, saving up to US$19bn and 
reducing the installed capacity by 78,000 MW (Banktrack 2014). To gain better 
understanding of the proportion of investments going to energy efficiency, 
International Rivers reports that in 2009 the BNDES disbursed US$8bn to Brazil’s 
electric sector, of which only 0.1 per cent (about US$9.5m) went to energy efficiency 
projects (International Rivers 2012). The BNDES therefore seems myopic in 
considering the most valuable investments for the long-term sustainable development 
of the country. 
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 Business interests dominate. Strictly connected to the point made by WWF-Brazil, 
Franck (2012) argues that the BNDES would support a green economy dominated by 
business interests at the expense of Brazil’s natural resources, environment and 
population. In this respect, the study quotes the controversial hydroelectric mega 
projects (e.g. the Belo Monte dam), nuclear power plants (e.g. Angra 3), 
unsustainable cattle-raising practices in the Amazon forests and finally the sugar 
cane plantations that are invading indigenous areas. 
 Displacement of agricultural crops to less productive areas. Through its support 
for the expansion of sugar cane plantations to feed sugar-alcohol processing plants, 
the BNDES has been blamed for the displacement of other agricultural crops to less 
productive areas. 
 Reinforcing inequality (Armijo 2013: 21). The BNDES finances large-scale, almost 
monopolistic, corporations, which account for over 70 per cent of all its 
disbursements, with the ten largest corporations making up 36 per cent of the total. 
Perversely, these bigger firms access cheaper credit than small businesses and 
poorer households, which have to borrow at higher rates. BNDES subsidised funding 
for such big companies is not really justified as they could easily raise funds from 
other commercial banks or in the international capital market (Castelar Pinheiro 
2012). 
 The crowding-out effect. The BNDES undermines the development of the private 
capital market in Brazil (Armijo 2013). The BNDES’ presence in the Brazil capital 
market means that the market is heavily influenced by the state. The BNDES borrows 
from the government (Treasury) at a TJLP rate that is currently 5 per cent a year. This 
rate is much lower than the Central Bank’s target overnight interest rate, making 
BNDES lending significantly cheaper than the market rate. This makes it very difficult 
for commercial banks to compete with the BNDES (Castelar Pinheiro 2012). The 
crowd-out effect has been smoothed in some cases as the BNDES managed to 
‘crowding in’ other private banks and investors in some strategic projects, e.g. the 
Belo Monte dam, which has been co-financed by BTG Pactual and the Caixa 
Economica Federal. 
 Public money for centrally-prioritised investments. The BNDES is said to provide 
long-term funding to be used in strategic sectors as set by the National Sustainable 
Development Strategy. In this position, the BNDES’ subsidised financing is justified 
by the economic argument for government provision of public goods (Wheatley 
2009). As a consequence, critics point out that the BNDES should restrict its 
operations to its core competency sectors (namely infrastructure, heavy industry, 
innovation and special purpose funds) instead of being present in every sector of the 
Brazilian economy. 
 Concessionary finance has the effect of raising Brazilian interest rates (Arida 
2005; Romero 2011; De Mello and Garcia 2012; Armijo 2013) as the state has to 
borrow at a much higher rate in order to fund the BNDES. In this context, the BNDES 
also falls beyond the authority of the Central Bank as BNDES interest rates are not 
determined by the Central Bank. Brazilian monetary policy affects the interest rates 
provided by other commercial banks (Castelar Pinheiro 2012). 
 Low profitability of funded projects. Some of the projects financed by the BNDES 
have been found to have high costs and produce low returns, e.g. the Belo Monte 
dam which reached R$44bn (US$25bn). At the same time, some argue that the 
BNDES’ use of public money to finance big companies at the expense of Brazilian 
taxpayers also has little economic justification. The money going to Petrobras, for 
instance, has been criticised for being excessive. The Finance Ministry borrows to 
lend to the BNDES, which in turn lends or buys stocks in Petrobras. This circle seems 
to fuel chronic inflation (Gall 2011). 
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2.15.4 Transparency and accountability issues 
 No external assessment. There is no public discussion on Treasury allocations to 
the BNDES and no external assessments of the bank (Castelar Pinheiro 2012). 
 No detail on the Ombudsperson. In 2003, the BNDES created an Ombudsperson 
responsible for replying to public and private suggestions, reporting misconduct, and 
dealing with complaints. Despite the importance of this institution in terms of 
accountability, the BNDES gives little information about its functioning and regarding 
complaints received.14 
 No public consultation carried out prior project finance approval. The BNDES, 
through its portal BNDES Transparente, publishes a list and short description of 
approved projects by sector every three months. However, this is an ex post action 
and does not enable stakeholders to comment in advance on projects to be financed. 
As argued by Franck (2012), other multilateral development banks (e.g. the World 
Bank/IFC) disclose information prior to project finance being approved in order to 
leave room for discussion that is then taken into consideration by the Board 
approving the projects (Franck 2012: 15). Also, the BNDES provides very little 
information on the projects it finances, and should give more detail (NGO Reporter 
Brazil and Biofuel Watch Center 2011). For example, the bank does not publish the 
legal, social, environmental and land-related safeguards it demands from projects it 
funds, and gives no details regarding enforcement procedures related to the 
safeguards (such as appropriate adjustment measures and sanctions). In the case of 
the BNDES’ socio-environmental policies, the lack of consultation with civil society 
organisations through Platforma BNDES may support ineffective policies. As argued, 
the BNDES should monitor closely the projects it funds, assess their impact and 
publicise what audits have been carried out and any sanctions that have been 
applied. 
  
                                               
14 See Accountability Counsel, www.accountabilitycounsel.org/resources/arg/the-brazilian-development-banks-ombudsperson/. 
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3 India Country Profile: The Exim Bank of 
India 
3.1 Background 
The development finance framework of India is highly fragmented. There are four types of 
development bank: 
 Industrial development banks: e.g. the Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
(IFCI), Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) and Small Industries Development 
Bank of India (SIDBI) 
 Agricultural development banks: e.g. the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) 
 The Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank). 
 Housing development banks: e.g. the National Housing Bank (NHB). 
The Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) was the first development bank in India, 
established on 1 July 1948 under the Industrial Finance Corporation Act of 1948. Its objective 
is to provide medium- to long-term financial assistance to medium- and large-scale 
industries. Its resources come from (i) the issuing of shares and bonds ownership capital, (ii) 
borrowing from the Reserve Bank, the IDBI and central government, and (iii) deposits from 
the public, state governments and local authorities. The IFCI finances the manufacturing, 
services and infrastructure sectors. 
The Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI), was established on 1 July 1964 under an 
Act of Parliament. It was originally a wholly owned subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India, 
but on 16 February 1976 its ownership was transferred to the Government of India. The bank 
provides credit facilities and other services to almost the whole range of Indian industrial 
activities, including manufacturing and services. It is also the principal institution coordinating 
the activities of other financial institutions in the country that promote and finance industrial 
development in India. 
The Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) was set up on 2 April 1990 through 
an Act of Parliament for the promotion, financing and development of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Originally it was a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Industrial Development Bank of India but now its shareholders are spread among various 
state-owned banks, insurance companies and financial institutions. As the SIDBI provides 
concessional credit to MSMEs, it has played an important role in India’s economic recovery 
following economic downturns. 
The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) was established on 12 
July 1982 by a special Act of Parliament. Its objective is to promote and develop agriculture, 
small-scale industries, cottage and village industries, handicrafts and other rural crafts, and 
other allied economic activities in rural areas. It was set up as an apex bank with the 
mandate to provide refinancing for lending institutions working in rural areas, as well as to 
promote institutional development and monitor client banks and other lending institutions. 
The National Housing Bank (NHB) is an apex bank and was created on 8 July 1988 under 
the 1987 National Housing Bank Act. It is owned by the Reserve Bank of India and is in 
control of the country’s housing financial system. In this role, the NHB provides financial and 
other support to housing finance institutions both at local and regional levels. 
The Exim Bank interacts with several international banks, multilateral institutions (the World 
Bank, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and 
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International Monetary Fund) and export-credit agencies (the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, other US government agencies, industry associations and corporations). 
Within this framework, the Exim Bank of India was created in 1981 as the leading 
development financial institute for the promotion of India’s international trade. 
As a consequence of India’s expanding role in the global economy, the central government 
assigned the Exim Bank the task of channelling government credit towards foreign countries 
and/or Indian exporting companies by setting up lines of credit. Until 2004, the Exim Bank 
had a virtual monopoly in this (Economic Times 2004), but since then has shared the task 
with other national banks (the State Bank of India, the Bank of Baroda and the Indian 
Overseas Bank). The Exim Bank has also cooperated with other domestic institutions to fulfill 
this assignment. In 2013, for instance, it signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the 
Small and Medium Business Development (SME) Chamber of India for the promotion of 
exports, which entails activities aiming to channel export finance, identify potential export 
markets, carry out research, and provide training and education (The Hindu Business Line 
2013). 
Since 1996, the Exim Bank has been part of the Asian Exim Banks Forum (AEBF), which 
comprises export credit agencies (ECAs) from India, Australia, China, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand (all founding members), Indonesia, the Philippines and, shortly, Vietnam. 
The Asian Development Bank has permanent observer status in the Forum. 
In March 2006, the Global Network of Exim Banks and Development Finance Institutions (G-
NEXID) was set up in Geneva and the Exim Bank of India became a member. The aim of G-
NEXID is to foster enhanced South-South trade and investment cooperation. 
In April 2010, the Exim Bank signed the Framework Agreement on Financial Cooperation 
within the BRICS Inter-Bank Cooperation Mechanism, together with Brazil’s Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES), the Russian State Corporation Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs – Vnesheconombank, the China Development 
Bank, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
In 2012, India’s Exim Bank signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the 
Ecobank Group (Togo) to support cross-border transactions and projects of common 
interest, facilitate India-Africa trade and investment, and the establishment of joint ventures 
(Exim Bank of India 2013a: 52). 
In 2013, the bank signed a memorandum of cooperation (MOC) with the IDBI to co-finance, 
co-arrange, syndicate rupee and foreign currency loans, jointly finance export-oriented 
projects in India, and provide a refinancing facility to Indian export-oriented companies (in 
both Indian rupees and foreign currencies), particularly in the MSME sector (Exim Bank of 
India 2013a). 
3.2 Origin and mission statement 
The Exim Bank of India was established in 1981 by the Government of India to deal with 
international development and the integration of Indian companies into the world economy. 
Its official mandate is to: ‘not just enhance exports from India, but also to integrate the 
country’s foreign trade and investment with the overall economic growth’.15 
  
                                               
15 See www.eximbankindia.in/?q=organization. 
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Its main objectives as stated in the constituent act are: 
providing financial assistance to exporters and importers, and for functioning as the 
principal financial institution for coordinating the working of institutions engaged in 
financing export and import of goods and services with a view to promoting the 
country’s international trade… act on business principles with due regard to public 
interest. 
(Export-Import Bank of India Act 1981) 
3.3 History 
When India introduced market-oriented economic reforms in 1991, the Exim Bank acquired a 
more powerful position in facilitating imports and augmenting exports according to newly-
issued foreign policy measures. It was in 2003–04, however, that the Exim Bank was 
appointed to enhance the country’s engagement with other developing countries. 
In its 2003 budget speech, the Indian government launched the India Development Initiative 
(IDI), a new approach to development cooperation that officially shifted India from a recipient 
of foreign assistance to an aid donor (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013). 
In 2004, as a result of this changing approach, the India Development and Economic 
Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) was launched to provide lines of credit through India’s Exim 
Bank (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013; Chaturvedi 2012). 
3.4 Mandate and strategy 
The Exim Bank was created to provide financial support to exporting and importing 
companies and importers and to function as the principal financial institution for coordinating 
the working of institutions engaged in financing the export and import of goods and services 
with a view to promoting the country's international trade. 
It supports Indian companies to ‘invest abroad for, inter alia, setting up manufacturing units 
and for acquiring overseas companies to get access to the foreign market, technology, raw 
material, brand, IPR etc’.16 
The strategy behind Exim Bank operations is that of promoting India’s political, economic and 
commercial interests, as openly stated by the Government of India (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 
2013). The whole structure of Indian aid, relying on lines of credit extended to overseas 
governments, has been interpreted as an instrument for Indian companies to gain access to 
overseas markets as well as to foster Indian investment abroad (Price 2005; Agrawal 2007; 
Kragelund 2008). 
The lines of credit extended to African governments seem to have focused on oil-rich nations 
and there is also evidence of overlapping commercial and business interests for the Indian 
companies operating in those countries (both companies involved in infrastructure 
development and oil companies operating in the same countries). This has been explained in 
the literature as India’s open interest in contributing comprehensively to the economic 
development of the developing countries to which it has extended aid, so as to create more 
business opportunities for Indian companies in all fields of the economy (Fuchs and 
Vadlamannati 2013). In those oil-rich African nations, Indian companies have reached 
sectors such as information and communications technology (ICT), infrastructure and 
agriculture (Agrawal 2007; Chanana 2010; Katti et al. 2009; Sinha and Hubbard 2012; Naidu 
2008; Naidu and Herman 2009).17 
                                               
16 See www.eximbankindia.in/?q=oif. 
17 This is a result of the Government of India’s Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) programme 
which is implemented by extending lines of credit worth US$500m to nine West African countries (Kragelund 2008). 
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3.5 Organisational structure 
The managing body of the Exim Bank is the Board of Directors, which is under the control of 
the Government of India, as appears clearly in its statute. The government nominates a 
chairman and a managing director, plus another two full-time directors (Press Information 
Bureau Government of India Cabinet 2011). Members from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of External Affairs and Ministry of Commerce and Industry are also on the Exim board. The 
number of directors nominated by the government, however, cannot exceed 12. 
The Board of Directors also comprises of one director nominated by the Reserve Bank; one 
nominated by the Development Bank and, finally, one nominated by the Export Credit and 
Guarantee Corporation Limited. 
The functions of the bank are divided between the following divisions: 
 Corporate Banking, responsible for financing programmes directed at Indian export-
oriented companies. 
 Project Finance/Trade Finance, in charge of administering export credit services (e.g. 
supplier's credit and pre-shipment credit) 
 Agriculture Business, managing agricultural sector financing 
 Small and Medium Enterprise, handling credit proposals from SMEs 
 Export Services, delivering advisory and information services related to investment 
promotion 
 Support Services, namely Research and Planning, Treasury and Accounts, Loan 
Administration, Internal Audit, Management Information Services, Information 
Technology, Legal, and Human Resources. 
The Bank’s Head Office is in Mumbai and there are nine regional offices in India. Overseas, 
the bank has representative offices in Johannesburg (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Addis 
Ababa (Ethiopia), Dubai (Emirates), London (UK), Singapore and Washington DC (US). 
3.6 Sector focus 
Table 3.1 Sector-wise exposure 
Sector (%) 
Ferrous metal and metal processing 10.41 
Engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) services 9.41 
Textiles and garments 8.06 
Drugs and pharmaceuticals 6.28 
Auto and auto components 5.55 
Chemicals and dyes 5.50 
Petroleum products 4.83 
Capital goods 3.46 
Non-ferrous metal and metal processing 3.31 
Renewable energy 3.16 
Other 40.03 
Source: Exim Bank of India (2013a: 52). 
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3.7 Geographic focus 
The Exim Bank has offered over 140 lines of credit (LOCs) to overseas governments and 
other financial entities. About 100 of these targeted African countries with a special focus on 
the agricultural sector (Vaidyanathan 2013). In 2012, the 18 LOCs extended by Exim India 
for financing exports of Indian projects, products and services in Africa totalled US$1,499m 
and reached the majority of countries in West Africa. In 2013, the Exim Bank allocated LOCs 
worth US$808.61m to African countries and US$697.37m to the Asian region. 
Figure 3.1 Geographic distribution of the operative lines of credit            
(as at 31 March 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Exim Bank of India (2013a). 
Table 3.2 Geographic distribution of the operative lines of credit            
(as at 31 March)  
 2005 2011* 2012 2013 
Total US$953m US$7,054m US$8,160 US$8,560m 
Africa 32% 54% 53% 59% 
Asia 42% 43% 42% 36% 
Oceania – 1% 1% 1% 
Latin America and Caribbean 21% 1% 2% 2% 
Europe and CIS 5% 1% 2% 2% 
*as at 31 October 2011 
Source: Exim Bank of India (2013a). 
Most interest by Indian investors operating in Africa is concentrated in South Africa. Other 
countries are Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Mozambique (Jones 2013). In these countries 
the Exim Bank offered LOCs linked to infrastructure projects (power, road and rail), soft skill 
development, capacity building, technology knowledge transfer and training in exports (CII 
Africa Conclave 2012). 
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Table 3.3 Geographic allocation of Exim India credit lines in 2013 
Region Entity Amount (US$m) 
East Africa  93 
 Burundi Government 80 
Mozambique Government 13 
West Africa  325.6 
 Economic Community Of West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
ECOWAS Bank of Investment 
and Development 
150 
Mali Government 100 
Senegal Government 27.50 
Togo Government 15 and 13.10 
Nigeria Nigerian Exim Bank 20 
Southern Africa  50 
 Zambia Government 50 
Central Africa  340.01 
 Chad Government 40.32 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Government 168 
Republic of Congo Government 70 
Central African Republic Government 39.69 + 20 
Asia  697.37 
 Nepal Government 250 
Republic of Maldives Government 40 
Sri Lanka Government 382.37 
Mongolia Government 20 
Source: Exim Bank of India (2013a). 
 
Box 3.1 The Exim Bank’s role in Government of India regional focus 
programmes 
Other Government of India programmes administered by the Exim Bank are Focus Africa, Focus 
Latin America and the Caribbean and Focus Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Focus Africa programme 
On 31 March 2002, the Government of India (GOI) announced its Focus Africa programme along 
with its 2002–07 EXIM policy. The Programme was initially meant to target seven sub-Saharan 
countries – South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia – and to be later 
extended to all sub-Saharan African countries where India has diplomatic missions – i.e. Angola, 
Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe – and North African countries – i.e. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco 
and Algeria. 
A process of country risk evaluation is undertaken by the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of 
India (ECGC). The ECGC periodically reviews the grading of the perceived risk of each country and, 
wherever this improves, signals the change to the GOI and the Exim. 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 3.1 (cont’d)
The objective under this programme – worth US$550m18 – is to enhance commercial relations 
between India and African countries. The Exim Bank has been appointed as the implementing 
institution and administrator of export subsidies to Indian companies, including SMEs trading with 
African nations and LOCs to African governments tied to the purchase of Indian products (Fuchs 
and Vadlamannati 2013). Products traded under these arrangements are industrial manufactures, 
consumer durables and capital and engineering goods. The role of the Exim Bank in this context is 
that of an intermediary that mitigates the repayment risk for the Indian exporters. In fact, while part 
of the contract value (15–20 per cent) is paid in advance by the overseas importers, the rest (80–85 
per cent) is paid directly by the Exim Bank to the Indian exporters on the shipment of goods 
(Government of India 2012a). 
So far, the Exim Bank has contributed to India-Africa trade relations by offering US$6bn in LOCs to 
45 African countries in order to promote their import of Indian equipment and services on deferred 
credit terms. Looking at the evolution of LOCs to Africa, there has been a significant increase in the 
volume of LOCs offered. In 2004/05, LOCs to Africa amounted to US$304m but had reached 
US$4.3bn in 2011/12 (Taraporevala and Mullen 2013). 
The Indian LOCs to Africa have gone towards infrastructure and development projects, such as one 
hydroelectric project in the DRC; a housing project in Gabon; the development of the sugar industry 
in Ethiopia; the Gaza electrification project in Mozambique (Jones 2013); agriculture, ICT and 
potable water in Sierra Leone (US$74.45m); and a solar street-lighting project in ECOWAS 
(US$20m) (World Trade Organization 2013). 
In Central Africa, the Exim Bank has supported Indian companies’ exports of power transmission 
equipment and other industrial machinery into the DRC through a LOC of US$168m linked to the 
Ketende hydro-electric project (WTO 2013). 
In East Africa, the Exim Bank has financed projects in textile, agribusiness and in natural resources 
sectors. For example, in Ethiopia Indian firms have invested heavily in agriculture and mining, and 
the bank contributed to the development and rehabilitation of the sugar industry by offering four 
concessional LOCs of US$213m, US$122m, US$166m and US$91m (WTO 2013; Schellhase 
2013). 
Table 3.4 Sector allocation of credit lines extended to African countries 
Projects/sectors Countries 
Agriculture Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania 
Construction Gabon, Gambia and Ghana 
Irrigation Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Senegal 
Power generation DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger and 
Sudan 
Power transmission and 
distribution, rural electrification 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique and Senegal 
Railway rehabilitation  Angola, Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal 
Road transportation  Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger and 
Senegal 
Technology (parks and training) Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Mozambique and Senegal 
Sugar industry rehabilitation  Ethiopia and Sudan 
Source: Exim Bank of India (2011). 
(Cont’d) 
                                               
18 Value relating to the 2002–07 period. 
75 
Box 3.1 (cont’d)
Focus Latin American and Caribbean programme 
India has demonstrated an interest in the trade growth potential of the Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries. The total merchandise exports of Latin America were US$1,097.207bn 
in 2011. Over the same period, India imported US$18.61bn from LAC. The total LAC imports in 
2011 were US$1038.245bn, of which US$13.64bn was India’s export to LAC. 
Table 3.5 Top Indian trade partners in LAC in 2011–12 (in US$m) 
Country Exports Imports Total trade 
Brazil 5,769.28 4,315.25 10,084.54 
Venezuela 249.6 6,666.62 6,916.22 
Chile 521.83 2,057.83 2,579.66 
Bahamas 2,243.52 3.49 2,247.01 
Argentina 473.45 1,052.61 1,526.07 
Colombia 887.34 559.13 1,446.47 
Peru 563.86 470.16 1,034.02 
Panama Republic 232. 17 163.19 395.36 
Ecuador 231.55 62.42 293.97 
Trinidad 82.46 205.25 287.72 
Source: Government of India (2012c). 
Table 3.6 Top items of Indian exports to LAC in 2011–12 (in US$m) 
Commodity Apr–Mar 
2011 
Apr–Mar 
2012 
% Growth % Share in 
2011–12 
Petroleum (crude and products) 3,852.56 5,035.12 30.70 41.04 
Transport equipment 792.07 1,078.52 36.16 8.79 
Drugs, pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals 682.11 71.49 4.81 5.83 
Machinery and instruments 449.39 615.48 36.96 5.02 
Plastic and linoleum products 219.68 628.18 185.95 5.12 
Manmade Yarn, fabrics, madeups 514.86 566.09 9.95 4.61 
Inorganic/organic agro chemicals 404.82 555.43 37.21 4.53 
Cotton yarn, fabrics, made-ups 421.65 464.66 10.2 3.79 
Manufactures of metals 193.66 251.84 30.04 2.05 
Primary and semi-finished iron and steel 246.76 219.16 -11.18 1.79 
RMG cotton incl. accessories 112.78 206.65 83.23 1.68 
Rubber manufactured products except footwear 126.87 189.14 49.09 1.54 
Other ores and minerals 175.72 164.99 -6.1 1.34 
Electronic goods 120.2 154.58 28.6 1.26 
Dyes/intermediates and coal tar chemicals 124.06 153.47 23.7 1.25 
Source: Government of India (2012c). 
Despite the modest position of India in LAC trade, the country has shown great interest in the 
potential of the LAC region and bilateral relations have grown steadily over time as a result of GOI 
efforts in boosting commercial relations. In November 1997, the Ministry of Commerce launched the 
Focus LAC programme aimed at granting incentives for Indian exporters to operate in the Latin 
America region. Products targeted by the programme have been: 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 3.1 (cont’d)
 Textiles, including readymade garments, carpets and handicrafts 
 Engineering products (and computer software) 
 Chemical products, including drugs/pharmaceuticals. 
These three categories now constitute nearly half of India’s exports to the region (Government of 
India 2012c). In the textile sector, the main products are readymade garments, made-up fabrics, 
yarn, carpets and handicrafts. Among the engineering products are automobiles, auto components, 
electrical appliances and machinery. In the last group, Indian exports concentrate on bulk drugs, 
pharmaceuticals, dyes and intermediate agrochemicals, plastic products, naphtha, resins, essential 
oils, molasses, tyres for buses, trucks and cycles. 
Table 3.7 Lines of credit extended by the Exim Bank through the LAC 
programme (in US$m)  
Borrower Amount 
of credit 
Purpose Tenure 
Banco de Comercio 
Exterior de Colombia S.A. 
(Bancoldex), Colombia 
10.00 General purpose Up to 5 years 
Corporacion Andina de 
Fomento (Andean 
Development Corporation) 
(covering Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Venezuela) 
10.00 General purpose Tranche a: 
up to 5 years 
Tranche b: 
up to 2 years 
Banco Bradesco S.A., 
Brazil 
10.00 General purpose Tranche a: 
up to 5 years 
Tranche b: 
up to 2 years 
Republic Bank Ltd., 
Trinidad & Tobago 
8.00 General purpose Up to 5 years 
Government of Suriname 16.00 General purpose Up to 15 
years 
Government of Guyana 19.00 Cricket stadium in Georgetown Up to 20 
years 
Government of Honduras 30.00 Communications, health, transport and Air 
Force components from India to Honduras 
Up to 20 
years 
Government of Guyana 2.10 Signalling system Up to 20 
years 
Government of Jamaica 7.50 Export of water pumps Up to 12 
years 
Government of Suriname 10.40 Water supply project Up to 15 
years 
Government of Suriname 10.59 Purchases from Bharat Electronics, 
Hindustan Aeronautics and Ordinance 
Factory Board 
Up to 15 
years 
Government of Suriname 4.3 Supply of ten crash fire tenders Up to 15 
years 
Government of Suriname 5.76 Purchase of helicopters from Hindustan 
Aeronautics 
Up to 15 
years 
Source: Government of India (2012c). 
(Cont’d) 
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Box 3.1 (cont’d)
Focus Commonwealth of Independent States programme 
Launched in 2003, the Focus on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) programme initially 
focused on seven CIS countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Later, the scope was extended to the rest of the region, including the 
Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. 
Currently, the bulk of India-CIS trade is with Russia (61.2 per cent of India’s exports; 59.8 per cent 
of India’s imports from the region) and Ukraine (25.8 per cent of total trade). India's major export 
products to CIS are: pharmaceuticals; coffee/tea/spices; readymade garments, iron and steel, and 
machinery. India’s major import commodities from CIS are iron/steel/nickel, fertilisers, mineral fuel, 
cereals, and rubber (Government of India 2012b). 
Table 3.8 Lines of credit to CIS countries 
Institution  Country  Amount (US$m) 
Vneshtorgbank Russia 25  
Vnesheconombank Russia 10  
Bank TuranAlem Kazakhstan 10 
Absolut Bank Russia 10 
Source: Government of India (2012b). 
3.8 Financial performance 
Selected financial indicators (as measured at 31 March 2012) 
 Total assets: 655.63bn rupees (approx. US$10.9bn); (547.50bn rupees (approx. 
US$9.10bn) in 2010/11) 
 Ratio of adjusted total equity to adjusted assets: 9.8 per cent in 2012; (16 per cent 
prior to 2005)19 
 Total profits: 10.89bn rupees (approx. US$179.6m); (10.13bn rupees – approx. 
US$168.4m – in 2010/11,) 
 Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio: 1.46 per cent in 2012 (1.04% in 2011)20 
 Return on assets (ROA) ratio: 1.13 per cent (on average over 2010–12 period)21 
In total, the amount of loan disbursements during 2012/13 amounted to 406.35bn rupees 
(approx. US $6.66bn) while for 2011/12 they reached 370.45bn rupees (approx. US$607m) 
(Exim India 2013a). Guarantees issued amounted to CR 47.44bn (approx. US$ 778m) during 
2012/13 (as at 31 March) and to CR 13.61bn (approx. US$223.38m) in 2011/12. 
3.9 Sources of finance 
The Exim Bank raises capital through (i) the issue/sell of bonds and debentures; (ii) 
borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India; (iii) borrowing from the central government or 
other national authority, organisation or institution approved by the central government; and 
(iv) borrowing from the International Markets. 
                                               
19 Reuters (2012). 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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Table 3.9 Total loan disbursements and guarantees 2003/04 to 2013/14 (in 
rupees billions) 
Year Approvals Disbursements Loan assets (1) Approvals Issuance Guarantee 
portfolio 
2003/04 92.657 69.575 107.751 10.792 5.743 15.769 
2004/05 158.535 114.352 129.104 15.887 16.602 23.727 
2005/06 204.887 150.389 175.931 43.264 21.959 34.023 
2006/07 267.622 220.760 228.862 49.978 16.972 35.360 
2007/08 328.045 271.587 287.767 21.994 20.386 34.556 
2008/09 336.285 289.327 341.564 16.184 10.315 35.401 
2009/10 388.430 332.485 390.357 13.508 3.875 22.736 
2010/11 477.984 344.233 456.558 32.165 11.535 30.557 
2011/12 444.119 370.451 538.898 27.549 13.611 32.407 
2012/13 419.185 406.349 643.530 58.075 29.378 47.440 
Source: Adapted from Exim Bank India (2013a). 
Table 3.10 Origins of the Exim Bank’s resources from 2003 to 2013 (in 
rupees billions)  
Financial year Paid-up capital Reserves Borrowings* Total resources 
2003/04 6.500 14.933 119.206 155.192 
2004/05 8.500 16.625 120.118 156.922 
2005/06 9.500 17.703 160.090 201.401 
2006/07 10.000 18.741 216.616 262.439 
2007/08 11.000 21.064 317.163 373.006 
2008/09 14.000 24.681 372.023 442.017 
2009/10 17.000 28.316 405.088 470.715 
2010/11 20.000 32.302 471.918 547.508 
2011–12 23.000 37.003 546.546 636.730 
2012–13 30.594 41.796 644.848 761.182 
*Borrowings include deposits which are net of reciprocal deposits placed/investments made with counter-parties for the years 
2004–05 to 2006–07 
Source: Adapted from Exim Bank of India (2013a: 2). 
Currently the paid-up capital of the Exim Bank is 30.6bn rupees (approx. US$511m) and total 
resources amount to 761.2bn rupees (approx. US$12.7bn). Most of the bank’s resources 
come from market borrowing – 644.8bn rupees (approx. US$10.7bn), which is 84 per cent of 
the bank’s total resources. 
The Government of India (GOI) wholly subscribes the issued capital of the Exim Bank. In 
2011/12, the GOI made an infusion of Cr300 (approx. US$50m) (Exim Bank India 2013a) 
and again in late 2013 provided an extra Cr700 (approx. US$117m) into the bank’s equity 
capital (Economic Times 2013). This increment follows an amendment of the Exim Bank’s 
act in 2011, which increased the authorised capital of the bank from Cr2,000 (approx. 
US$334m) to Cr10,000 (approx. US$1.6bn) and approved the 'option for the government to 
further increase the capital ‘up to an amount that it may deem necessary from time to time’ 
(Press Information Bureau Government of India Cabinet 2011). 
The strategy underlined by these measures is to provide the Exim Bank with the resources to 
take higher export credit exposures in a changing context where India needs to increment its 
presence in international markets. 
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Among its 2012/13 operations, the Exim Bank issued five-year US$500m and ten-year 
US$750m Eurodollar bonds, five-year Singapore dollar-denominated bonds of SGD250m, 
and five-year AU$200m Australian dollar-denominated bonds through its London Branch 
(Exim Bank of India 2013a). According to its 2012/13 financial statement, in 2013 the Exim 
Bank managed to raise about US$3.97bn in foreign currency resources from various 
sources. 
3.10 Instruments deployed 
The Exim Bank of India has different forms of support depending on the borrower and the 
nature of the project financed. 
Under the Overseas Investment Finance Programme, it provides term loans to: 
 Indian companies up to 80 per cent of their equity investment in overseas joint 
ventures/wholly-owned subsidiaries 
 Indian companies towards up to 80 per cent of the loan extended by them to the 
overseas joint ventures/wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
 Overseas joint ventures/wholly-owned subsidiaries for (i) capital expenditure towards 
acquisition of assets, (ii) working capital, (iii) equity investment in another company, 
(iv) acquisition of brands/patents/rights/other intellectual property rights, (v) 
acquisition of another company, and (vi) any other activity that would otherwise be 
eligible for finance from the Exim Bank had it been an Indian entity.22 
Exim Bank also provides guarantees to the overseas joint ventures/wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, sustaining them in raising term loans/working capital. These guarantees 
amounted to 29.38bn rupees (approx. US$486m) in 2012/13 and were extended for 
overseas projects related to power generation, transmission and distribution, infrastructure 
development, and export obligation guarantees (Exim Bank of India 2013a). 
The Exim Bank provides deferred credit on a medium- or long-term basis for project exports 
from India through buyers’ credit under the National Export Insurance Account (NEIA). 
Access to this facility is restricted to a list of 40 countries approved by the Export Credit and 
Guarantee Corporation of India (ECGC), and belonging to SAARC or ASEAN, or in Africa, 
Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. Exim Bank obtains credit 
insurance cover under the NEIA, a trust set up by the Ministry of Commerce. The 
beneficiaries of this facility are sovereign governments and government-owned entities in 
need of medium- and long-term deferred credit to import Indian goods and services (Exim 
Bank India 2013c). For example, the bank has provided US$248m for projects related to the 
functioning of a water treatment plant in Sri Lanka (Exim Bank of India 2013a: 38). 
Lines of credit (LOCs) extended to overseas financial institutions, regional development 
banks, sovereign governments and other entities overseas act as intermediaries and lend to 
overseas buyers for the import of Indian equipment, goods and services on deferred credit 
terms. This instrument represents by far the most important one instrument, both in monetary 
terms – it makes the largest share of the bank’s operation – and in strategic terms – it is the 
primary instrument employed to promote the economic, commercial and political interests of 
the Indian government overseas. As at 31 March 2013, the Exim Bank has provided 
US$8.6bn in the form of export credits, the largest share of which went for projects in Africa 
(US$5bn) and the second largest to Asia (US$3.1bn) (Exim Bank of India 2013a: 38). LOCs 
have been a key element in support of India’s small and medium-sized enterprises 
(Chaturvedi 2012). 
                                               
22 See www.eximbankindia.in/?q=oif. 
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3.11 Financing terms 
3.11.1 Interest rates and other terms of lending 
Table 3.11 Countries receiving loans from the Exim Bank – terms and 
conditions 
Class of 
country 
Names of countries Interest Period Grace Grant 
element 
HIPC 
Heavily 
indebted 
poor 
countries 
declared 
under the 
Paris Club 
Initiative 
Angola, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivorie, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Yemen, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, 
Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Vietnam 
1.75% 
(fixed) 
20 5 years 41.25% 
LIHD 
Countries 
having low 
income and 
medium to 
high levels 
of debt* 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, 
Bhutan, Cambodia, Ecuador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Georgia, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Peru, Solomon Islands, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, 
Zimbabwe 
LIBOR + 
0.5% 
(floating) 
15 5 years 35.11% 
MILD 
Countries 
having 
middle-level 
income and 
low levels 
of debt 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Chile, 
Croatia, Dominica, Estonia, Gabon, Grenada, 
Hungary, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Russia, Samoa, 
Slovakia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and 
Grenadines, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uruguay 
LIBOR+0.5
% (floating) 
8–10 2–3 years 17.11%– 
24.56% 
MIHD 
Countries 
having 
middle-level 
income and 
medium to 
high levels 
of debt* 
Albania, Algeria, Barbados, Belarus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Costa Rica, China, Czech Republic, Djibouti, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, 
Guatemala, Iran, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Oman, Paraguay, Poland, Seychelles, 
Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St Lucia, 
Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela 
LIBOR + 
0.5% 
(floating) 
12 4 years 28.75% 
*According to the World Bank Statistical Appendix 2003 
Source: Government of India (2014). 
3.11.2 Currency 
Rupee loans and advances accounted for 40 per cent of the total loan assets as at 31 March 
2013, while the balance (60 per cent) was in foreign currency. 
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3.11.3 Maturity 
Table 3.12 Length of maturity of loans (in rupees billions) 
Items  Less than 
or equal to 
1 year 
More than 
1 year up 
to 3 years 
More than 
3 years up 
to 5 years 
More than 
5 years up 
to 7 years 
More than 
7 years 
Total 
Rupee assets 240.67 144.26 127.33 121.42 131.20 764.88 
Foreign currency assets 217.18 147.01 132.25 63.87 138.50 698.81 
Total assets 457.85 291.27 259.58 185.29 269.70 1463.69 
Rupee liabilities 240.12 140.93 42.73 31.20 203.48 658.46 
Foreign currency liabilities 215.79 146.80 11.716 53.47 161.15 694.37 
Total liabilities 455.91 287.73 159.89 84.67 364.63 1352.83 
Source: Exim Bank of India (2013a). 
3.11.4 Exposure norms 
The Exim Bank complies with the norms set by the Reserve Bank of India relating to the 
exposure limit. The bank’s exposure to a single industry sector cannot therefore surpass 15 
per cent of the overall bank’s credit exposure to all industry sectors. 
3.12 Conditionality 
The Exim Bank of India operates without conditionality, i.e. the bank provides credit while 
leaving the recipient countries free of deciding which projects to finance and the modalities 
(Chaturvedi 2012). No conditionality is attached in terms of political, social or environmental 
matters. 
Lines of Credit (LOCs) provided by the Exim Bank have been interpreted as ‘tied’ in the 
sense that they are often bound to the requirement that 80–85 per cent of the goods and 
services procured for the realisation of the financed project is purchased from Indian 
companies. 
3.13 Environmental and social policies and practices  
 
Box 3.2 The Exim Bank’s approach to green growth 
The Exim Bank of India does not provide information on its environmental and social practices. 
There is also no publicly available indication as to whether or not some environmental and social 
appraisals have been undertaken before extending financial assistance to domestic export-oriented 
companies and/or overseas governments. 
The bank interest in financing eco-friendly and energy efficient projects is proved by its participation 
in the 18th Annual Meeting of the Asian Exim Banks Forum held in Cebu, Philippines during 
November 2012. The forum discussed the role played by Exim Banks in the areas of co-financing of 
green projects, resource raising and training (Exim Bank of India 2013a). 
More recently, on 9 May 2013, the Exim Bank of India signed an agreement for a 20-year €150m 
loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) that will enable it to finance projects contributing to 
climate change mitigation. This EIB facility is the second of its type provided to the Exim Bank of 
India (the first was granted in December 2008) and is meant to support renewable energy projects 
(e.g. wind, solar, and biomass) and energy efficiency enhancement (e.g. fuel switching and plant 
modernisation), as well as projects that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions and contribute to a 
cleaner environment and afforestation. 
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3.14 Debated issues 
LOCs vs ODA. Some have argued that LOCs could qualify as a form of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) given that they satisfy the criteria of a grant element of at 
least 25 per cent. Nevertheless, Sinha and Hubbard (2011) and Fuchs and Vadlamannati 
(2013) point out that LOCs are extended for the purpose of export promotion, tied to the 
purchase of Indian products and services. LOCs therefore meet the criteria of officially 
supported export credits rather than ODA. 
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4 South Africa Country Profile: The 
Development Bank of Southern Africa 
4.1 Summary key features 
 The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) is one of four state-owned 
development banks in South Africa. 
 It is wholly-owned by the Government of the Republic of South Africa and reports 
regularly to its National Treasury. 
 The DBSA has two main objectives: (i) financial sustainability and (ii) development 
impact. 
 It is a primary source of infrastructure financing in South Africa and in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). Almost three quarters of its overall budget 
goes to domestic operations, while approx. 25 per cent of funding goes to 
infrastructure projects in other African countries. 
 The bulk of its activities are in support of municipalities. It provides finance to over 
500 municipalities and to a wide range of public utilities and private firms. 
 The institution is committed to public consultation and therefore maintains an open 
dialogue with its stakeholders. 
 In the 2008 financial crisis, the DBSA struggled to play the role of countercyclical 
lender as it suffered the impact of the crisis and the NPLs increased substantially. 
4.2 Background 
With the 1994 elections, South Africa entered a complex political and constitutional 
transformation that led to a complete restructuring of the financial system and to the creation 
in 1996 of five separate development financing institutions (DFIs) in charge of facilitating the 
development of the country (Thomas 2001): 
 The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), with the mandate of providing finance 
for large-scale industrial development projects 
 The Khula Enterprise Finance, dedicated to the development of small and medium-
sized enterprises 
 The National Housing Finance Corporation, with the mandate to provide financial 
assistance for housing 
 The Land Bank, which deals with agricultural and rural development. 
 The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
In 1996, the DBSA stopped receiving annual funds from the government and was required to 
become self-sustainable, while contributing to the development of the country’s 
infrastructure. Like the DBSA, all the DFIs were required by the government to be self-
sustainable, while each ensuring the accomplishment of their own mandates. 
The IDC23 and DBSA both operate on a large scale in South Africa. The IDC was established 
in 1940 to support the development of domestic industrial capacity when trade between 
Europe and South Africa was disrupted due to the Second World War. The IDC has focused 
on the implementation of South Africa’s industrial policy, mainly by providing financial support 
to the development of large industrial projects related to the petrochemical and mineral 
industries. The bank has also operated in favour of other industrial sectors – such as 
fabricated metals, agro-industries, clothing and textiles. Until the 1990s, the IDC operated 
                                               
23 With 112,230m rand (approx. US$10.6bn) total assets; 91,862m rand (approx. US$8.7bn) capital and reserves; and 3,410m 
rand (approx. US$324.7m) profit before taxation. 
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mostly within South Africa’s borders, but since then has extended its operations to the rest of 
Africa. Its first venture was an aluminum smelter in Mozambique (IDC 2013). The IDC and 
DBSA have jointly participated in capacity-building initiatives such as the Pan-African 
Capacity Building Programme (PACBP) in 2010, which the Agence Française de 
Development (AFD) also contributed to. This programme obtained joint support of 55m rand 
devoted to the setting up of a capacity-building fund to support the development of 
competences for infrastructure development in Africa (DBSA, IDC and AFD 2010). Another 
field of cooperation between the two institutions, alongside the government’s primary priority 
areas, has been funding via public–private partnerships (PPPs) to improve hospitals and 
provide finance for health projects (PPP Quarterly Online 2010). 
The DBSA also has a longstanding partnership with the African Development Bank (ADB). 
With the aim of promoting broad-based economic growth, job creation, poverty reduction, 
regional integration and prosperity, in 2011 the ADB extended a fifth line of credit to the 
DBSA of US$300m for infrastructure development projects in the SADC region. The eligible 
sectors are: energy, transport, information and communications technology, health, housing, 
ports, roads, and water and sanitation; infrastructure and related sub-projects in resource-
based industries such as agribusiness and mining; and manufacturing and infrastructure 
relating to tourism (ADB 2011). 
The DBSA has cooperated with other financial institutions and private and public entities for 
both its domestic and external operations. For the development of the North-South Corridor, 
for instance, the DBSA has engaged with various African governments, as well as the South 
African government, regional development finance institutions and other international 
stakeholders. Projects in the North-South Corridor programme (linking Durban to the copper 
belt in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, and Dar es Salaam and the copper 
belt and Durban to Malawi) have been financed via a tripartite trust account managed by the 
DBSA with funds from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) funded 
TradeMark Southern Africa (TMSA) programme. The projects have benefited from the 
tripartite alliance between the SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) (DBSA 2013). 
4.3 Origin and mission statement 
The DBSA was established in 1983 by the South African government. The vision of the bank 
is ‘to be a leading change agent for socio-economic development in southern Africa’. The 
mission of the bank is ‘to contribute to development by providing finance and expertise to 
improve the quality of life of the people of southern Africa mainly through the provision of 
infrastructure’. 
The main objects and mandate of the bank are provided for in the 1997 DBSA Act. Article 3 
(1) notes that: 
The main objects of the Bank shall be the promotion of economic development and 
growth, human resources development, institutional capacity building (by mobilizing 
financial and other resources from the national or international private and public 
sectors) and the support of (sustainable) development projects and programmes in 
the region. 
(DBSA Act No. 13 of 1997) 
4.4 History 
At the time of its establishment in 1983, the DBSA received an initial capitalisation of 200m 
rand. Until the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, the DBSA operated in a credit risk-free 
environment (Thomas 2001), with the government providing annual transfers to the Bank. 
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With the political transformation following the 1994 elections, the government ceased fiscal 
transfers to the DBSA making it necessary for the bank to find alternative sources of funding 
in order to be financially self-sustaining (Musasike 2004). Since then, the DBSA has raised 
capital both domestically and internationally through the issuance of market-related debt-
instruments (including Eurobonds). 
Since 2007, the DBSA capital base has been eroded and has generated an estimated 
growth gap of 2.4bn rand in shareholders’ equity (DBSA Integrated Annual Report 2012/13). 
At the end of the 2013 fiscal year, the DBSA reported losses of 825.9m rand (approx. 
US$89.3m) (Global Credit Research 2014). 
The DBSA’s negative performance led to it being downgraded by the rating agency Moody. 
The reasons for this were given as the progressive deterioration of the DBSA asset quality, 
its increasing credit concentrations and pressure on earnings. The deterioration of the quality 
of the bank’s assets – apparent from an increase in the NPL ratio which reached 7.3 per cent 
from 4.9 per cent at year-end March 2012 – has been interpreted as a consequence of large 
exposures to the private sector, which in turn was negatively affected by the 2012/13 
slowdown in economic growth in South Africa, and by labour unrest in the mining sector 
(Global Credit Research 2014). As for the increasing credit concentrations, the DBSA’s top 
20 exposures make around 67 per cent of total loans as at September 2013 (58 per cent in 
March 2013). This creates a great risk for the solidity of the bank in case of default by any of 
its large borrowers (Global Credit Research 2014). 
As a consequence of its capital erosion, the government intervened by injecting 2.4bn rand in 
June 2013 as part of a total capital commitment of 7.9bn rand to be provided over three 
years and increasing the ‘callable capital’ (Global Credit Research 2014). 
4.5 Mandate and strategy 
The DBSA aims at financing strategic infrastructure projects and promoting the capacity to 
deliver infrastructure whilst achieving long-term financial sustainability. 
Along with financial support to municipalities, the DBSA has played a part in institutional 
capacity building through a series of actions/programmes aimed at enhancing institutional 
ability to plan, implement and manage large-scale infrastructure projects – for example, the 
Siyenza Manjie programme entailed knowledge transfer and skills development in 
municipalities through the deployment of young professionals specialised in finance, 
engineering, project management, and town planning, etc. (Gumede et al. 2011). 
According to what the DBSA itself states, it plays a triple role in the pursuit of its mandate, as 
quoted in its annual reports: 
1. the ‘financier’, as it contributes to the delivery of basic services and the promotion of 
economic growth through infrastructure financing. It has also committed to play the 
role of market facilitator crowding-in rather than crowding-out private finance (National 
Treasury of South Africa 2011) 
2. the ‘adviser’ as it provides development solutions and builds institutional, financial 
and knowledge capacity for development 
3. the ‘partner’, working together with private, public and community stakeholders in the 
development process. 
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Table 4.1 The DBSA’s triple role 
Financier Partner Adviser 
Making grants Training Providing development information 
Lending Acting as development catalyst Providing policy analysis and advice 
Investing Leveraging funds and expertise Advocacy 
Underwriting Facilitating development Providing technical assistance 
Arranging Providing agency services Research, monitoring and evaluation 
Source: NDB-Kgarimesta (2004). 
4.5.1 Domestic operations 
The DBSA conforms to the government’s priority national mandates. So far, special 
emphasis has been given to green energy, hospital and school infrastructure and water and 
sanitation (IDFC 2011). It has been appointed as the implementing agent for the National 
Infrastructure Plan, adopted by the government in 2012 to transform the country’s economic 
landscape.24 The DBSA is responsible for developing the business plan and for programme 
management of some strategic integrated projects (SIPs), in particular Integrated Municipal 
Infrastructure and Electricity Transmission and Distribution for All. These projects are 
intended to support economic development and address service delivery in the poorest 
provinces (DOE 2014). 
4.5.2 External operations 
The DBSA seeks to be a leading change agent for sustainable socioeconomic development 
in the SADC region as well as a strategic partner across sub-Saharan Africa (Musasike 
2004). It focuses on financing large infrastructure cross-border projects to solve blockages 
around the delivery of infrastructure, thereby promoting regional integration and more 
equitable development, as part of its mandate to enhance trade and economic growth and 
foster regional integration. 
4.6 Organisational structure 
The Financing Operations Division supports both the South Africa Financing Division and 
International Financing Divisions by assessing and preparing projects, providing expertise 
and managing the DBSA portfolio. 
The Infrastructure Delivery Division is responsible for the delivery of important infrastructure 
programmes, for example, in the education and health sectors. 
The Risk Division was created in 1996, following the government’s expectation of a self-
sustaining DBSA, with the objective of providing a proper assessment of the risks involved in 
infrastructure project financing. The ultimate responsibility for risk management, however, 
remains with the Board of Directors. 
4.6.1 Domestic operations 
The South Africa Financing Division is responsible for all lending operations in South Africa. 
4.6.2 External operations 
The International Financing Division is responsible for investment and project development 
operations outside of South Africa (in Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
                                               
24 This focused on the assessment of the country’s (i) basic needs, (ii) economic opportunities, (iii) state of existing 
infrastructure, (iv) required infrastructure, and (v) unlocking economic opportunities. 
87 
Zambia and Zimbabwe). It manages the funds of other international cooperating partners 
from both multilateral and bilateral institutions. To better evaluate and manage the risk 
associated with the investments in the SADC region, the DBSA monitors the country risk 
ratings of the countries that it deals with and respects country lending limits. Country risk 
ratings and limits are reviewed at least annually. 
4.7 Sector focus 
Prior to1994, the bank funded projects in all sectors, including agriculture, industrial 
development and small and medium-sized enterprises. In the period between 1994 and 
1996, the government streamlined the entire development funding system. As a result, the 
five national DFIs refocused on their core sectors: the DBSA on infrastructure; the Landbank 
on Agriculture; the Industrial Development Corporation on industry; Khula Enterprise on 
small and medium-scale lending and the National Housing Finance Corporation on housing. 
4.7.1 Domestic operations 
Within the SIPs, of which the DBSA is the coordinator, the focus sectors are: 
 Sewerage, bulk water and water reticulation 
 Residual new build backlog maintenance and upgrade of water and sanitation 
 Electricity distribution network builds and upgrades 
 Maintenance and fixing of roads under the S’Hamba Sonke programme 
 New road construction 
 Boreholes in rural communities to provide access to water 
 Revitalising clinics and hospitals 
 Digital migration/access to digital TVs 
 Solar water heaters 
 Schools revitalisation programme. 
Table 4.2 Disbursements and non-performing loans by sector (in 1,000 
rand) 
Sector Disbursements Non-performing loans 
2012 2013 2012 2013 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Commercial infrastructure 4,743,527 11 4,557,437 10 787,065 39 1,111,909 34 
Communication and transport 
infrastructure 
5,099,177 12 3,845,136 9 368,449 18 1,070,560 33 
Energy 8,295,086 20 13,951,864 31 326,129 16 321,236 10 
Human resources 
development 
1,189,987 3 1,099,243 2 20,114 1 41,638 1 
Institutional infrastructure 16,057 0 12,462 0 – – – – 
Residential facilities 2,334,863 6 2,193,949 5 112,221 6 253,452 8 
Roads and drainage 9,087,516 22 9,988,235 22 50,571 2 61,667 2 
Sanitation 1,429,999 3 1,375,748 3 86,928 4 90,677 3 
Social infrastructure 4,259,678 10 3,988,656 9 160,574 8 214,538 7 
Water 4,923,605 12 3,943,634 9 114,187 6 104,718 3 
Total 41,379,495 100 44,956,364 100 2,026,238 100 3,270,395 100 
Source: Adapted from DBSA Integrated Annual Report (2013). 
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For the electrification programme in rural areas, 205m rand were disbursed as part of a total 
of 2bn rand allocated by the DBSA and the Department of Energy to the Electrification 
Programme over a period of three years (Odendaal 2013). 
Regarding the performance of loans by sector, two sectors – namely, the commercial 
infrastructure sector and the communication and transport infrastructure sector – cover the 
largest share of the NPL portfolio. Their joint contribution went from 57 per cent in 2012 to 67 
per cent in 2013. The energy sector also records a large share of NPL; in 2012 this share 
equalled 16 per cent, while in 2013 it went down to 10 per cent. 
4.7.2 External operations 
In the SADC, the DBSA has focused on providing finance not only to infrastructural projects 
but also to economic growth sectors considered drivers for the economic development plans 
of those countries. The bank, through its International Financing Division approved projects 
for 2.9bn rand (approx. US$44.6m) in strategic energy and transport sectors in Angola, 
Mozambique and Zambia (DBSA 2013). 
As at 31 March 2013, the DBSA reports the following loan exposure by sector: 
 34 per cent transportation 
 28 per cent energy 
 15 per cent financial services 
 6 per cent health 
 5 per cent manufacturing 
 5 per cent information and communications technology 
 7 per cent other. 
The large exposure of the DBSA in the transportation sector refers to the activities related to 
the development of the North-South Corridor. Projects financed under this programme serve 
the goal of regional integration and development, and encompass various sub-sectors such 
as road, rail, ports, and one-stop border posts. 
4.8 Geographic focus 
About one-fifth of the DBSA’s loans go for development in the SADC region, excluding South 
Africa. This region also accounts for more than half of the DBSA’s non-performing loans. 
4.8.1 Domestic operations 
The bulk of the DBSA’s domestic lending has gone to the Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal 
districts. Gauteng recorded among the lowest share of NPLs, while KwaZulu-Natal accounts 
for a low but still substantial share of the NPL total during the last two years. 
4.8.2 External operations 
Within the realms of its mandate, the DBSA operates in other countries in the SADC region. 
The government has recently issued a draft DBSA Amendment Bill that will extend the scope 
of authorised DBSA operations to African countries (beyond the SADC region) and the 
continent’s oceanic islands following its enhanced engagement and relationship within the 
BRICS block (National Treasury 2013). 
The DBSA’s largest loan exposure to a single country is for Zambia (32 per cent), then 
Zimbabwe (12 per cent), Mozambique (9 per cent), Lesotho (8 per cent) and Angola (7 per 
cent) (DBSA 2013). 
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Table 4.3 Disbursements and non-performing loans by geographical 
region in South Africa and other SADC countries (in 1,000 rand) 
Geographical region Disbursements Non-performing loans 
2012 2013 2012 2013 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Eastern Cape 1,667,787 4.0 1,895,894 4.2 256,070 6.5 154,916 2.4 
Free State 570,997 1.4 660,933 1.5 86,812 2.2 996,011 15.7 
Gauteng 13,433,450 32.5 15,053,54
1 
33.5 33,531 0.9 46,447 0.7 
KwaZulu-Natal 7,946,658 19.2 7,437,554 16.5 187,641 4.8 215,910 3.4 
Limpopo 1,004,072 2.4 1,076,897 2.4 50,674 1.3 355,464 5.6 
Mpumalanga 1,344,687 3.2 1,606,530 3.6 317,264 8.1 322,194 5.1 
North West 910,386 2.2 639,902 1.4 83,392 2.1 9,250 0.1 
Northern Cape 446,295 1.1 1,550,590 3.4 183,334 4.7 217,958 3.4 
Western Cape 3,793,787 9.2 3,459,887 7.7 714,030 18.1 759,061 12.0 
Multi-regional South Africa 7,614 0.0 5,913 0.0 – – – – 
SADC (excluding South Africa) 10,253,762 24.8 11,568,72
3 
25.7 2,026,238 51.4
% 
3,270,395 51.5 
Total 41,379,495 100 44,956,36
4 
100 3,938,986 100 6,347,606 100 
Source: Adapted from DBSA Integrated Annual Report (2013). 
Table 4.4 Disbursements and non-performing loans by country (in 1,000 
rand) 
Geographical region Disbursements Non-performing loans 
2012 2013 2012 2013 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Angola 178,011 1.7 174,344 1.5 – – – – 
Botswana 57,573 0.6 43,412 0.4 57,573 8.1 43,412 5.7 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
70,780 0.7 86,342 0.7 – – – – 
Lesotho 949,179 9.3 889,767 7.7  0.0  0.0 
Malawi 177,411 1.7 125,416 1.1 117,490 16.5 84,282 11.1 
Mauritius 184,936 1.8 194,840 1.7 – – – – 
Mozambique 1,086,484 10.6 1,060,258 9.2 146,531 20.5 158,368 20.9 
Namibia 644,229 6.3 545,821 4.7 – – – – 
Swaziland 202,578 2.0 215,174 1.9 126,734 17.7 136,804 18.0 
Tanzania 377,717 3.7 374,544 3.2 – – – – 
Zambia 3,754,217 36.6 3,714,006 32.1 122,303 17.1 154,605 20.4 
Zimbabwe 559,026 5.5 1,418,338 12.3 – – – – 
Other 2,011,621 19.6 2,726,461 23.6 143,399 20.1 181,590 23.9 
Total 10,253,762 100 11,568,723 100 714,030 100 759,061 100 
Source: Adapted from DBSA Integrated Annual Report (2013). 
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Table 4.5 Other financial indicators 
 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Financial position (rand million) 
 Cash and cash equivalents 2475 2707 1180 2113 1252 
Financial market assets 5321 5521 4159 4842 4859 
Investment in development activities (1) 31997 36133 41323 44432 47075 
Other assets 589 695 736 950 754 
Total assets 40382 45056 47397 52337 53940 
Financial market liabilities (2) 22405 26327 28588 33612 36159 
Other liabilities 741 943 957 1198 1075 
Total liabilities 23146 27270 29546 34810 37234 
Total equity 17236 17786 17851 17528 16706 
Financial performance (rand million) 
 Interest on development loans 2784 3077 3119 3514 3631 
Interest on investments 677 525 469 468 437 
Total interest received 3461 3602 3588 3982 4068 
Interest expense 1705 1971 1945 2286 2442 
Net interest income 1756 1631 1642 1697 1626 
Operating income (3) 1857 1751 1794 1950 1938 
Operating expense (4) 669 716 758 779 948 
Sustainable earnings/(loss) (5) 871 807 808 677 -615 
Profit/(loss) for the year 1426 518 29 -371 -826 
Financial ratios (%) 
 Total capital and reserves to development loans 59 54 47.20 43.40 39.20 
Long-term debt to equity 131 149 161.60 193.80 217.40 
Debt/equity (including callable capital) (6) 131 118 127.40 152.20 169.50 
Cash and cash equivalents to total assets 6 6 2.50 4 2.30 
Total capital and reserves to assets 43 40 37.70 33.50 31 
Financial market liabilities to investment in 
development activities 
70 73 692 75.60 76.80 
Non-performing book debt as a % of gross book debt 5 5 4.20 4.90 7.30 
Return/(loss) on average total equity 9 3 0.20 -2.10 -4.80 
Return/(loss) on average total assets 4 1 0.10 -0.70 -1.60 
Interest cover (times) 2 2 1.80 1.70 1.70 
Net interest income margin (7) 51 45 45.80 42.60 40 
Cost-to-income ratio 36 41 42.20 39.90 48.90 
(1) Development activities, development loans and equity investments. 
(2) Financial market liabilities comprise debt securities, lines of credit, funding under repurchase agreements, and derivative 
assets held for risk management. 
(3) Operating income excludes net foreign exchange gain/(loss), net gain/(loss) from financial assets and liabilities, and 
impairments. 
(4) Operating expense comprises personnel expenses, general and administration expenses, and depreciation. 
(5) Sustainable earnings/(loss): Net profit/(loss) before grants, and adjustments to foreign exchange and revaluation of financial 
assets and liabilities. 
(6) Measure includes 4.8bn rand callable capital. 
(7) This ratio is calculated as net interest income (interest income less interest expense) over interest income. 
Source: DBSA Integrated Annual Report (2013). 
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4.9 Financial performance 
Selected financial indicators25 (as measured at the end of 2012) 
 Total liabilities: 37,234m rand (approx. US$3.5bn) 
 Total equity: 16,706m rand (approx. US$1.5bn) 
 Total assets: 53,940m rand (approx. US$5.1bn) 
 Tot. Profits: 826m rand (approx. US$78.2m) 
 Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio: 7.30 per cent 
 Return on assets (ROA) ratio: 1.60 per cent 
 Return on equity (ROE) ratio: 4.80 per cent 
4.10 Sources of finance 
The DBSA is a self-funded development finance institution. Its capital comes from: 
 Internally generated sources 
 Bond issues, private placements with select investors – in domestic and international 
capital markets 
 Lines of credit with supranational and major bilateral financial institutions as well as 
commercial banks – e.g. the African Development Bank (ADB), the Korea Eximbank, 
the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
 ‘Callable capital’ that the DBSA could draw at any time and implicitly guarantees the 
intervention of the Southern African government in case of need. 
Table 4.6 DBSA capital structure (in rand thousands) 
 2012 2013 
Debt securities 25,808,711  
(approx. US$2.4bn) 
25,790,079  
(approx. US$2.4bn) 
Held at fair value through profit or loss (1) 7,876,593 8,390,655 
Held at amortised cost (2) 17,932,118 17,399,424 
Lines of credit – Held at amortised cost 7,705,306  
(approx. US$733.6m) 
10,081,507  
(approx. US$960m) 
Funding under repurchase agreements (3) – Balance at 
the end of the year 
– 201,752  
(approx. US$19.2m) 
Capital authorised 5,000,000  
(approx. US$476m) 
5,000,000  
(approx. US$476m) 
Permanent government funding (4) – Balance at the end 
of the year 
3,792,344  
(approx. US$361m) 
3,792,344  
(approx. US$361m) 
Revaluation reserve on land and buildings (5)   
Balance at the beginning of the year 245730 255088 
(Loss)/gain on revaluation of land and buildings 9358 –1601 
Balance at the end of the year 255088  
(approx. US$24.2m) 
253487  
(approx. US$24.1m) 
(1) Debt securities designated at fair value through profit or loss consists of DV bonds and private placements listed and 
unlisted. 
(2) Debt securities carried at amortised cost consist of Euro rand bond issues, Money Market Issuance (bridging bonds). 
(3) Investments under resale agreements. In the ordinary course of business, the bank raises short-term funding through the 
repurchase market. This entails the sale of financial assets in such a way that all or part of the assets do not qualify for 
                                               
25 Compiled according to the official data provided by the DBS. See www.DBSA.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=4448 
(accessed 27 January 2014).   
92 
derecognition cost. The essence of such a transaction is to raise short-term funding through the repo market. The financial 
instruments thus transferred include government bonds, corporate bonds and municipal bonds. The bank retains substantially 
all of the credit risks and rewards associated with the transferred assets, and continues to recognise these investments within 
investment securities, whilst the corresponding financial liability considerations received are recognised in funding under 
repurchase agreements. At 31 March 2013, the fair value of the financial assets used as collateral is 202m rand (2012: Rnil). 
(4) This represents capital provided by the South African government and remains part of the permanent capital of the bank. No 
funds have been received since March 1994.There are no repayment terms and this funding is interest free. To date, no cash 
repayments have been made and the full amount initially received is equal to the residual amount and is thus allocated to 
equity. 
(5)This reserve represents the valuation surplus recognised on the revaluation of the land and buildings. 
Source: DBSA Integrated Annual Report (2013: 97). 
4.11 Instruments deployed 
The instruments used by the DBSA can be classified in two categories: 
 financial: lending/investment, guarantees, grants 
 non-financial products and services: advisory services – e.g. preliminary project 
assessments (feasibility and pre-feasibility studies) to determine if a project is viable, 
technical assistance and capacity building, research (Hagerman 2012). 
Table 4.7 Services provided by the DBSA, its operations and types of 
client served 
Type of service Operations Clients 
Project development 
advisory services 
 Project identification 
 Feasibility assessments 
 Technical assistance 
 Financial structuring 
 Project preparation funds 
 Municipalities 
 Public–private partnerships 
 Public–public partnerships 
 Regional integration 
Project finance  Debt 
 Mezzanine finance 
 Limited and non-recourse lending 
 Guarantees 
In South Africa 
 Municipalities 
 State-owned enterprises 
 Public–private partnerships 
 Public–public partnerships 
 Private sector intermediaries 
Outside South Africa 
 No municipalities and 
sovereign 
Accelerating 
infrastructure delivery 
Managing the design and construction of key 
projects in the education, health and housing 
sectors 
National and provincial 
government departments 
Programme 
implementation 
Project management support, including to 
the jobs and green funds 
National and provincial 
government departments 
Source: Coetzee (2013). 
The DBSA is predominantly a debt provider, but also invests in equity instruments and, more 
recently, has started providing investment banking products such as arranging syndication 
and performing underwriting roles (Musasike 2004). 
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Box 4.1 The DBSA Development Fund 
In 2001, the DBSA established the Development Fund to promote sustainable capacity-building at 
municipal level and to enhance service delivery and local economic development in support of 
municipalities. Aside from grants to development projects, the fund has provided a series of non-
financial services, in the form of expertise, agency management services, sharing of knowledge and 
best practices. 
The fund has provided its services through four programmes: 
1. National Provincial Implementation Support Programme: in support of education, 
housing and health. In the education sector, the DBSA was appointed to support the 
construction of school infrastructure (689m rand was allocated to the construction of 49 
schools in the 2011–12 period and the planning of another 70 schools to be constructed 
between 2013 and 2015). 
2. Municipal Capacity Building and Implementation Programme which financed 
infrastructure and housing programmes in various under-resourced municipalities 
3. The Operations and Maintenance Programme: providing capacity support to 
municipalities to run infrastructure maintenance activities 
4. The Jobs Fund: a 9bn rand fund in support of job creation through the co-financing of 
public, private and NGO projects. By 31 March 2013, grants amounting to 4.3bn rand had 
been allocated to 17 public projects (1.4bn rand), 18 private projects (1.2bn rand) and 31 
NGO projects (0.8bn rand) with an estimated impact of 100,524 new jobs created and 
56,194 people employed in existing jobs. 
4.12 Financing terms 
The bank diversifies its portfolio in terms of country/sector spread and applies single obligor 
limits in order to mitigate risks. For its project finance, financing terms also vary depending 
on the nature of the project and its risk assessment. 
4.12.1 Interest rate policy 
The Board of Directors approves the DBSA interest rate policy, which interest rates applied 
to project finance (cost of funding plus a margin for risk and an internal overhead charge) are 
based on. Interest can be fixed rate or floating rate. 
4.12.2 Maturity 
Long-term debt can have a maturity up to 20 years if debt is issued in rand (Musasike 2004), 
and up to ten years for US$ and Euro debts (Mthembu 2012). 
4.12.3 Repayment 
Capital grace during construction. 
4.12.4 Single obligor limits 
The public sector single obligor limit varies for domestic and external operation: 
 For South Africa, it is set at 10 per cent of shareholders’ interest including the callable 
capital. 
 For outside South Africa, it is 10 per cent of shareholders’ interest excluding callable 
capital. 
Also, no more than ten per cent of shareholders’ interest may be invested in equity/quasi-
equity in aggregate (Musasike 2004). 
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4.13 Conditionality 
All programmes and projects proposed to the DBSA for financial support are subjected to an 
environmental appraisal (DBSA 2010). 
The environmental conditionalities are incorporated in the legal agreements with its 
borrowers. 
Before any fund can be disbursed, the DBSA may require proof of the acquisition of an 
environmental authorisation or permit. The bank can also act when the non-compliance with 
certain requirements would affect the environmental risks of a project to a certain extent. All 
these conditions are called ‘suspensive’ (DBSA 2010). 
There may be further conditionality included in the agreement under the header ‘further 
terms and conditions’ and these are envisaged to ensure compliance with the environmental 
conditions identified in the loan agreement (e.g. the preparation of an environmental 
mitigation and management plan) (DBSA 2010). 
4.14 Environmental and social policies and practices 
The DBSA’s environmental policy was approved by the Board of Directors in 2005 and 
designed in compliance with national and regional environmental policies, legislative and 
regulatory requirements, and international obligations and commitments (e.g. the United 
Nations Environment Policy Finance Initiative to which the DBSA is a signatory). 
The DBSA’s environmental policy requires all operations to be carried out in an 
environmentally and socially responsible manner, deriving the maximum environmental and 
social benefits (DBSA 2010). For this reason environmental conditionality applies to all 
projects funded by the DBSA. The DBSA will not provide funding for projects recognised as 
having a high environmental risk even after mitigation. 
An environmental appraisal is an integral part of the project assessment and approval and 
must be carried out by an environmental analyst. Also an environmental specialist in the 
Advisory Unit must review all appraisal reports for high-risk and SADC programmes and 
projects. 
Four types of risks are considered within the environmental appraisal: 
 the environmental impact of the project, e.g. the risks of groundwater pollution 
associated with the establishment of a waste disposal site, road fill contamination with 
heavy metals, etc. 
 non-compliance with legislative requirements, e.g. planning authorisation, EIA 
approvals, water permits, etc. 
 the capacity of an institution to fulfil environmental requirements throughout all 
phases of project implementation 
 reputational risks and public and political concerns. 
The environmental appraisal takes place at all phases of the project cycle – project 
screening, site visit, environmental impact assessment, throughout implementation, and 
during the monitoring, completion and evaluation phases. 
1. Application: an environmental analyst is assigned to the team assessing the 
application. He or she will determine the environmental risk category of the project 
and may require further information on the project. 
2. Mobilisation of project resources and information: while the project team works 
together with the borrower to design the project, the environmental analyst will assess 
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the information provided and assist the client in fulfilling the environmental 
requirements. 
3. Recommendation: the project team undertakes a detailed appraisal of the 
sustainability of the project, issues a recommendation on whether the DBSA should 
provide investment assistance and, if so on which terms and conditions. 
4. Investment decision: Depending on the type and value of the project, the 
Development Intervention Committee, the Corporate Credit Committee or the Board 
Investment Committee decides about support for the project. 
5. Contract: At the point of negotiation and agreement on the terms and conditions of 
the contract, environmental requirements suggested in the appraisal phase are 
included. 
6. Implementation: all projects under implementation are monitored to ensure full 
compliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement, including environmental 
conditions. 
7. Project completion: the DBSA monitors the project for the whole duration of the loan 
term. 
 
Box 4.2 The Green Fund 
The Green Fund was established in 2011 by the Government of South Africa/Department of 
Environmental Affairs, which made available 800m rand over three years to initiate the fund. The 
DBSA was then appointed as the implementing agent. 
The Green Fund objectives are: 
 Promoting innovative and high-impact green programmes and projects 
 Reinforcing climate policy objectives through green interventions 
 Building an evidence base for the expansion of the green economy 
 Attracting additional resources to support the development of South Africa’s green 
economy. 
The fund operates in support of the ‘green cities and towns’, providing grants and concessional 
finance as well as assistance in project preparation. The sectors covered by this initiative are waste 
management and recycling; water demand management; public transport; municipal buildings and 
infrastructure; and urban greening. The applicants are municipalities and municipal entities and, to a 
small degree, other organisations. 
The Green Fund promotes the shift to a low-carbon economy, focused on climate mitigation, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, cleaner production, sustainable transport, and biofuels. 
Applicants to these schemes are private companies, research organisations, small to medium-sized 
enterprises and NGOs. 
A third scheme through which the Green Fund provides support is the Environmental and Natural 
Resource Management scheme. This scheme focuses on biodiversity and ecosystem management, 
sustainable agriculture, fisheries and rainwater harvesting. Applicants are farmers and community-
based organisations, research organisations, private companies and NGOs. 
The instruments deployed by the Green Fund range from project development grants to capital 
development grants, research and policy development grants, and concessional project 
development loans (DBSA-DEA 2012). 
In order to ensure the ‘additionality’ of financed interventions, the Green Fund supports only those 
projects that would not have been implemented without its support.26 
 
 
                                               
26 See www.sagreenfund.org.za/Pages/About.aspx. 
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Box 4.3 DBSA support to the green and renewable-energy sector 
The DBSA‘s engagement in South Africa’s transition to a green economy has been large, both in 
financial and political terms. 
In the framework of the 2011 National Strategy for Sustainable Development and Action Plan 
(NSSD3) – whose priorities have been identified as providing effective responses to climate change, 
building sustainable communities and sustaining ecosystems through the efficient use of natural 
resources – the DBSA provided US$2.5bn for the industrial development green economy initiatives. 
These funds were accompanied by a further US$10bn raised from the private sector and US$80m 
from the National Treasury (Kaggwa et al. 2013). 
The DBSA has been appointed as the implementing agent for the Renewable Energy Market 
Transformation Project (REMT), a GEF/World Bank-funded project aimed at reducing barriers to 
renewable energy development in South Africa, thus enabling the country to reduce its greenhouse 
gas emissions and develop its renewable energy sector. 
In comparative terms, the DBSA’s financial support to the green economy is similar to that of other 
domestic banks such as the IDC, which provided 25bn rand (approx. US$2.8bn) over the 2011/2012 
to 2014/15 period (Montmasson-Clair 2013). Also, with respect to the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme, the DBSA’s loan facilities of 6.2bn rand 
(approx. US$0.7bn) in the first bid window (Vermeulen 2012) came along with the IDC contribution 
of 7.5bn rand (approx. US$0.8bn) extended over the first two phases in 2011 and 2012 
(Montmasson-Clair 2013). 
In 2012, the DBSA announced another round of loan facilities amounting to 9.6bn rand (approx. 
US$0.9bn), mostly targeting solar projects and including one wind energy project (see Table 4.8) 
(DBSA-DEA 2012). 
Table 4.8 Loan facilities for renewable energy projects (in rand 
millions) 
Province Project name Technology (sector) Capacity (MW) Total DBSA exposure 
Northern Cape De Aar Solar Solar PV 483 647 
Northern Cape Droogfontein Solar PV 483 650 
Northern Cape Abengoa KaXu Solar CSP 100 1.300 
Eastern Cape Jeffrey’s Bay Wind 1.339 1.057 
Northern Cape Bokpoort Solar CSP 75 1.900 
Northern Cape Abengoa Khi Solar CSP 50 600 
Northern Cape Herbert Solar PV 20 1.605 
Northern Cape Scatec Solar PV 75 350 
Northern Cape Greefspan Solar PV 10 110 
Free State Lesedi Solar PV 75 400 
Northern Cape Letsatsi Solar PV 75 400 
Western Cape Touwsrivier Solar CPV 36 470 
Northern Cape Khathu Solar PV 75 521 
Northern Cape Kalahari Solar CSP 75 1103 
Total 896.5 MW 9.668.50bn 
Source: DBSA (2012). 
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5 Russia Country Profile: The 
Vnesheconombank 
5.1 Summary key features 
 The Vnesheconombank (VEB) is a 100 per cent state-owned policy bank. 
 The VEB’s mandate limits its operations to targeted sectors and to the regions 
of the Russian Federation. 
 The VEB does not pursue profitability. On the contrary, it is meant to provide 
financial support to sectors characterised by high uncertainty and long-term 
pay-off. 
 The VEB aspires to overcome infrastructural barriers and obstacles to national 
development and to foster the competitiveness and diversification of the 
Russian economy. 
 Under the general objectives of its mandate, VEB is meant to foster specific 
development drivers such as the high-tech industrial sectors, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and exports. 
 The VEB’s external operations mainly take the form of export support activities 
and support to exporting SMEs via the Entrepreneurship Fund or the SME’s 
bank. 
5.2 Background 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former USSR 
territories – now belonging to the Russian Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – 
started a process of economic modernisation that revealed several shortcomings in the 
financial system. It became clear that the undeveloped financial, industrial and infrastructure 
facilities, along with a lack of long-term funding (Maidan 2012), were major challenges to the 
rapidly changing political and economic context in the CIS. Against this background, the 
mainstream literature has considered that the establishment of development financing 
institutions (DFIs) – both financial and non-financial – would be one viable solution to 
overcoming such structural deficiencies. 
From the end of the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, a number of DFIs were created, 
especially between 2006 and 2008 (Maidan 2012). As a consequence, Russia now has a 
considerable variety of DFIs, which are ineffective and which do not coordinate with other 
peer institutions. The VEB stands out as the most important DFI in the whole of the Russian 
Federation, with total assets representing over 5 per cent of Russia’s GDP. 
The VEB is characterised by wide international cooperation with other financial institutes, 
especially DFIs. With their shared objective of supporting large infrastructural investment 
projects, the VEB and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) have 
established several joint financing programmes.27 Their joint investment programme entitles 
the VEB to access IBRD funds – from a minimum of US$500m up to US$1bn – for a 15–30-
year period at a below-market interest rate for infrastructure and industrial development 
projects. The programme includes the possibility of getting technical assistance from the 
World Bank and other DFIs in preparing project documentation. Another programme related 
to financing energy-efficiency projects in Russia provides access to a US$300m IBRD loan 
for a period of 18 years against a full sovereign guarantee from the Russian Federation.28 In 
                                               
27 More details are available on the VEB website: www.veb.ru/en/strategy/pmfi/vebmbrd/. 
28 More details are available on the VEB website: www.veb.ru/en/strategy/pmfi/vebmbrd1/. 
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February 2011, the VEB and IBRD signed a memorandum of understanding setting up the 
Partnership for Modernisation Initiative, with the objectives to sustain the modernisation of 
the Russian economy and to promote mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and 
the European Union. Priority is given to financing energy efficiency, transport, innovation 
initiatives related to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the commercialisation 
of innovations in a number of sectors. 
The VEB has engaged in intensive relations with the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW). This relationship has been fostered by the periodic German-Russian 
intergovernmental consultations that have been taking place annually since 2009. Within this 
framework, several agreements have been signed between the VEB and KfW. In May 2012, 
the VEB, the KfW and the Permanent Secretariat of the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) signed the so-called Baltic Memorandum to support SME financing in Russian 
territories adjacent to the Baltic Sea. A long-term US$110m loan agreement followed in 
November 2012 and, later, the International Fund for Entrepreneurship Support was founded 
with US$150m to introduce long-term foreign investments for SMEs in Russia. 
The VEB belongs to the Montreal Group, a non-profit organisation comprised of the VEB, 
BDC (Canada), BNDES (Brazil), CDB (China), NAFINSA (Mexico), OSED (France) and 
SIDBI (India), which exchanges ideas and best practices on the challenges facing SMEs. 
The VEB is also part of the Long-Term Investors Club comprised of important development 
financial institutes such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the CDB, Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti, KfW, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) and others. The club’s principal 
objective is to develop a joint investment and enhance cooperation between major global 
investors. 
5.3 Origin and mission statement 
The Vnesheconombank (VEB) – the state corporation Bank for Development and Foreign 
Economic Activity – is a wholly state-owned bank with the mandate of ‘fund(ing) major 
investment projects aimed at removing economic growth infrastructure restrictions’.29 The 
VEB fills a gap in financing as it ‘does not compete with commercial credit institutions and 
participates only in those projects that are not capable of receiving private investors’ 
financing’. Along with these functions, the VEB: 
 participates in funding investment projects aimed at modernising mono-cities 
 provides support for small and medium-sized enterprises 
 supports Russian exporters on world markets 
 assists in raising direct foreign investments for Russia.30 
5.4 History 
The VEB traces its origins back to 1922, when it was established as the Russian Commercial 
Bank. In 1924, it was renamed the Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR (Vneshtorgbank 
USSR). At the time, the bank was one of only three state-controlled banks and the only 
financial institution entrusted with servicing export-import transactions and foreign currency 
transactions. 
Following new banking regulations introduced in 1987, the Vneshtorgbank was assigned 
broader duties and named the Bank for Economic Affairs of the USSR – Vnesheconombank 
of the USSR. 
                                               
29 See www.veb.ru/en/strategy/. 
30 See www.veb.ru/en/strategy/. 
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Between 1997 and 1999, after the fall of the USSR, the VEB was recognised as the legal 
successor of the USSR Vnesheconombank, and is responsible for restructuring the former 
USSR’s liabilities due to foreign banks and financial institutions, the London Club and the 
Paris Club. The VEB played the role of intermediary between London Club creditors and the 
Russian Government for the rescheduling of the outstanding London Club debt (approx. 
US$31,700m as at 31 March 2000), which in 2000 was converted into new Eurobonds 
issued by the Russian government with maturity in 2010 and 2030. 
In 2003, the VEB was appointed as the agent for managing Russian State Pension Fund 
assets. This task role, as the state trust management company for pension savings, is due to 
last until 1 January 2019. 
In 2007, the bank underwent a profound transformation into a state bank for development, 
taking the German KfW model for both its mandate and internal procedures. 
With the outbreak of the 2008 economic crisis, the VEB acted as a countercyclical lender, 
providing anti-crisis support to the Russian economy in line with Russian government policies 
and strategy. Once it had completed anti-crisis measures in 2010, the VEB refocused on its 
development mandate, dedicating resources to large infrastructure development projects. 
In 2011, the VEB established the first Russian export credit agency (EXIAR), with a charter 
capital of approx. US$1bn, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). The fund – a 
100 per cent VEB-owned subsidiary endowed with US$10bn – was created to encourage 
investments in high-tech sectors of the Russian economy. 
In 2013, the VEB Asia Ltd was registered in Hong Kong. This is a 100 per cent VEB-owned 
subsidiary in charge of liaising with Hong Kong financial institutions and supporting Asian 
investors willing to finance large-scale projects in Russia. 
5.5 Mandate and strategy 
The VEB’s official mandate is: ‘to diversify the Russian economy, boost its competitive edge 
and encourage the inflow of investments’.31 
According to the federal law ‘On Bank for Development’, the purpose of the VEB is: 
To promote competitiveness of the Russian Federation economy, its diversification, 
encouragement of investment activity through investment, foreign economic, 
insurance, consultancy and other activity contemplated hereby in order to implement 
projects in the Russian Federation and abroad, including projects involving foreign 
capital, aimed at development of infrastructure, innovations, special economic zones, 
environmental protection, support of export of Russian goods, works and services, as 
well as small and medium business support.32 
The VEB helps to implement state economic policy aimed at overcoming infrastructural 
barriers to national development; boosting the development of the high-tech industrial sector, 
promoting the innovation and production potential of small and medium-sized enterprises; 
supporting industrial production and service export; and upgrading efficiency in the use of 
natural resources. 
  
                                               
31 See www.veb.ru/en/strategy/. 
32 See www.veb.ru/en/about/normpr/law. 
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Under these provisions, the VEB operates as a driver for economic development and private 
investment in Russia. It does so by operating in the following areas: 
a. Investments and development in 
 top priority strategic industries for Russia 
 national infrastructure projects 
 other Russian banks 
 Small and medium enterprise development 
 Equity funds. 
b. Export support in the form of: 
 Export credit finance, insurance and guarantees (heavy machinery, high tech 
equipment, etc.) 
 Cooperation agreements with other export credit agencies and export-import 
banks. 
c. Agent of the state 
 Government debt management (London Club and Paris Club) 
 Government financial asset management 
 Pension fund management 
 Anti-crisis measures. 
5.6 Organisational structure 
As stated in its statute, the VEB group comprises: the state corporation ‘Bank for 
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (VEB), Russian banks, CIS-based banks, and 
Russian and foreign companies (collectively, the “Group”)’. 
The federal law on the ‘bank for development’ establishes the governing bodies of the VEB: 
the Supervisory Board, the Management Board and the Chair of the VEB. 
The Supervisory Board is a collegial organ and represents the VEB’s supreme governing 
body, responsible for defining the policy orientation of the bank within the framework set by 
the federal law. In particular, the Supervisory Board: 
i. defines the major areas of the bank’s activities, 
ii. approves the bank’s revenues/expenditures plan (budget) 
iii. issues the annual report and other basic internal documents 
iv. approves an independent external auditor to perform a mandatory annual audit of the 
bank’s annual financial statements, 
v. approves the head of the bank’s internal control service and, lastly, 
vi. makes decisions on approving transactions in compliance with the documents 
regulating the Bank’s activities. 
The board consists of eight members appointed by the Government of the Russia Federation 
and the chair of the VEB. The chairman of the Russian Federation Government, Dimitry 
Medvedev, is also the chair of the VEB’s Supervisory Board, as a sign of the strong political 
connection between the government and the VEB. 
The Management Board is a collegiate executive body of the VEB. It consists of the VEB’s 
chairman (ex officio) and eight Management Board members appointed by the VEB’s 
Supervisory Board. 
The Chairman of the VEB heads the board and is in charge of its activities. It acts as the sole 
executive body managing the bank’s everyday operations. 
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The VEB’s headquarters are in Moscow and there are Foreign Representative Offices in 
London, Frankfurt, Milan, Paris, New York, Beijing, New Dehli, Mumbai, Johannesburg and 
Zurich. 
The bank comprised of 33 standalone structural divisions and 17 representative offices in 
Russia and abroad. 
The VEB is at the head of several subsidiaries operating in the same sector, which 
complement the bank and share the same mission and strategy. 
Table 5.1 Operating segments of the VEB group 
Segment Criteria of classification/
division 
Banks 
Segment 1 Major banks within the group VEB, SME Bank, Eximbank of Russia 
Segment 2 Banks purchased in 2007 and 
2008 (to recover their financial 
stability) 
Sviaz-Bank, CJSC ‘Globexbank’ 
Segment 3 Group’s bank in Ukraine PSC Prominvestbank 
Segment 4 Group’s bank in Republic of 
Belarus 
Bank BelVEB OJSC 
Segment 5 Subsidies and fund in which the 
Group holds a controlling 
ownership interest 
OJSC ‘VEB-Leasing’, LLC ‘VEB Capital’, ‘VEB 
Engineering’ LLC, FCPF, Closed-endMutual Hedge 
Fund ‘MRIF’, Closed-end Mutual Equity Fund ‘MRIF-II’, 
OJSC ‘Development Corporation of North Caucasus’, 
RDIF Management Company, LLC, EXIAR, Mutual 
Fund RDIF, OJSC ‘The Far East and Baikal Region 
Development Fund’ and other subsidiaries 
Source: Compiled from information provided in the Memorandum on Financial Policies, Vnesheconombank 2012 Annual Report. 
5.7 Sector focus 
The VEB’s sector priorities are set out in the Memorandum on financial policies of state 
corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank) (No. 
1007-r, July 27, 2007). As established there, VEB operates in those sectors characterised by 
lack of private capital investments, mainly due to large investments and a long-term pay-off, 
and high uncertainty of investments. 
In compliance with its mission and strategy VEB is engaged in financing investment projects 
in the following sectors: aircraft construction, rocket and space complex, shipbuilding, 
electronics industry, atomic industry including nuclear power engineering, heavy, transport, 
special and power engineering machine-building, smelting industry (production of special 
steels), timber processing industry, defence industrial complex, agro-industrial complex, 
strategic computer technologies and software, information-communications systems, medical 
equipment and pharmaceutics. 
Loans extended to finance 33 projects in priority lines of economy modernisation amounted 
to RUB 159.7bn (approx. US$4.47bn), the majority of which were designed to increase 
power efficiency. 
In terms of external operations, the VEB’s export support primarily targets aircraft 
engineering and space and rocket complex; electronics; transport; special-purpose and 
power engineering; and the defence industry (Vnesheconombank 2013). 
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Figure 5.1 The VEB’s loan portfolio (as at 31 December 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Vnesheconombank Annual Report (2012:13). 
5.8 Geographic focus 
In line with its mission and objectives aimed at developing infrastructure and fostering 
innovation projects, the VEB has a relatively narrow geographic interest, focusing its financial 
operations almost exclusively on Russian Federation territory. 
Such a tendency is more evident with respect to investment projects as compared to other 
operations. Indeed, only three investment projects have been financed outside the Russian 
Federation during the whole period. With regard to distribution within the Russian Federation, 
the VEB is engaging in investment projects throughout the Federation. 
5.9 Financial performance 
Table 5.2 Selected financial indicators (as measured at end of 2012) 
Total equity RUB 531.1bn (approx. US$17.2bn) 
Total assets RUB 2,919.1bn (approx. US$95bn);  
(RUB 2,531.9bn, approx. US$2.4bn 2011) 
Total profits RUB 17,488m (approx. US$566m;  
(RUB 7,480m, approx. US$247m in 2011) 
Total disbursements RUB 720.2bn (approx. US$20.7bn;  
(RUB 505.4bn, approx. US$14.1bn in 2011) 
Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio** n/a 
Return on assets (ROA) ratio 0.0059% 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio 0.032% 
Source: Based on data from Vnesheconombank (2012). 
As shown in Figure 5.2 below, the VEB’s loan portfolio in 2012 was more than seven times 
bigger than in 2007, passing from about RUB 100bn (approx. US$4.05bn) in 2007 to more 
than RUB 720bn (approx. US$20.7bn) in 2012. This growing dynamic reflects the VEB’s 
continued focus on its core business activities and the related provision of significant 
37%
50%
11%
2%
Infrastructure sectors
Industries
Agro-industrial complex
Other sectors
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financing for several large-scale infrastructure and investment projects, as well as strategic 
investments in Russian banks and corporates. 
Since its peak in 2007/08, borrower concentration33 has been reduced from 43 per cent to 
just 16 per cent at the end of 2012 (Vnesheconombank 2014). 
Figure 5.2 Loan portfolio34 (as at 31 December 2012 in RUB bn) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Vnesheconombank (2012). 
5.10 Sources of finance 
Given the bank’s legal status as a state corporation, the Russian Federation and Ministry of 
Finance contributed continuously to the charter capital and paid-in capital of the VEB in the 
period 2007–11. The VEB’s equity attributable to the Russian government for the year 2012 
equalled RUB 531,177bn (approx. US$14.8bn). In order to ensure an appropriate resource 
base to fund its activities, the VEB also relies on other sources of finance. More specifically, 
in addition to traditional borrowing from other banks, the VEB can raise funds through 
placement of debt securities in the domestic and foreign capital markets, including 
Eurobonds, for a term of not less than one-year maturity. 
The total amount of financial resources gathered in the capital market steadily increased year 
by year during the 2007–13 period, reaching RUB 527.8bn (approx. US$14.7bn) in 2012, of 
which almost 76 per cent have over five-year maturity. Financial resources gathered in 2011 
amounted to about RUB 400bn (approx. US$11.2bn), of which 72 per cent had maturity of 
over five years. 
Borrowing from other international financing institutions represents the main source of 
funding for the VEB. Recently, the bank has been particularity active in signing 19 individual 
loan agreements, including agreements with China, the US and Europe. With the China 
Development Bank, the VEB signed an agreement of US$1.43bn (with maturity of 14 years) 
to finance a project for the construction of Taishet aluminium plant in the Irkutsk Region (the 
biggest bilateral deal in 2012) (Vneshekonombank 2013: 48). 
                                               
33 Borrower concentration is measured as the ratio between the amount of the three biggest borrowers and gross loans.  
34 Portfolio of loans extended by the VEB to non-credit institutions, public executive bodies and municipalities for investment 
projects and export support, excluding loans extended using the funds of the Central Bank and the National Wealth Fund. 
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As a rule, funds obtained through bilateral agreements are bound to the realisation of specific 
investments, or destined to specific beneficiaries, i.e. SMEs. During 2012, the total amount of 
funds obtained through bilateral agreements amount to the equivalent of RUB 65.7bn to be 
destined to specific interventions (Vneshekonombank 2012). 
5.11 Instruments deployed 
The bank combines a wide range of financial instruments: 
a. Loans: comprising a series of traditional financing products ranging from commercial 
loans, to project finance, pre-export finance, claims under letters of credit, etc. These 
items count for almost half of the VEB’s total assets (Vnesheconombank 2012). 
b. Guarantees and securities: mostly deployed for: (i) supporting large investment 
projects, or exports, (ii) supporting exports by guaranteeing exporters’ obligations to 
foreign buyers, (iii) supporting businesses willing to invest in the Russian Federation 
c. Participation on equity: the bank also provides financial support by purchasing 
shares, particular bonds and other kinds of financing participation instruments in the 
equity of investment projects, under a pay-back period of over five years, and for 
financing amounts of over RUB 2bn. 
d. Leasing transactions: in favour of either investment projects or SMEs. 
The VEB provides the following types of assistance: 
 Commercial loans: the most important financial instruments for investment projects 
reaching RUB 746.33bn (approx. US$20.9) at the end of 2012 
 Loans to SMEs: supporting SMEs’ needs for capital 
 Project finance: for the implementation of large infrastructural or energy projects 
through the acquisition of shares/participation on equity or bonds. For these 
operations, the VEB uses a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose core activity is the 
realisation and management of the project over a long period. As a rule, the project 
and cash flows deriving from it once it is fully operative constitute the only guarantee 
for loan payback. Project finance is the second most deployed instrument following 
commercial loans 
 Export finance: includes: export credits to foreign banks and non-banking 
institutions, pre-export financing of manufactured products to be delivered to foreign 
markets, guaranteed support for Russian high-tech exporters (worth approximately 
US$7bn for the 2007–13 period). As at 31 December 2013, the export finance 
portfolio amounted to approximately US$3.7bn (Vneshekonombank 2013). 
5.12 Financing terms 
As a general rule, the VEB offers credits and guarantees for projects with payback periods 
exceeding five years and for a total value higher than RUB 2bn. As stated in the 
Memorandum of the Bank’s Financial Policies, the VEB complies with the following rules. 
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Box 5.1 The SME Programme 
Financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has entered the strategic priorities 
of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development which launched a public SME development 
programme, managed by a specialised development bank – the SME Bank – fully owned by the 
VEB. This VEB subsidiary provides loans at preferential terms through a network of partner banks 
to which the SMEs apply for funding. The SME Bank has had 247 partner banks and 202 partner 
organisations since the start of the programme, and has offered them funds containing a subsidy 
element and subject to capped interest rates. This financial support is intended to promote 
investments for the modernisation of production facilities or the creation of technological 
innovations. While SME Bank-funded enterprises still only make up about 1.5 per cent of the total 
banking sector, the SME Bank’s portfolio has experienced a sharp increase, growing by over 120 
per cent in 2011 (IPC GmbH 2013). 
Table 5.3 Details of the VEB’s SME programme 
Size RUB 98.59bn (approx. US$2.7bn) the total amount of support 
provided to SMEs (as at 1st quarter 2014) 
Sector focus Manufacturing sector, innovation-driven SMEs, entrepreneurs in 
regions with a difficult socioeconomic situation 
Geographical focus 82 regions of the Russian Federation 
Terms of lending 12.7% is the average rate on the portfolio loans; 65% of the loans 
with a maturity up to one year, 20% from 1 to 3 years, 15% over 3 
years.  
Source: IPC GMbH (2013). 
Table 5.4 Rules governing the VEB’s credits and guarantees  
Financial 
instrument 
Beneficiary Pay-back 
period 
Project total 
value 
Amount 
Extending credits or 
loans 
Investment projects aimed at 
developing infrastructure and 
implementing innovation projects 
5 years or 
more 
No less than 
RUB 2bn 
More than 
Rub 1bn 
Credit institution and legal entity 
which provide financial support to 
small and medium sized enterprises 
More than 2 
years 
 Less than 
Rub 1.5m 
Issuing or (and) 
extending guarantees 
and sureties 
Industrial production exporting 
companies and Opened Joint Stock 
Company35 
n/a  Less than 
30% of the 
total value 
exported 
Extending credit and 
providing guarantees 
and sureties 
Organisations engaged in 
implementing state defence orders 
and targeted federal programmes in 
defence and security 
Does not 
apply the 
general rules 
 Does not 
apply the 
general rules 
Participation in the 
capital, through 
shares or other 
instruments 
Investment projects aimed at 
developing infrastructure and 
implementing innovation projects. 
5 years or 
more 
No less than 
RUB 2bn 
More than 
RUB 1bn 
Source: Government of the Russian Federation (2007). 
                                               
35 A company established by the VEB which arranges insurance for export credits and investments against entrepreneur and 
political risk.  
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Figure 5.3 Loans to customers (by maturity) (as at 31 December 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Vnesheconombank (2012: 22). 
5.13 Conditionality 
The Memorandum on the financial policies of the VEB clearly defines ‘the core business and 
indicators of investment and financial activity’ of the bank, restricting its operations from a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective. As a result, investment projects should fulfil several 
requirements to be eligible for support. Needless to say, such limitations in the VEB’s 
mandate reflect its mission and strategy. 
In particular, the projects are subject to sector restrictions. Only investment projects in the 
pre-established sectors (see Section 5.7) are considered. This restriction can be understood 
in terms of the Russian economy’s high dependence on raw materials, from which derives 
the need to diversify the economy and foster new drivers for competitiveness. For this 
reason, oil projects, for example, are not supported. 
Moreover, investments are subject to size restrictions. Indeed, only projects with a total cost 
of more than RUB 2bn are considered for financing support. In the same way, the minimum 
participation share of the VEB in each operation amounts to half of the total investment value 
or RUB 1bn. 
Another restriction regards the ownership, provenance and situation of projects. Companies 
receiving financial support from the VEB should be owned or controlled by Russian 
companies. Investment projects are generally located within the Russian Federation. 
5.14 Environmental and social policies and practices 
Social responsibility has gained special attention in the VEB’s operations. As a matter of fact, 
the VEB’s Board has adopted a corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy for the period 
2012–15. According to the strategy document, CSR is an integral part of all the banks 
activities rather than a separate business line. This implies that the VEB is fully responsible 
for the social and environmental impact resulting from its decisions. By adopting a 
sustainability approach, the bank is expected to contribute to (Vnesheconombank 2012): 
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 increasing the bank’s contribution to social, economic, and environmental 
sustainability 
 raising the efficiency of managing the social and environmental impacts of the bank’s 
activities 
 developing the system of corporate governance 
 improving the management quality of nonfinancial risks 
 making the bank more attractive to investors 
 positioning the bank as a modern development institution of international significance 
 promoting stakeholder relations and increasing stakeholders’ confidence in the bank 
 building up corporate culture and enhancing employee loyalty towards the bank 
 promoting corporate social responsibility in the business community. 
In 2012, the VEB adopted guidelines for evaluating the social and economic impact of all of 
activities conducted with the bank’s support. 
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Annex 1 Summary of results 
 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Mandate To provide medium- to 
long-term financing for the 
development of a robust 
economy and a healthy, 
prosperous community 
To foster sustainable and 
competitive development in 
the Brazilian economy, 
generating employment, 
while reducing social and 
regional inequalities 
To enhance exports and to 
integrate the country’s 
foreign trade and 
investment with overall 
economic growth 
To contribute to 
development by providing 
finance and expertise to 
improve the quality of life 
of the people of southern 
Africa mainly through the 
provision of infrastructure 
To fund major investment 
projects aimed at removing 
economic growth 
infrastructure restrictions 
Strategy  Countercyclical lender 
 Domestic strategy: CDB 
has used Local 
Government Financing 
Vehicles (LGFVs) – 
companies set up by 
local governments – to 
finance infrastructure 
development through 
low interest asset-
backed loans. 
 International Strategy: 
CDB engaged in cross-
border energy and 
natural resources deals 
to implement the 
national government’s 
‘going global’ strategy, 
thus financing the 
expansion of Chinese 
firms abroad and 
securing long-term 
access to natural 
resources for China 
 Countercyclical lender 
 Since the 1990s a 
founding agent 
promoting the 
internalisation of 
Brazilian companies 
 Financial support to 
large companies 
 Not a countercyclical 
lender 
 Promotes India’s 
political, economic and 
commercial interests: 
through lines of credit 
(LOCs) extended to 
overseas governments, 
Indian companies to 
gain access to overseas 
markets, and to foster 
Indian investment 
abroad 
 LOCs extended to 
African governments 
seem to have focused 
on oil-rich nations 
 Not a countercyclical 
lender 
 Pursues financial 
sustainability 
 The bulk of DBSA 
activities have been in 
support of municipalities. 
DBSA operates as: 
 ‘financier’ as it 
contributes to the 
delivery of basic 
services and the 
promotion of economic 
growth through 
infrastructure financing 
 ‘adviser’ – i.e. it builds 
institutional, financial 
and knowledge capacity 
for development 
 ‘partner’ – working 
together with private, 
public and community 
stakeholders 
 Countercyclical lender 
 Participates in funding 
investment projects 
aimed at modernising 
mono-cities 
 Provides support for 
small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
 Supports Russian 
exporters in world 
markets 
 Assists in raising direct 
foreign investments for 
Russia 
(Cont’d) 
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Annex 1 (cont’d) 
 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Size      
 Equity US$79.8bn US$24.9bn US$1.06bn US$1.5bn US$17.2bn 
Assets US$1,205bn US$329bn US$10.9bn US$5.1bn US$95bn 
Profits US$10.2bn US$3.6bn US$179.6m US$78.2m US$ 0.566m 
NPL 0.30% 0.14% 1.46% 7.30% – 
ROA 0.92% 0.46% 1.13% -1.60% 0.0059% 
ROE 13.37% 6.96% – -4.80% 0.032% 
Main funding 
sources 
The main source of funds 
is the low-interest bonds 
with long-term maturities 
up to 30 years purchased 
by national commercial 
banks. Since 2000, CDB 
has also been selling in the 
international bond market. 
 1/3 from FAT/PIS-
PASEP (workers' 
assistance fund) 
 1/2 from National 
Treasury 
 Fundraising abroad only 
3.3% 
BNDES borrows from the 
government at TJLP rate 
(subsidised rate now equal 
to 5%) 
 Market borrowing is the 
main source – equal to 
84% 
 Exim India also borrows 
from the Reserve Bank 
of India and from the 
Indian government 
 Debt securities – 
approx. US$2.4bn 
 LOCs credit – approx. 
US$960m 
 Capital authorised –
approx. US$476m 
 Russian government 
(equity attributable to it 
approx. US$14.8bn). 
 Borrowing from other 
banks, debt securities in 
the domestic and foreign 
capital markets (approx. 
US$14.7bn of funds 
raised in 2012, of which 
almost 76% have over 
five-year maturity). 
(Cont’d) 
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Annex 1 (cont’d) 
 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Instruments  Asset-backed loans (e.g. 
land-backed) 
 Energy-backed loans 
 Loans and LOCs to 
support Chinese state-
owned enterprises 
‘going global’ 
 Equity funds 
 Financing (e.g. project 
finance, export credits, 
etc.) 
 Non-reimbursable 
resources (e.g. grants to 
the Amazon Fund, etc.) 
 Subscription of 
securities: (e.g. 
subscription of shares, 
debentures, mutual fund 
shares and other 
securities to support 
publicly-listed and 
private companies like 
Petrobras, Vale, 
Odebrecht) 
 Main instruments used 
are LOCs 
 Financial: 
lending/investment, 
guarantees, grants; 
 Non-financial products 
and services: advisory 
services – e.g. 
preliminary project 
assessments, technical 
assistance and capacity 
building, research 
 Commercial loans 
 Loans to SMEs 
 Project finance 
 Export finance 
(Cont’d) 
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 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Terms of 
lending 
 Long terms (up to 20 
years) 
 Commercial interest 
rates (no concessional 
rates) 
 Off-taker agreements – 
i.e. the obligation to buy 
Chinese goods 
correspondent to a 
certain percentage of 
the loan received (e.g. 
60% of the loan amount 
in the case of Ghana) 
 Long terms 
 1997–2007 30% was 
concessionary credit 
 Local content 
conditionality 
 Direct operations: 
financing cost (TJLP) + 
BNDES fee + risk 
premium = interest rate 
 Indirect operations: 
financing cost (TJLP) + 
BNDES fee + financial 
intermediation tax + 
financial institution 
spread = interest rate 
 No political and/or 
environmental 
conditionality attached to 
LOCs 
 80–85% of goods and 
services procured for the 
realisation of the 
financed project is 
purchased from Indian 
companies 
Terms depend on the 
country class. 
 HIPC interest rate = 
1.75% (fixed); maturity = 
20; grace period = 5 
years; grant element = 
41.25% 
 LIHD interest rate = 
LIBOR+0.5% (floating); 
maturity = 15; grace 
period = 5 years; grant 
element = 35.11% 
 MILD interest rate = 
LIBOR+0.5% (floating); 
maturity = 8–10; grace 
period = 2–3 years; 
grant element = 17.11–
24.56% 
 MIHD interest rate = 
LIBOR+0.5% (floating); 
maturity = 12; grace 
period = 4 years; grant 
element = 28.75% 
 Environmental 
conditionality applies to 
all projects funded by 
the DBSA. 
 Maturity up to 20 years if 
debt is issued in rand, 
up to ten years for US$ 
and € 
 Grace period during 
construction 
 Single obligor limits 
(10%) 
Credits and guarantees for 
projects payback periods 
generally exceeds 5 years 
(88%) and for a total value 
higher than RUB 2bn. 
(Cont’d) 
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 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Sector 
allocation 
The first three sectors are: 
 Public infrastructure 
(20.6%) 
 Roads (17.2%) 
 Power (energy and 
natural resources) 
(11.4%) 
Share of disbursements: 
 Industry 30% 
 Infrastructure 33% 
 Agribusiness 10% 
 Trade and services 27% 
BNDES corporate shares: 
 Oil and gas 47.4% 
 Electric energy 10.9% 
 Mining 19.8% 
BNDES offers large 
support to the renewable 
energy sector (e.g. 
biofuels, hydroelectric 
energy) 
The first three sectors are: 
 Ferrous metal and metal 
processing (10.41%) 
 Engineering, 
procurement and 
construction (EPC) 
services (9.41%) 
 Textiles and garments 
(8.06%) 
The first three sectors are: 
 Transportation (34%) 
 Energy (28%) 
 Financial services (15%) 
VEB sector exposure: 
 Infrastructure (37%) 
 Industry (50%) 
 Agro-industrial projects 
(11%) 
The majority of VEB’s 
investments in 
modernisation projects 
focused on increasing 
energy power efficiency 
(Cont’d) 
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 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Country 
allocation 
Geographic allocation of 
CDB funds: 
Domestic operations: 
 Eastern China 46.10% 
 Central China 17.02% 
 Western China 20.85% 
 Overseas 16.03% 
External operations: 
 Loans to Africa 
US$13.7bn as of July 
2012 
 Loans to Latin American 
countries from 2005–11 
US$62bn 
 Reported loans to 
Russia and Central Asia 
US$28bn 
International operations: 
Earlier engagement in 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) than in 
Africa 
 2000–10 US$3.6bn to 
LAC of which 49.2% to 
Argentina and 19.8% to 
Venezuela 
 In Africa BNDES has 
engaged prevalently in 
energy, mining, 
construction, 
infrastructures; Brazilian 
companies operating in 
Angola, Mozambique 
and South Africa 
received most of 
BNDES financing. 
Domestic operations: 
Nearly half of 
disbursements goes to the 
south-eastern region of the 
country. 
 Africa received 59% of 
LOCs in 2013 
 Asia received 36% of 
LOCs in 2013 
 LAC countries received 
2% of LOCs in 2013 
 Target countries in 
Africa: Burundi, 
Mozambique, West 
Africa, ECOWAS, Mali, 
Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Zambia, 
Chad, DRC, Republic of 
Congo, Central African 
Republic 
 Target countries in Asia: 
Nepal, Maldives, Sri 
Lanka, Mongolia 
 Target Latin American 
countries: Colombia, 
Corporacion Andina de 
Fomento (Andean 
Development 
Corporation) (covering 
Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela), Brazil, 
Trinidad & Tobago, 
Honduras, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Suriname 
 Almost 75% of its 
budget goes to domestic 
operations 
 approx. 25% of funding 
goes to infrastructure 
projects in other SADC 
countries 
 VEB operates within the 
Russian Federation 
territory 
(Cont’d) 
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 CDB BNDES EXIM INDIA DBSA VEB 
Environmental/
social policies 
 Environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) 
required to all loan 
applications 
 Not a signatory to the 
Equator Principles 
 CDB environmental 
assessment is 
undertaken along the 
whole loan cycle and is 
structured around two 
phases – pre- and post-
lending 
 EIA required (but there 
is not an independent 
evaluation when 
producing the EIAs) 
 Not a signatory of the 
Equator Principles 
 2008 – BNDES signed a 
‘green protocol’ with the 
Ministry of Environment 
 2009 – created an 
environmental division 
 Manages the Amazon 
Fund and the Climate 
Fund 
 No information available 
 Not a signatory of the 
Equator Principles 
 Exim India manages the 
funds coming from the 
European Investment 
Bank (EIB) to be 
devoted to climate 
change mitigation 
projects 
 DBSA will not provide 
funding for projects 
having a high 
environmental risk even 
after mitigation. 
 Environmental appraisal 
is an integral part of 
project assessment and 
approval throughout all 
phases of the project 
cycle (i.e. project 
screening, site visit, 
environmental impact 
assessment, project 
implementation, 
monitoring, completion 
and evaluation). 
 No information available 
 In 2012 VEB adopted 
guidelines for evaluating 
the social and economic 
impact of financed 
projects. 
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